

THE 5th COMMON
SECURITY AND
DEFENCE POLICY
OLYMPIAD

DUBROVNIK 2020



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EUROPEAN
INITIATIVE FOR
THE EXCHANGE
OF YOUNG
OFFICERS
INSPIRED
BY ERASMUS



CROATIAN DEFENCE
ACADEMY
"Dr. Franjo Tuđman"



EUROPEAN
SECURITY AND
DEFENCE
COLLEGE

The 5th common
security and defence policy
OLYMPIADA

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Speech by Colonel-General Mate Pađen - Commander of the Dr Franjo Tuđman Croatian Defense Academy during the winners 'ceremony for the 5th Common Security and Defense Policy Olympiad



Ladies and gentlemen,

It is my great honor to welcome you in Croatia and the Croatian Defence Academy.

At this occasion I would like to emphasize that in the development of European standards of professional military education, process of rising quality and broadening of space dominated by European values, one of the key places is reserved for the European initiative for the exchange of young officers inspired by Erasmus (or in other words: "Military Erasmus" or "EMILYO"), which was launched in 2008. Thirteen years later we are witnessing that an initiative led by a group of enthusiasts has grown into a real European project that encompasses the best that Europe can offer in the field of military science and education.

Although it is usually pointed out that the goal of this initiative is to harmonize the basic military education of European officers and raise the level of interoperability which improves European security, in my opinion, the real goals of the initiative are in the values that connect us, in increasing trust and transparency between the states and in states between the armed forces and society.

Croatian Defence Academy entered this initiative relatively late, in 2018, but led by the enthusiasm of its officers and cadets, and the help provided by the Implementation Group led by Colonel Harald Gell, we have shown commitment to the goals of the Initiative and willingness to participate in the activities conducted under the umbrella of the Initiative. Hosting a CSDP Olympiad is an expression of that commitment.

Through the organization of the Olympiad we saw an opportunity, that in the activity which represents the essence of the European spirit of unity, to show how much our Croatian identity is woven into a common European identity.

The planned venue of the residential phase of the competition - Dubrovnik, was not chosen by chance. Dubrovnik is not only a European and world top tourist destination, but also a symbol of Croatian and European spirit and prosperity. One word proudly stands out on all the symbols of the city of Dubrovnik - LIBERTAS,

which means FREEDOM. There is nothing that Dubrovnik, Croatia, but also Europe as a whole, values more than freedom. And our fundamental mission, as soldiers, is to preserve and defend freedom. So, the military academies through education give us the necessary skills and tools to carry out that mission.

I must emphasize my satisfaction that we were given the opportunity to be part of this successful and valuable story - CSDP Olympiad, but also my regret that it was not possible, due to the pandemic, to organize in the way we planned - in Dubrovnik.

At the end I want to point out that the Croatian Defence Academy, that is, the University of Security and Defence, which is in the process of being created on the foundations of the Croatian Defence Academy, will continue its path within Military Erasmus and intensify activities in this large, growing, European family of military educational institutions.

I would like to thank all the cadets that participated on the 5th CSDP Olympiad, and especially the winners that are today with us. Let your focus on European values, your work, knowledge and commitment that you have shown in this competition follow you throughout your career. Good luck to everyone and I hope that we will see each other on the 6th CSDP Olympiad in France or soon on some activity of Military Erasmus in Croatia.

In the end I would like to thank everyone who put an effort in the realization of this activity and I wish you a safe trip home.

Speech by Colonel Assoc. Prof. Harald GELL, PhD, MSc, MSD, MBA – Chairman of the Military Erasmus (EMILYO) Implementation Group during the winners' ceremony for the 5th Common Security and Defence Policy Olympiad



Dear General, dear Colonels, dear Officers, dear Officer Cadets, Ladies and Gentlemen!

Once Baron Pierre de Coubertin, the founder of the Olympic Games of modern times, said: "The most important part in life is not the victory – it is the fight. The most important part in life is not to win – but doing well. To spread this rule means – you make human kind braver and stronger – on the one hand and on the other hand – you make human kind more noble-minded and more sensitive."

This is exactly what the CSDP Olympiad and the elaborations of the Implementation Group are about. According to a clear order and mandate, issued by all European Union Ministers of Defence in 2008 – later, when Croatia joined the European Union in 2013 this order was also adopted by your country – the Military Erasmus – or EMILYO – Implementation Group has to facilitate exchanges among young European Officer Cadets. The overall goals are: increase interoperability, harmonise the European Union basic officer education and thus, promote a European security and defence culture.

The last point means that all European future leaders – independently which EU country they are from – see the threats and challenges of other member states as the own ones. For example, if you talk to people from Southern Europe the refugee threat is immanent; if you talk to people from Eastern Europe, the threat from the East is immanent. To sensitise Officer Cadets from e.g. Ireland, who are most probably not that touched by the threats mentioned before, the Implementation Group organises exchanges – such as the CSDP Olympiad – not only to discuss these threats but also to "feel" it by travelling to other countries receiving common education.

From the very beginning the Implementation Group agreed with NATO that different avenues of approach for the basic officer education will be done by EU structures and advanced officer training will be in the hands of NATO – to avoid duplications, to avoid similar structures and to save money, since most of the EU countries are members of NATO as well and vice-versa.

The history of the CSDP Olympiad started in Paphos/Cyprus in 2012, introduced by LtCol Zambas, a former training manager of the European Security and Defence College. Since then, this biennial event has been linked to the country, which holds the Presidency of the Council of the European Union. One of the reasons for this link is the financial aspect, because you may get support during this period.

In 2014 the 2nd CSDP Olympiad was conducted in Athens/Greece, in 2016 at the Armed Forces Academy in Liptovsky Mikulas/Slovakia, in 2018 at the National Military University in Veliko Tarnovo/Bulgaria and finally in 2020 the 5th CSDP Olympiad was foreseen to be conducted at the Dr. Franjo Tuđman Croatian Defence Academy in Dubrovnik. But unfortunately the Corona pandemic was the show-stopper for this wonderful location, which was already proposed by Col Domjancic Stjepan – who did all the preparatory work – to the Implementation Group in 2018.

In spite of the pandemic, CDA tried several times to organise a residential phase, several times we all postponed the event, but – because the first steps for the 6th CSDP Olympiad 2022 had to be initiated and to avoid overlapping competitions – we decided in February this year to cancel the residential phase and to count the work, which has been done until then, as the final result and to organise a winners' ceremony in Croatia at least.

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to the Dr. Franjo Tuđman Croatian Defence Academy for organising this event,

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to all the organisational personnel involved in this event,

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to all the Officer Cadets for their work,

and I would like to congratulate all the winners.

Thank you.

Speech for the 5th CSDP-Olympiade in ZAGREB/ CROATIA by Nikolaus Pachucki-Bammer



Dear General, Colonels, Ladies and Gentlemen, colleagues!

I am very honored by your award and the opportunity to address you. Thank you for your invitation to this historical and nice place and the chance to come together during these challenging times.

30 years ago, your country declared independence from Yugoslavia together with Slovenia. Ten years of war in Europe followed and showed the world and the international community, that peace and freedom are fragile values. In addition, the European Union learned hardly how important a common security and defense policy is in a multipolar world, and that cooperation is the answer to current and upcoming crisis. Since then, many steps have been taken. Among these for instance the integration of our eastern European neighbors and partners and the implementation of major crises management missions and operations.

In the last years, CSDP set some important milestones, as there are:

- The Global Strategy and its implementation plan*
- The Permanent Structured Cooperation PESCO, and*
- The last Cyber Security Strategy in winter 2020.*

Of course, all these things stepped behind during the last sixteen months. COVID-19 became a challenge for the whole society. The health sector, public transport, the educational system, law enforcement, the public administration and last but not least the armed forces: All sectors had and still have to fulfill their mission to fight the virus and to establish a safe and secure - and livable environment. Again, cooperation is the key. Cooperation within our nations and between our countries within the European Union. As young military leaders, we have to be clear of our role in society and for the security of our peoples. As I learned yesterday – and I am very thankful for this experience – our young colleagues are aware and mentally prepared to fulfill this role. Cooperation starts right here among us, connects our institutions and countries and makes Europe a safer and better place. We are able to learn from each other and this experience makes us more resilient for the crisis of the future, whatever they may be: Terror, black out, climate change – we are prepared!

Finally, let me take the opportunity to say thank you to Colonel Dominacic and Colonel Gell, who made this possible and who are an inspiration for a successful teamwork and friendship, which also works in challenging times. This shows us young officers and officer's candidates, that a common understanding to solve problems is important to reach our goals. Only together we are able to solve the problems of the future.

Thank you for your warm welcome, all the best and good luck!



European Initiative for the exchange of young officers inspired by Erasmus

Implementation Group

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Brussels & Wiener Neustadt, the 29th of February, 2020

Results of the 5th CSDP Olympiad

Dubrovnik – Croatian Defence Academy, Croatia


1) Cover Page competition:

Remark: Out of 7 proposals – by accident – pairs were created. Those proposals, which received more votes (by 75 IG members), succeeded to reach the next round, as long as the best proposal was determined.

Place	Name	Country	Institution
1	OCdt KERN Alexander	AT	TMA
2	OCdt KODORI	HU	NUPS
3	OCdt CORRADO	IT	SAMS
	OCdt PANIC (proposal 1)	GR	HAFA
	OCdt PANIC (proposal 2)	GR	HAFA
	OCdt PANIC (proposal 3)	GR	HAFA
	OCdt SZABOLCS	HU	NUPS



1



2



3



2) Results of the essays (essay-points before the residential phase):

Place	Points	Name	Country
1	95.50	PACHUCKI-BAMMER Nikolaus	AT
2	94.00	ZERZER Tinja	AT
3	93.00	OBOROCEANU Șerban-Ionuț	RO
4	91.00	SZILÁGYI Laura	HU
5	89.50	MESIĆ Luka	HR
	89.50	SCHROÉ Evelyne	BE
7	88.00	GONÇALVES Miguel	PT
	88.00	RAPPOLD Jonathan	AT
9	87.75	SZYMAŃSKI Bartłomiej	PL
10	87.50	MACCHIONE Luigi	IT
11	86.50	KODORI Jozsef	HU
12	86.00	NTELLIS Spyridon	GR
	86.00	WIJNANTS Viktor	BE
14	82.50	GERVAIS Lea	FR
15	81.00	UHLIAROVÁ Simona	SK
16	77.25	KOWAL Wiktor	PL
	77.25	LOIUDICE Carlo	IT
18	76.75	TINHOF Peter	AT
19	76.50	GEORGIEV Petar	BG
20	76.00	SZABOLCS Viktoria Laura	HU
21	75.00	SZCZEGIELNIAK Aleksandra	PL
22	73.00	VOICU Petronel-Dragoș	RO
23	71.25	GINCHEV Dimitar	BG
	71.25	MARTÍN PÉREZ Pablo	ES
25	70.00	PISKALSKI Iliyan	BG
26	68.75	CORRADO Mariano Benito	IT
27	68.50	CORRAL ROZALEM Eduardo	ES
28	66.75	BOISSEL Thomas	FR
29	64.50	MUÑOZ IBAÑEZ Mario Pablo	ES
30	63.50	GOMES Diogo	PT
31	58.00	PAPAGEORGIU Eleftherios	GR
32	57.00	FODOR Mark Jozzipovics	HU
33	55.50	LITVIN Dominik	SK
	55.50	TURCZYŃSKI Radosław	PL
35	54.50	HANNI Charalambos	CY
36	50.83	STAMATIOU Bakatselos	GR
37	45.50	THEUNISSEN Robert	BE
38	34.50	KRASTEV Nikolay	BG
39	32.00	HOCKICKO Kristian	SK
40	16.50	NATALIA Michail	CY



The Context between “strategic Autonomy” and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)

Officer Cadet Nikolaus Pachucki-Bammer
Student of the Theresan Military Academy, Austria

Abstract

The European integration process is a very successful story. It realises the idea of peace, prosperity and stability on the European continent for half a billion people from 28 countries. It guaranteed peace between historical enemies for more than 70 years since the end of the 2nd World War. Nevertheless, the European Union (EU) must face new challenges and threats in a multi-polar world. In order to further develop the Union, the EU Member States (EU MS) agreed on the EU Global Strategy and on the concept of “strategic autonomy”. The goal was to create a more responsible, capable and “powerful” EU. Since then, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the EU made some major steps forward and a lot of research on these steps was done. However, the question on the context between the CSDP and “strategic autonomy” was not answered yet.

In this essay the author wants to answer this key question. At the beginning, this paper describes the history of the CSDP and the implementation of the EU Global Strategy. Furthermore, it answers the question of the preconditions of “strategic autonomy”, the content of “strategic autonomy” and the goals of the CSDP. At the end, the author answers the key question by combining and discussing the different answers to the supplemental questions. A chart of the context of “strategic autonomy” supports the presentation of the author’s double meaning of “strategic autonomy”.

The methodical approach of this essay is the author-based interpretation, also known as hermeneutics. It is based on an intense study of different sources such as EU documents and factsheets, books and academic articles from online journals and the internet.

Keywords

CSDP, EU, Global Strategy, PESCO, strategic autonomy.

1. Preface

In 2019 the European Union has among others to deal with five challenges: The migration crises, the war in the Ukraine, the Islamic terror, China on the way to West with the initiative “one belt, one road”¹ and the BREXIT. The Common Security Defence Policy (CSDP) of the European Union (EU) and the concept of “strategic autonomy” is an answer to this.

As an Austrian soldier and Officer Cadet of the Theresan Military Academy, the author has been confronted with many issues of the CSDP of the EU. As a citizen and interested observer of a challenging world the author has a personal interest in this topic and believes very hard, that Europe needs a strong Common Security and Defence Policy. This includes the necessity of independence from other powers in a globalised world.

The topic was chosen to improve the author’s knowledge on CSDP and to answer personal questions on the importance and the context of a “strategic autonomy” for the European Union (EU).

Furthermore, the author would like to take this opportunity to wright a word of thanks to Col Assoc. Prof. Harald Gell, PhD, head of the international office of the Theresan Military Academy and Dr. Rastislav Bachora, a junior researcher of the Directorate for Security Policy in the Austrian Ministry of Defence for their support in authoring this essay.

2. Introduction

For one decade the European Union is more or less in a crisis mode. Due to different reasons, Europe is not only confronted with economic and financial challenges, Europe faces some serious threats for its security as well. In 2008 the breakdown of Lehman Brothers and the invasion of Georgia by Russian troops marked the beginning of a century of instability.²

Today the EU, a common political and economic space of 500 million people, looks back to recent or on-going threats and challenges. The significant ones are listed hereinafter:

- The Arab Spring.
- The war in Libya.
- The migration crisis of 2015.
- The ongoing wars in Ukraine and in Syria.
- The ongoing tensions and armed conflicts in the Middle East, in North-Africa, and in Central-Asia.

In all these regions the EU as such or its Member States are engaged or play a major role.³

One major step was the implementation of the Global Strategy of the EU in 2016.⁴ Additionally, it was of course one answer to improve the security and resilience of the EU. The Union should be able

1 Remark of the author: One belt, one road summarises projects and initiatives of China in Central Asia, the Middle East and Eastern Europe in order to improve Chinas influence and power along the former silk road.

2 Cf.: M. Leonhard. (2017). Ein postamerikanisches Europa. In: BMLVS/ Direktion für Sicherheitspolitik. Sicher. Und Morgen? Sicherheitspolitische Jahresvorschau 2018. Translated into English the title means: A post American Europe. In: Secure. And tomorrow? Annual Security Policy Forecast 2018. Vienna. P. 52-55.

3 Cf.: Homepage of European External Action Service (EEAS). Page of EU missions and operations. URL: [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/430/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations_en.\[7-10-19\]](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/430/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations_en.[7-10-19]).

4 Cf.: EEAS (2016). Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy. Brussels. P. 9-10.

to defend its unprecedented security, democracy and prosperity⁵ and to share these values with its neighbours and partners. In order to do so, the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) says: “An appropriate level of ambition and strategic autonomy is important for Europe’s ability to promote peace and security within and beyond its borders.”⁶

The following pages should show how the EU is forming an independent security policy. In a way it could be shown, how “strategic autonomy” comes to live in the context of the Common Security and the Defence Policy of the EU. At the beginning the author explains what does “strategic autonomy” mean in general?

Autonomy is very often understood as independence, as the Oxford Dictionary states.⁷ In addition it is defined as “the ability to act and make decisions without being controlled by anyone else”.⁸

Strategy, on the other hand, has its origin in the antique Greece and is – among others – still understood as general ship.⁹ In a more modern manner it can be defined as: “A plan of action designed to achieve a long-term or overall aim.”¹⁰

In order to answer the research questions properly, the author defines “strategic autonomy” as follows: The ability for the EU to act and make decisions independently in order to achieve common long-term purposes including the process of planning and the execution of actions.¹¹

On the following pages the author also shows that this definition will very well meet the understanding of the EU, including the military aspect of the concept “strategic autonomy”.

3. Current State of Research

In this chapter the author wants to describe the current state of developments and research, especially in the fields of the Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU. During the research for this paper a lot of information provided by EU’s official bodies could be found. In order to give the reader an overview on this topic the three most relevant subjects will be presented below.

One major problem during the work on this essay was the source of information. Most of the sources are political ones, as the European External Action Service (EEAS), the Commission of the EU, or linked to European or western politics, as there are e.g. the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) or the Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael. Therefore, a critical processing of the information was important.¹²

3.1 The Development of the CSDP

The history of the CSDP is very well reflected in today’s sciences. Nevertheless, a short view is important for the understanding of the CSDP today.

5 Cf.: Ibid. P. 9.

6 Ibid.

7 Cf.: Homepage of Oxford Dictionary. URL.: <https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/autonomy?q=autonomy>. [3-11-19].

8 Ibid.

9 Cf.: Homepage of Online Oxford Lexicon. URL: <https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/strategy>. [3-11-19].

10 Ibid.

11 Definition by the author.

12 Assessment by the author.

From the very beginning, the European integration process included the idea of a kind of a European Defence architecture. After the catastrophic World War II, the main idea was to ensure peace between France and Germany and to defend Europe against the threat from the Soviet Union and its allies. Due to these reasons strategic resources should be under supranational control and new technologies, such as nuclear power, should be used for common peaceful means. The foundation of the European Steel and Coal Community in 1951 and the establishment of the European Atomic Energy Community in 1957 were first results of this policy.¹³ Since then several important steps followed:

- 1954: Modified Brussels Treaty and creation of the Western European Union (WEU).
- 1957: Treaties of Rome.
- 1969: Davignon Report introducing the concept of a closer European Political Cooperation.
- 1975: Helsinki Final Act.
- 1992: Signing Maastricht Treaty and implementing the Common Foreign and Security Policy as one of three pillars of the EU.
- 1997: Signing Amsterdam Treaty integrating the Petersberg Tasks from the WEU.
- 1999: Council Meeting formulating the Helsinki Headline Goals on military capacities.
- 2003: First CSDP missions and operations, adoption of the European Security Strategy and of the Berlin Plus Arrangements between NATO and the EU.
- 2004: Headline Goals 2010.
- 2009: Implementation of Lisbon Treaty including the idea of European solidarity.¹⁴

All these events followed the idea of “an ever-closer union” and led to a new strategy paper: The Global Strategy of the EU.¹⁵

3.2 The Global Strategy of the EU and current Developments

In 2016 the EU implemented the Global Strategy as an answer to challenges and threats of the 21st century.¹⁶ This step was the logical consequence from the political integration process of the EU since the entry of force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. Additionally, the stronger importance of the Common Security and Defence Policy includes the idea of solidarity and a collective defence.¹⁷ The title of the EUGS “Shared Vision, Common Action: A stronger Europe” makes clear that the EU is currently in a longer lasting process in order to enhance European politics, and to improve structures and instruments of the EU.¹⁸ In its conclusion the EUGS states clearly: “*We must now swiftly translate this vision into action.*”¹⁹ Very soon after publishing the European Global Strategy some major steps followed. These steps were:

- Agreement on an Implementation Plan of the EUGS.²⁰
- Agreement on a common level of ambition.²¹

13 Cf.: Rehl, J. (2017). Handbook CSDP. The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union. Vienna. Armed Forces Printing Centre. Volume 1. 3rd edition. P. 16-17.

14 Cf.: Ibid. P. 19.

15 Cf.: Homepage of the Council of the EU. Page Library. URL.: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/de/documents-publications/library/library-blog/posts/ever-closer-union-the-legacy-of-the-treaties-of-rome-for-today-s-europe-1957-2017-online-exhibition/>. [11-11-19].

16 Cf.: Rehl, J. (2017). Op. cit. P. 20-23.

17 Cf.: Ibid. P. 18.

18 Cf.: Ibid. P. 38.

19 EEAS (2016). Op. cit. P. 51.

20 Cf.: Rehl, J. (2017). Op. cit. P. 35.

21 Cf.: Ibid. P. 36.

- The European Defence Action Plan.²²
- Establishment of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) on security and defence.²³

Because of these developments a lot of research is focused on these concrete actions based on the EUGS. This can be proven by the annual reports by the commission on the implementation of the EUGS.²⁴

4. Research Gap

“We Europeans must really take our fate fully into our own hands. (...) we should work on a vision of one day establishing a real European army.”²⁵

This statement of the German Chancellor Angela Merkel from November 2018 in a speech at the European Parliament in Strasbourg seems to represent the missing link between “strategic autonomy” and the CSDP of the EU.

In addition, up to this point the author has shown common aspects of the CSDP and the idea of “strategic autonomy”. It seems to be common sense, that there is a close link between these two concepts. Especially when it comes to concrete military and foreign policy measures by the EU and its Member States, “strategic autonomy” is very often a strong argument.²⁶

However, among the existing research the answer to the specific context between “strategic autonomy” and the CSDP has not been given yet.²⁷ This is the author’s aim by editing this essay.

5. Research Questions

The main aim of this essay is to find the link between the concept of “strategic autonomy” and the CSDP of the EU. In order to describe and to find this context, the key question for this paper is:

What is the context between “strategic autonomy” and the Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU?

In order to answer this research question, three supplemental questions must be answered. These ones are as follows:

- Supplemental question number 1: What are the preconditions that led to the idea of “strategic autonomy”?
- Supplemental question number 2: What is the understanding of “strategic autonomy” of the EU?
- Supplemental question number 3: What are the goals of the CSDP of the EU?

22 Cf.: Ibid. P. 24-25.

23 Cf.: Ibid. P. 38.

24 Cf.: Homepage of European External Action Service. Subpage EU-Global Strategy. URL.: https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/eu-global-strategy_en. [23-11-19].

25 Homepage of Reuters. URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-politics-merkel/germanys-merkel-calls-for-a-european-union-military-idUSKCN1NI1UQ>. [11-11-19].

26 Cf.: Homepage of European Council on foreign Relations (ECFR). URL: https://www.ecfr.eu/specials/scorecard/independence_play_europes_pursuit_of_strategic_autonomy. [9-11-19].

27 Statement by the author.

6. Methodology

In order to achieve a valid and reliable result, the author uses a wide range of sources in gathering the essential information for this essay. These sources range from EU documents, books, online articles, and academic journals to officially published internet-based information.

First, the research gap was explored, and three supplemental questions were formulated in order to get a better understanding of the topic. In addition, this method makes it easier to answer the main question. At the end the answers of the three supplemental questions lead to the answer of the main question and the discussion as the conclusion of the essay. The methodical approach of this essay is the author-based interpretation, also known as hermeneutics. On the following sketch the author shows the structure of the research work and the steps that led to the results while editing this essay.




Figure 1: Flowchart of the methodical approach.²⁸

²⁸ Figure created by the author.

7. Research and Results of Research

7.1. Preconditions of the Development of “strategic Autonomy”

7.1.1 A changed Global Order

The EU faces a changed world with different types of threats and challenges. Europe is no longer only the little brother of the US and the possible battlefield of the Cold War. It is today situated in the centre of different global players in a multipolar world.²⁹ In addition, the EU tries to find its role as a political power and one pole among others like the US, Russia or China.³⁰ Also smaller countries as Turkey, Brazil and India try to find their place in the world, and use their economic and political influence as a regional power with growing impact abroad their borders. This stresses the traditional leading nations and organisations and puts the EU under pressure.³¹

The United Nations (UN) lost their importance and today the conflicts are marked by the right of the stronger. This is very well shown by the conflicts in Syria and the Ukraine, where different regional and global parties try to increase their influence without legal legitimation.³² The aim of the EU is not only to defend its interests and values against such an order, but also to be a role model for a world of peace and prosperity based on the principles of humanity and the rule of international law. These values should be shared with partners in order to enlarge the idea of good global governance for the 21st century.³³

7.1.2 A changed NATO and “America first”

In parallel to the changes after the end of the Cold War the relationship of EU and the US changed. The protection of the US is no longer needed, the role of NATO as an instrument of collective defence is in certain ways reduced, and there are fewer common interests of the EU and the US.³⁴ President Bush for example created the coalition of the willing and made a coordinated reaction of NATO or EU impossible.³⁵ Also the migration crises made clear, that Europe suffers more from conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa and has own interests in these regions.³⁶

In addition, the vote of President Trump is still a game changer. His motto “America First” has the consequence, that the EU is no longer an exclusive partner or allied. It must define its role in the transatlantic partnership from one situation to another.³⁷ Political as well as economic differences affect this relationship. These differences are for example:

- Importance of NATO as an instrument of collective defence.

29 Cf.: Homepage Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). Translated into English the name means: Foundation for Science and Politics. URL.: <https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2019RP04/#hd-d14204e773>. [25-11-19].

30 Cf.: Ibid.

31 Cf.: Ibid.

32 Cf.: Homepage of Carnegie Middle East Centre. URL.: <https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/54733>. [25-11-19].

33 Cf.: Rehrl, J. (2017). Op. cit. P. 23.

34 Cf.: H. Brands. (2017). Wandel in der außenpolitischen Doktrin der USA. In: BMLVS/ Direktion für Sicherheitspolitik. Sicher. Und Morgen? Sicherheitspolitische Jahresvorschau 2018. Translated into English the title means: Change in the Foreign Policy Doctrine of the USA. In: Secure. And tomorrow? Annual Security Policy Forecast 2018. Vienna. P. 70-73.

35 Cf.: Homepage of Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). URL.: <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/coalition-willing>. [25-11-19].

36 Assessment by the author.

37 Cf.: Homepage Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). Translated into English the name means: Foundation for Science and Politics. URL.: <https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2019RP04/#hd-d14204e773>. [25-11-19].

- Relationship to Russia and Turkey.³⁸
- US tariffs on imports of steel and aluminium.³⁹
- Trumps political support for the BREXIT.⁴⁰

Related to last discussions about the role of NATO, the US and EU, triggered by President Macron, the former US ambassador Anthony Gardner stated in an interview: *“Trump prefers to deal one-on-one in a transnational way with particular states of the EU”*.⁴¹ This leads to incoherent politics and national strategies among the EU Member States.

7.2 The Content of “strategic Autonomy”

The answer to that changed global order is the EU Global Strategy. It defines the strategic goals for the external actions of the EU. These goals are:

- The security of the EU.
- State and societal resilience to our East and South.
- An integral approach to conflicts.
- Cooperative regional orders.
- Global governance for the 21st century.⁴²

These priorities should be achieved and supported by strategic autonomy. The core of the idea of strategic autonomy seems to be political and military independence as a multi-lateral organisation. According to Ronja Kemping and Barbara Kunz this autonomy has three dimensions:

- „Political Autonomy: The capacity to take security policy decisions and to act upon them”.
- „Industrial autonomy: The capacity to develop and build the capabilities required to attain operational autonomy”.
- „Operational Autonomy: The capacity to independently plan for and conduct civilian and/or military operations”.⁴³

The EU tries to bring these three dimensions to life. In addition, the implementation of the EUGS follows these dimensions as well. On the pages below, the author takes a closer look at these dimensions.

7.2.1 Political Autonomy

The EUGS says: *„The sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of states, (...) are key elements of the European security order.”*⁴⁴ This makes clear: The core of a political autonomy are independent decision-making processes. Based on sovereignty of the Member States, the EU establishes the framework

38 Cf.: S. Genç. (2017). Türkei 2018. In: BMLVS/ Direktion für Sicherheitspolitik. Sicher. Und Morgen? Sicherheitspolitische Jahresvorschau 2018. Translated into English the title means: Turkey 2018. In: Secure. And tomorrow? Annual Security Policy Forecast 2018. Vienna. P. 101-103.

39 Cf.: Homepage of the Royal Institute of international Affairs. Chatham house. URL.: <https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/us-eu-trade-relations-trump-era-which-way-forward>. [25-11-19].

40 Cf.: Homepage of European Council on foreign Relations (ECFR). URL.: https://www.ecfr.eu/specials/scorecard/independence_play_europes_pursuit_of_strategic_autonomy. [25-11-19].

41 Cf.: Homepage of Consumer News and Business Channel (CNBC). URL.: <https://www.cnbc.com/2019/11/12/trump-making-a-historical-mistake-with-eu-former-us-diplomat-says.html>. [25-11-19].

42 Cf.: Rehr, J. (2017). Op. cit. P. 21-23.

43 Cf.: Homepage of the Institute Français de Relations International. Page Publications. URL.: <https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/notes-de-lifri/notes-cerfa/france-germany-and-quest-european-strategic-autonomy-franco>. [25-11-19].

44 EEAS (2016). P. 33

of autonomy and solidarity.⁴⁵ “Strategic autonomy” makes it possible to decide and to act independently. The goals of these decisions are protection of European citizens, defence of European values and interests, guarantee of political, economic, and social stability.⁴⁶ This must be done freely and unaffected by other powers and on a broad legitimated basis.⁴⁷ Of course, the principle of unanimity in the CSDP is a controversial factor, but cannot be discussed here.⁴⁸ This is beyond the scope of this essay. Additionally, the EU recognised, that sovereignty and independence need strong instruments.

7.2.2 Industrial Autonomy

One instrument is an autonomous defence industry, that makes the EU independent from foreign technologies and imports of military goods. The EUGS clearly states: “A sustainable, innovative and competitive European defence industry is essential for Europe’s strategic autonomy and for a credible CSDP.”⁴⁹ In addition the EU Member States understand that the European defence industry sector is ineffective and driven by national interests. In 2015 – for example – the armed forces of the 28 EU Member States operated 154 weapon systems, ran 37 types of armoured personnel carriers and 19 types of combat aircrafts.⁵⁰ In this field the EU and its Member States make the largest steps to the future. The implementation of the European Defence Action Plan, the European Defence Fund and the agreement on PESCO are direct results from the implementation of the EUGS.

Especially PESCO became the major tool to work closely together and to enhance interoperability. 25 partnering EU Member States agreed on 47 security and defence related projects and made the idea of a more capable and resilient EU becoming true.⁵¹ These projects range from capacity building programmes and defence industry developments to the implementation of common command and communication structures. They represent the will to coordinate the activities and to cooperate in the field of CSDP and they are a major signal to become strategically autonomous.⁵²

7.2.3 Operational Autonomy

The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) is more than a pool of projects of the defence industries in Europe. It is a major project to develop common capacities and capabilities within the EU. Based on the protocol No 10 on permanent structured cooperation established by Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), PESCO is an instrument to engage in a “(...) common foreign and security policy based on the achievement of growing convergence of action by Member States”.⁵³

The goal is to develop defence capabilities together and make them available for CSDP operations.⁵⁴ PESCO is financed by the European Defence Fund and by money from the Member States. Addition-

45 Cf.: Homepage Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). URL.: <https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2019RP04/#hd-d14204e773>. [25-11-19].

46 Cf.: EEAS (2016). Op. cit. Passim.

47 Cf.: Homepage Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). URL.: <https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2019RP04/#hd-d14204e773>. [25-11-19].

48 Cf.: Ibid.

49 EEAS (2016). Op. cit. P. 45.

50 Cf.: Rehrl, J. (2017). Op. cit. P. 39.

51 Cf.: Homepage of European External Action Service. Subpage Headquarters. URL.: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/70328/european-cooperation-defence-eu-ministers-agree-13-new-pesco-projects_en. [23-11-19].

52 Cf.: Homepage of European Council on foreign Relations (ECFR). URL.: https://www.ecfr.eu/specials/scorecard/independence_play_europes_pursuit_of_strategic_autonomy. [25-11-19].

53 Homepage of European Law Lexicon. EUR-Lex. URL.: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12008M%2FPRO%2F10>. [25-11-19].

54 Cf.: Homepage of European External Action Service. Page Factsheet PESCO. URL.: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/pesco_factsheet_may_2019.pdf. [25-11-19].

ally, it is evaluated on a regular basis by an instrument called Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD).⁵⁵ Especially CARD sets a new standard. It provides common guidelines on the political and operational level and makes the EU more independent from NATO in the field of standardisation and interoperability.⁵⁶

Of course, the EU follows the concept of the Integrated Approach and does not only use military means, but armed forces play a more important role for the future strategies of the EU.⁵⁷

In addition, the implementation of the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) as an operational headquarters for training and monitoring missions – such as the European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM MALI) – is a clear signal to become more independent from structures of the EU MS and of NATO.⁵⁸ By the implementation of the EUGS and PESCO the EU enhanced the instruments and structures to accomplish the main goals of the CSDP following the given strategic priorities autonomously. The EU is in certain fields – such as crisis management – more independent from major powers and their structures.⁵⁹

7.3 The Goals of the CSDP of the EU

In general, the tasks of operations and missions are defined by the so-called common level of ambition from the EUGS Implementation Plan. This represents also the core of the strategic priorities of the EU, namely:

- Response to external conflicts.
- Building capacities of partners.
- Protection of the EU and its citizens.⁶⁰

In addition, the EEAS writes: *“The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) enables the Union to take a leading role in peace-keeping operations, conflict prevention and in the strengthening of the international security.”*⁶¹ These three goals meet very well the common level of ambition and bring it to live by real actions.⁶²

55 Cf.: Homepage of European Defence Agency (EDA). URL.: [https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/our-current-priorities/coordinated-annual-review-on-defence-\(card\)](https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/our-current-priorities/coordinated-annual-review-on-defence-(card)). [25-11-19].

56 Cf.: Homepage of Egmont Royal Military Institute. URL.: <http://www.egmontinstitute.be/content/uploads/2019/03/SPB109.pdf?type=pdf>. [25-11-19].

57 Cf.: Ibid. [25-11-19].

58 Cf.: Homepage of European External Action Service (EEAS). Page Factsheet MPCC. URL.: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/mpcc_factsheet_november_2018.pdf. [25-11-19].

59 Cf.: Homepage of Centre for Eastern Studies Warsaw. URL.: <https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2017-06-28/csdps-renaissance-challenges-and-opportunities-eastern-flank>. [25-11-19].

60 Cf.: Rehr, J. (2017). Op. cit. P. 36 and P.43.

61 Homepage of European External Action Service (EEAS). Page CSDP. URL.: https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/431/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp_en. [25-11-19].

62 Statement of the author.

8. Discussion of Results and personal Conclusions⁶³

8.1 Discussion of Results

A famous proverb says, a picture is worth a thousand words. Therefore, the author wants to sum up the results in a chart. The figure below explains the context of strategic autonomy and answers the key question for this essay. Starting from the EUGS from 2016 and the Implementation Plan on Security and Defence, it illustrates the impact and relations on the different levels and structures of the EU. In general, the strategic level, represented by the Global Strategy and the Implementation Plan sets the political goals for the CFSP. These goals are realised by instruments of CFSP and CSDP on the operational level. PESCO on the third level provides the necessary capacities and capabilities for operations and missions.




Figure 2: The Context of Strategic Autonomy and CSDP.⁶⁴

Strategic autonomy as a political term represents the frame of CSDP. Because of its three dimensions, it has direct impact on all three levels shown in the sketch. This impact is the closer context between CSDP and strategic autonomy. The author states therefore: The context between CSDP and strategic autonomy is its function for the further development of CSDP.

However, there is also a broader context. In the European framework strategic autonomy has a double meaning. It is on the one hand a tool for a stronger political and military integration in Europe. As this tool it led to major developments like PESCO, the creation of the European Defence Fund and the implementation of MPCC in times of different challenges and new threats.

⁶³ Based on the authors interpretation.

⁶⁴ Figure created by the author.

On the other hand, strategic autonomy is an aim of the CFSP and of course for CSDP as its part. It is a desired end state of a fully capable, credible, and responsible powerful European Union. This is denoted in the sketch as collective defence and the question mark stands for the unknown future of this development. This Union could be a global partner for peace and stability, which decides, acts and defends itself independently and without any differences among its Member States.

8.2 Personal Conclusion

The results from above meet the author's definition from the beginning. This is: The ability for the EU to act and make decisions independently in order to achieve common long-term purposes including the process of planning and the execution of actions. The EU also makes major steps to become a more independent power. Nevertheless, reality paints an indifferent picture.

The problem of the BREXIT, which has a strong importance for the military capacities of the EU, could not be solved yet. In addition, CSDP depends from the will and the ability of the EU Member States. The leading powers – such as France or Germany – take political initiatives to enhance the military cooperation, but smaller countries follow their own national interests. The problem of neutrality of Austria or Ireland plays no major role on the political stage in Brussels. However, it can be a major issue for voters in national elections. Additionally, smaller countries do not spend a lot on defence and use solidarity and economic reasons as excuse. History has proven, that strong nations need credible military capacities, and the common will to use them. The EU created the basis for such an evolution. Now the Member States' politicians must show their will to go further to bring strategic autonomy to life in order to keep this unique project of peace and stability.

9. Annexes

9.1 List of Abbreviations

CARD.....	Coordinated Annual Review on Defence
CFSP.....	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSDP.....	Common Security and Defence Policy
EC.....	European Commission
ECFR.....	European Council on Foreign Relations
EEC.....	European Economic Community
EEAS.....	European Union External Action Service
ECSC.....	European Coal and Steel Community
EDA.....	European Defence Agency
ESDP.....	European Security and Defence Policy
EU.....	European Union
EUGS.....	European Union Global Strategy
EU MS.....	European Union Member States

EUTM.....	European Union Training Mission
HR/VP	High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission
NATO.....	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PESCO.....	Permanent Structured Cooperation
TEU.....	Treaty of the European Union
UN.....	United Nations
US.....	United States

9.2 List of Figures

Figure 1: Flowchart of Methodology

Figure 2: Context of Strategic Autonomy and CSDP

9.3 List of Literature

9.3.1 Documents

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02. Rehr, J. (2017). Handbook CSDP. The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union. Vienna. Armed Forces Printing Centre. Volume 1. 3rd edition.

9.3.3 Internet

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09. Homepage of European External Action Service. Page Factsheet PESCO. URL.: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/pesco_factsheet_may_2019.pdf. [25-11-19].
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The Effect of Climate Change on future Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) Missions and Operations

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Abstract

Climate change is gaining ever more attention. Alongside, the concern that climate change will negatively impact security is growing. This raises the question how the EU could and should approach the issue?

This essay addresses how climate change will affect future Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations specifically. It does so by analysing what climate change is, which effects are anticipated from it, and what implications for security are expected from it.

Three challenges that climate change imposes on future CSDP missions and operations are addressed in the essay. Firstly, the to date unknown relationship between climate change and security underlines the need for further research on the issue. Secondly, the context-dependency of climate related problems emphasizes the necessity to pay particular attention to the issue within specific mission and operation planning. And thirdly, the interlinkage of climate change effects with human livelihood accentuates the growing importance of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC). Concludingly, some thoughts on the way forward are offered in the essay.

Keywords

Climate Change, CSDP, Missions, Operations, Security.

1. Preface

As a former representative of the European Students' Union it is a particular honour for the author to participate in this Olympiad. It gives the author the opportunity to experience European cooperation in an entirely new context, within the military, and within security policy.

Thus, the 5th Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) Olympiad draws together three passions of the author: European cooperation, academic scholarship, and security policy. The Olympiad offers

the great chance to first learn the basics of CSDP in the e-learning modules, and then try to contribute a small part to its advancement through the essay. Finally, it hopefully gives the author the chance to meet fellow aspiring officers, with the same passions, from all over Europe.

The essay topic is particularly close to the author's heart. Having written the master thesis of her civilian studies on the role of climate change for conflict, it poses a unique new challenge to explore the role that climate change will have on CSDP missions and operations.

It is the European Union's motto – United in Diversity – that has always inspired the author. Accordingly, it is her hope that this essay can be a pebble in building greater cohesion within the Union. Although climate change is one of the most complex challenges we are facing, it is the belief of the author that this challenge also harbours much potential for a stronger Union.

The author wishes to express her thanks to Col Assoc. Prof. Gell, PhD for the chance to participate, and to everyone involved in making this event possible.

2. Introduction

Climate change has gained more and more attention in recent years. 'Green' initiatives are present in almost every corner of policy. In September 2019 a 'Global Climate Strike' was able to mobilise several million people in over 100 countries.

At the same time, linking climate change to security has become increasingly popular. Two recent publications by the Austrian Armed Forces mention climate change as a serious threat to national security.^{1,2} The former High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Javier Solana published an entire report on "Climate Change and International Security".³ Even the former president of the United States, Barack Obama, stated in 2015 that "*climate change constitutes a serious threat to global security, an immediate risk to our national security.*"⁴ Climate change, here, is understood as a long-term, measurable change in the climate.⁵

From the perspective of the European Union (EU) it is therefore essential to take a look at the effect that climate change could have on its future security policy. This paper will look specifically at the effect that climate change could have onto the future CSDP missions and operations. CSDP missions and operations are a tool of the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy to take action in conflicts and crises. While operations usually refer to military action, missions usually refer to civilian action.⁶

This essay will only consider the effects of climate change onto possible future missions and operations and the planning of these in general. It will not cover its effect onto the conduct of specific operations. This includes, for example, personal equipment to deal with extreme temperatures, security from extreme weather events not linked to the reason for the mission/operation. Including these concerns would go beyond the scope of this essay.

1 BMLV (2019). Effektive Landesverteidigung – ein Appell. [Effective defence – An appeal]. Vienna. Passim.

2 BMLV (2019b). Unser Heer 2030. Die Antwort auf zukünftige Bedrohungen. [Austrian Armed Forces 2030 – The response to future threats]. Vienna. Passim.

3 Solana, J. (2008). Climate change and international security. Paper from the High Representative and the European Commission to the European Council. Brussels.

4 Homepage of the Washington Post (2015). Page Climate change is a 'serious threat' to U.S. national security, president says. URL: https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/climate-change-is-a-serious-threat-to-us-national-security-president-says/2015/05/20/83dfad56-ff2b-11e4-833c-a2de05b6b2a4_story.html. [7-11-19].

5 IPCC (2014). Summary for policymakers. In: Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Field, C.B. et al (eds.). Cambridge University Press. P. 5.

6 Cf.: EU Military Staff (2019). EU CSDP Missions and Operations for Human Security. Brussels. P. 1.

Countless documents were investigated for the content analysis in this essay, expanding and enhancing previously existing knowledge on the topic from the composition of a master thesis in Socio-ecological Economics titled “*Climate change as a driver of conflict?*”⁷, as to find scientifically valid answers to the research questions.

In order to research the issue at hand, this essay looks firstly at the current state of research on climate change and security of the EU policy and defines the research gap, from which the research questions will be derived. Secondly, after laying out the method used for the research conducted, the research results are presented. Finally, the results are discussed in the last section.

3. Current State of Research

This chapter reviews existing researches on climate change and the EU Common Security and Defence Policy. Although several studies have been done on the relationship between climate change and security in recent years, only few of them deal specifically with EU policy and CSDP actions on the issue. Those who do, often focus on the broader trend of linking the two, and on the development of the relationship between them.

The climate change and EU’s security policy relationship is described as an “*unmet challenge*” by Youngs.⁸ He finds that although some policy documents on climate change and security exist in the EU, a clear path cannot yet be recognised, and particularly specific implementation is lacking behind.⁹ This finding is corroborated by a look at the Handbook on CSDP. Although climate change is mentioned a few times alongside other issues, no section is allocated to it specifically.¹⁰ However, the EU would have good preconditions to tackle the issue of climate change and security, another study finds. In a comparison of the European Union, the United Nations (UN), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Depledge and Feakin have argued that the EU has been “*far more receptive than the UN and NATO to the possibility of expanding the international security agenda to address non-traditional and transnational threats such as those linked to climate change.*”¹¹ They trace this trend back to a general security culture in the European Union that focuses more strongly on crisis management and conflict prevention.¹²

Furthermore, the authors see the EU in a unique position due to its ability to “*deploy the combination of civilian and military assets that are more likely needed to manage conflicts involving the environment.*”¹³ NATO – for example – does not have this capacity. The authors also note that so far, the EU member states “*have demonstrated a considerable degree of unity*”¹⁴ on climate change policy, as for example on their Climate and Energy Package and their stance within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). In this regard Hayes and Knox-Hayes even attest that climate change policy “*also functions to cement EU policy making authority because it is an issue that cannot be addressed at the level of individual member states.*”¹⁵ However, Depledge and Feakin point out that this unity might

7 Zerzer, T. (2019). *Climate change as a driver of conflict? What resource access reveals about power struggles within the state*. Vienna University of Economics and Business. Master Thesis. Title page.

8 Cf.: Youngs, R. (2014). *Climate Change and EU Security Policy: An Unmet Challenge*. Lisbon. Nação e Defesa. No. 137. P. 100-117.

9 Cf.: Ibid.

10 Rehr, J. (2017). *Handbook on CSDP. The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union*. Vienna. Armed Forces Printing Centre. ISBN 978-92-95201-04-0. Third edition. Passim.

11 Depledge, D. & Feakin, T. (2012). *Climate change and international institutions: implications for security*. Unknown location. *Climate Policy*, 12. P. 78.

12 Cf.: Ibid.

13 Ibid. P. 79.

14 Ibid.

15 Hayes, J. & Knox-Hayes, J. (2014). *Security in climate change discourse: analyzing the divergence between US and EU approaches to policy*. Unknown location. *Global Environmental Politics*. Vol. 14. P. 83.

not be maintained, due to European countries' diverse vulnerabilities to the consequences of climate change.¹⁶

Liberatore develops three scenarios of how the relationship between climate change, security, EU policy, and international governance could play out in the future.¹⁷ The three scenarios are termed "Greening security"¹⁸, "The War on Climate Change"¹⁹, and "Much Ado about Nothing".²⁰ The first would be an increased awareness for climate change and its implications for security policy, the second a strong militarisation in the light of dreaded climate catastrophes, and the third a return to general disregard for climate concerns.²¹

Comparing civilian and military capacities for the response to climate change, the author states that the military could contribute in multiple ways. First, concerning emissions reduction, a military means could be to apply "emission reduction targets to the military sector"²², which is often exempt. Second, regarding adaption to climate change impacts, the military could contribute through disaster relief operations and threat analysis.²³ Beyond this, a concern is stated that "the involvement of the military sector beyond analysis and targeted relief operations could prove counterproductive."²⁴

The article touches briefly on the role that climate change could have specifically for "future CSDP strategy and missions."²⁵ It comes to the conclusion that "mainstreaming"²⁶ climate change into CSDP missions is a possibility, as this could "enhance effectiveness of such missions as compared to cases where climate change was not addressed while being possibly relevant."²⁷ However, only a brief section is accorded to this issue.

Overall, research on the role of climate change for security and defence policy in the EU has been focussing mostly on the broader link between climate change and CSDP. Particularly the civil and military competences of the EU put it in a unique position to respond to security implications of climate change. Threat analysis is viewed as a prime competence that the military can bring to the table. However, when it comes to the effects of climate change for CSDP missions and operations, little can be found.

4. Research Gap

"The EU is in a unique position to respond to the impacts of climate change on international security, given its leading role in development, global climate policy and the wide array of tools and instruments at its disposal."²⁸ This quotation by the former High Representative on CFSP Javier Solana shows the unique opportunity at the EU's hand. However, scientifically founded answers are needed if this endeavour is to be successful.

The previous chapter has shown that some research has been done on the role of climate change for

16 Depledge, D. & Feakin, T. (2012). Op. cit. P. 78.

17 Liberatore, A. (2013). Climate Change, Security and Peace: The Role of the European Union. Brussels. Review of European Studies. Vol. 5. No. 3. P. 91f.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid. Table. P. 92.

22 Ibid. Table. P. 90.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid, P. 90.

25 Ibid. P. 90.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid. P. 91.

28 Solana, J. (2008). Op. cit. P. 3.

the EU Common Security and Defence Policy. Authors have focused on the current state of EU security policy regarding the challenges of climate change, the development of this policy field, and its possible future scenarios. What has not been dealt with in detail is the effect which climate change will have on future CSDP missions and operations specifically. This research gap will be treated in this essay. The resulting research questions are presented in the next chapter.

5. Research Question

The key question which is answered in this paper is:

What effect will climate change have for future Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations?

For improved understanding, the author answers the following sub-questions regarding the role of climate change for CSDP missions and operations:

- 1) What is climate change?
- 2) Which are the effects of climate change?
- 3) Which are the effects of climate change specifically on conflict?

6. Methodology

This chapter describes the research process used for this essay. Hereinafter, the figure 1 below gives an overview about the process.




Figure 1: Research Process.²⁹

²⁹ Figure created by the author.

First, the research topic was chosen from the list of essay topics provided. Subsequently, a review of existing research on the topic was conducted. From this, the research gap was derived, and the research questions were developed. In order to answer the research questions, existing documents on climate change, its effects, and its relation to security were analysed using the method of content analysis. This cumulated in the research results. Finally, conclusions for the future policy on CSDP missions and operations were derived from the results.

7. Research and Results of Research

This chapter answers the three sub-research questions, in order to be able to answer the main research question. First, it is explained what climate change is and what its roots are, followed by what its anticipated effects are, and finally what effects on security can be expected.

7.1 Climate Change

This sub-chapter covers what climate change is and what is known about its causes. Although climate change is currently receiving much attention, it is rarely discussed what is exactly meant by it.

The IPCC defines climate change as *“a change in the state of the climate that can be identified (e.g., by using statistical tests) by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its properties, and that persists for an extended period, typically decades or longer.”*³⁰ Such changes in climate can be observed in the atmosphere, in the ocean, in the cryosphere,³¹ in the sea level, and in carbon cycles.³² The report finds that many warming trends since the 1950s are unprecedented in decades and some even millennia and that the *“atmosphere and ocean have warmed, the amounts of snow and ice have diminished, sea level has risen, and the concentrations of greenhouse gases have increased.”*³³

Concerning the causes of climate change, it is important to differentiate between natural climate change and anthropogenic climate change. Natural climate change occurs due to internal variability of the climatic system, in time frames of decades and longer. Causes can include changes in solar radiation or volcanic activity. Natural climate change must be differentiated from climate variability, which refers to short term trends, e.g. the El Niño.³⁴ Anthropogenic, or human-induced, climate change refers to the warming trend that can be traced back to human action, most prominently carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions. The IPCC finds that approximately 1° of global temperature increase compared to pre-industrial levels is attributable to human action.³⁵

Although climatic changes and variability occur naturally, it can be expected that the climate will change more rapidly in the coming years due to human action. The next sub-chapter addresses how this will impact human life.

30 IPCC (2014). Op. cit. P. 5.

31 Remark of the author: Earth surfaces that are permanently frozen.

32 Cf.: IPCC (2013). Summary for Policymakers. In: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Stocker, T.F., et al (eds.). Cambridge University Press. P. 4-14. Passim.

33 Ibid. P. 4.

34 Cf.: Homepage of The Conversation (2019). Page Climate explained: how much of climate change is natural? How much is man-made?. URL: <http://theconversation.com/climate-explained-how-much-of-climate-change-is-natural-how-much-is-man-made-123604>. [24-11-19].

35 Cf.: IPCC (2018). Summary for Policymakers. In: Global Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty. Masson-Delmotte, V. et al (eds.). Unknown location. In Press. P. 6.

7.2 The Effects of Climate Change

This sub-chapter discusses possible effects of climate change on human life. Climate change affects a variety of factors that directly impact human livelihood, from ecosystems, to extreme weather events, to food security.

For example, crop yields are influenced by climate change more negatively than positively.³⁶ This raises concerns for food security. Food production is expected to be severely impacted in South America and Australia, as shown in the figure 2 below. Furthermore, extreme weather events such as cyclones, droughts and floods, are expected to increase as a consequence of climate change.³⁷ These can result in consequences severely affecting human livelihood, which “include alteration of ecosystems, disruption of food production and water supply, damage to infrastructure and settlements, morbidity and mortality, and consequences for mental health and human well-being.”³⁸

However, it is important to note that not all regions and not all populations are equally vulnerable to the consequences of climate change. The IPCC finds that “differences in vulnerability and exposure arise from non-climatic factors and from multidimensional inequalities often produced by uneven development processes.”³⁹ Nonetheless, the consequences of climate change are expected to affect livelihood everywhere in one way or another. The figure below gives an overview of likely impacts in different regions and the confidence in their attribution to climate change.




Figure 2: Patterns of impacts in recent decades attributed to climate change.⁴⁰

36 Cf.: IPCC (2014). Op. cit. P. 4.

37 Cf.: Ibid. P. 6.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid. P. 7.

The consequences of climate change can look very differently. On the one hand, a warmer climate can lead to resource shortages in some regions. For example, water shortages due to droughts are feared in some regions. On the other hand, new sources are expected to be made accessible through climate change in other regions, as is anticipated in the Arctic through ice melting.

In any case, severe impacts on human livelihood are expected from changing climatic conditions. This induces some to fear an increase of violent conflict as a consequence. The next chapter addresses whether there is a significant basis for this concern.

7.3 Climate Change and Conflict

This sub-chapter assesses the existing evidence for a possible relationship between climate change and conflict. While some studies try to establish a quantitative link between climate change and conflict, they are also strongly contested. Furthermore, specific case studies, e.g. on Syria, show how a focus on climate change can obscure other more relevant factors.

In a review of 50 quantitative surveys on the relationship between climate change and violent conflict Hsiang and Burke conclude that *“climate’s influence on security persists in both historical and modern periods, is generalizable to populations around the globe, arises from climatic events that are both rapid and gradual, and influences numerous types of conflict that range across all spatial scales.”*⁴¹

However, studies like this are strongly contested. As one limitation Buhaug names the *“inability to capture and quantify very complex causal linkages that span long time periods, or vary greatly in the temporal dimension between cases and involve many intermediate steps.”*⁴² Another review of existing literature on the climate and conflict link finds that *“long-term effects of climate change on conflict necessarily imply a complex causal chain, the elements of which are hard to isolate and detect in a systematic, quantitative manner.”*⁴³

What is more, some studies find that in some cases increasing resource scarcity has in fact lead to more cooperation.⁴⁴ Nonetheless, Abrahams notes that *“the potential of climate change as a factor in peace-building has not received much attention when compared with climate change’s role as a driver of conflict.”*⁴⁵ However, a closer look at these cases could facilitate methods of conflict prevention and resolution.

A further problem of focusing on climate change as a driver of a specific conflict is that other, more relevant factors may be obscured. The ongoing civil war in Syria is frequently presented to make the point about climate change and conflict. The hypothesis is that a drought due to climate change has led to water scarcity, which in turn sparked unrests. On a closer look however, it becomes obvious that water access was more severely impacted by a rise in the price of diesel fuel, needed for groundwater pumps, and by the generally decreasing groundwater level.^{46,47}

The relationship between climate change and conflict is far from being resolved. Problems arise due to the immense complexity of climate change impacts and of social conflicts on the one hand, due to conceptual flaws on the other hand. It is exactly this uncertainty that needs to be taken into account

41 Hsiang, S.M. & Burke, M. (2014). Climate, conflict, and social stability: what does the evidence say? Unknown location. *Climatic Change*. Vol 123. P. 52.

42 Buhaug, H. (2015). Climate–conflict research. Some reflections on the way forward. Unknown location. *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change*. Vol 6(3). P. 270.

43 Theisen, O. M. & Gleditsch, N. P. & Buhaug, H. (2013). Is climate change a driver of armed conflict?. Unknown location. *Climatic change*. Vol 117(3). P. 615.

44 Abrahams, D. & Carr, E. R. (2017). Understanding the connections between climate change and conflict: contributions from geography and political ecology. Unknown location. *Current Climate Change Reports*. Vol. 3(4). Passim.

45 Ibid. P. 238.

46 De Châtel, F. (2014). The role of drought and climate change in the Syrian uprising: Untangling the triggers of the revolution. Unknown location. *Middle Eastern Studies*. Vol. 50(4). Passim.

47 Zerzer, T. (2019). Op. cit. Passim.

when considering future CSDP missions and operations under the aspect of climate change, as it will be laid out in the next chapter.

8. Discussion of Results and personal Conclusions

In this chapter, the results are summarised, the main research question is answered, and the findings are discussed.

8.1 Results

Here, the answers to the sub-questions are summarised and the main question is answered.

8.1.1 Results of the Sub-research Questions

Climate change is a change in the state of the climate that can be identified, e.g. by measuring the temperature of the atmosphere or the ocean, or the size of ice caps. While climate change can occur naturally, there is strong evidence that the effects are aggravated by human action.

The effects of climate change are highly complex and depend on the interaction of countless factors. Nonetheless it is expected that climate change will result in an increase of extreme weather events, have negative impacts on crop yields, and will overall pose considerable challenges for human livelihood.

In spite of these findings, so far, no clear link between the climate change and any conflict could be established. While climate change could lead to a conflict in some cases, it can lead to more cooperation in others. The embeddedness of all climate related struggles in people's everyday lives and their livelihood makes any effect of climate change strongly context dependent. In some cases, narrowing the focus on climate change can obscure other more pressing factors for conflicts.

8.1.2. The Effect of Climate Change on future CSDP Missions and Operations

It is exactly this uncertainty that needs to be taken into account when considering the effect of climate change for future CSDP missions and operations. Much more research is needed for a better understanding of the role that climate change can play for a conflict. Particularly, there is a need for research which is able to take the specific context into consideration and can explain causal mechanisms. Special attention should also be given to cases where resource scarcity contributed to peace building.

The context dependency of the consequences of climate change is another factor that needs to be considered concerning future CSDP missions and operations. This means that in any mission or operation where climate change could play a role, the background needs to be particularly well explored.

Finally, consequences result from the fact that the effects of climate change are always interwoven with people's livelihood. Where climate change will play a role, it will usually have an effect on the lives of civilians. This means that civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) will become ever more important in the upcoming years.

8.2 Personal Conclusions

The research in this essay revealed that to address the effect of climate change for future CSDP missions and operations three tasks are necessary. Firstly, further research on the relationship between climate

change and conflict in general is needed. Secondly, in mission or operation planning, special attention needs to be given to the issue. And thirdly, CIMIC will be particularly relevant.

The question left is: How can this be implemented? Three fields of action come to mind. Concerning the first issue, a solution would be to implement a coherent research strategy on the topic within the CSDP governance. Secondly, it would be advisable to integrate climate change considerations systematically into mission and operation planning where the EU is involved. And thirdly, it will become necessary to expand already existing CIMIC-capacities within the armed forces.

In the chapter “*Current State of Research*” previous findings by other authors were discussed, namely that the implementation is lacking behind,⁴⁸ that the EU has a unique capacity to link civilian and military means,⁴⁹ and that climate change policy is a field where EU policy making authority is established.⁵⁰ To pick up on these findings, the steps forward proposed in this essay would represent a chance to overcome the lack of implementation, to take advantage of the EU’s strengths, and to reinforce its authority.

In times of Brexit and migration crisis, where national tendencies are on the rise, proactively addressing the possible security implications of climate change could pose an opportunity for the EU to show that we truly are United in Diversity.

9. Annexes

9.1 List of Abbreviations

BMLV.....	Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung [Federal Ministry of Defence]
CFSP.....	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIMIC.....	Civil-Military Cooperation
CO2.....	Carbon Dioxide
CSDP.....	Common Security and Defense Policy
EU.....	European Union
IPCC.....	International Panel on Climate Change
NATO.....	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
UN.....	United Nations
UNFCCC.....	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

9.2 List of Figures

Figure 1: Research Process

Figure 2: Patterns of impacts in recent decades attributed to climate change.

48 Youngs, R. (2014). Op. cit. Passim.

49 Cf.: Depledge, D. & Feakin, T. (2012). Op. cit. P. 78.

50 2Cf.: Hayes, J. & Knox-Hayes, J. (2014). Op. cit. P. 83.

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03. IPCC (2018). Summary for Policymakers. In: Global Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty. Masson-Delmotte, V. et al (eds.). Unknown location. In Press.
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9.3.3 Internet

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02. Homepage of Washington Post (2015). Page Climate change is a 'serious threat' to U.S. national security, president says. URL: https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/climate-change-is-a-serious-threat-to-us-national-security-president-says/2015/05/20/83dfad56-ff2b-11e4-833c-a2de05b6b2a4_story.html. [7-11-19].

The Effect of Energy Security on Future Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) Missions and Operations

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Abstract

This paper tackles the bond between international security and the availability of energy in varied forms, stressing the influence these various forms of energy (gas supplies, oil stocks, nuclear energy and sustainable energy) have on the leading role taken by the European Union, which was given competence in the Energy Policy following the treaty of Lisbon, as well as in crisis management and conflict prevention. Delving into a number of such operations, these influences have been researched and reviewed taking into full consideration the legal framework of the EU energy policy objectives that are to be found in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the European Energy Security Strategy.

In order to fully comprehend how the CSDP as a whole is influenced by the security of the EU's availability for energy resources, and also by its import and export policies, it is of tremendous importance that we process through this paper the essence of the European Union's import habits, energy dependencies and how all these represent the "spark" that ignites the whole EU's energy sector grid. We have therefore explored alternatives to the actual suppliers of energy and analyzed the circumstances and risks of considering them. Only after doing so can we create a vision on how the energy security is handled at present and predict how it will be handled in the future. We found out how the CSDP objectives could be implemented in order to securely follow the strategy and goals of the Union (currently set for 2030) in terms of the energy sector development. It was crucial to identify and include in our research the ever-growing problem of climate change threatening the course and development of the defence policies involving the European Union, and how heavily the climate affects the CSDP missions and operations.

Keywords

Energy security, CSDP missions and operations, energy dependence, energy crisis, renewable energy.

1. Preface

There is a universally applicable rule we, cadets, are taught about in the very first years of our engineering studies. Every action has an equally opposite reaction: Newton's third law of motion. What this essay seeks to acquire is the translation of this scientific law into a rather humanized interpretation by exploring the meaning of the energy resources we, as a community, are responsible for. In order to fully grasp the concept of energetic security, we must anticipate the implications of such a topic in the current geopolitical context. While conducting the research process for this paper, I could not help but notice a rather unpredictable course of action and, needless to say, an anticlimactic characteristic of its evolution. The non-linear path of this topic, unpredictable as it is, gets more and more interesting as we approach it from the angle of actual security and defence procedures, missions and operations, especially those conducted by the Common Security and Defence Policy.

Furthermore, while exploring the requirements that a reliable energy security policy needs to properly function, we will review the involved statistics, technical realities, limitations, and possible or further developments that could either improve or periclitate such a policy. More thought-provoking is that "often energy security issues are addressed only at a national level without taking fully into account the interdependence of Member States"¹. Technicalities are often different from state to state, and while infrastructure is by far the most important aspect of energetic security, it is the internal regulations and external coordination that assemble the greater picture of a secure European Union under CSDP's protection. The greater picture is yet to be seen.

2. Introduction

Before laying down a proper introduction, it is fundamental that we provide a proper background for the two main components of this paper: energy security and the objectives of the Common Security and Defence Policy and how they are confined in the European Union, thus tracing a dependence between the two that will be tackled in the future chapters of the essay.

Energy security has multiple definitions, most of them based on the point of view approached. They can be characterized according to the sources of risk, the scope of the impacts, and the severity filters in the form of the speed, size, sustention, spread, singularity and sureness of impacts.² However, the majority of these definitions conclude in the same, following remark: energy security represents the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price³.

While standardized definitions were to be avoided initially, it is necessary for the proper constitution of this paper that we detail what the CSDP is. The Common Security and Defence Policy is part of the Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) which provides the European Union's capabilities of strengthening the international security of the state members, accessing both military and civilian resources. The 2016 EU Global Strategy lays out the strategy for the CSDP, while the Lisbon Treaty clarifies the institutional aspects and strengthens the role of the European Parliament.⁴ It is paramount to identify

1 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. European Energy Security Strategy. Paragraph 5. URL: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52014DC0330&from=EN>

2 Winzer C. (2012). Energy Policy. Volume 46. Elsevier. Pg. 36-48.

3 The International Energy Agency. What is energy security? URL: <https://www.iea.org/topics/energysecurity/whatisenergysecurity/>

4 European Parliament factsheet on CSDP. URL: <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/159/common-security-and-defence-policy>

that the CSDP is subject to the European Council and The Council of the European Union decisions, with the European Parliament right to scrutinise it.⁵

The tie between the CSDP and the ever-evolving parameters of energy security is the foundation of this essay. The agenda will debate how the European Union can become less energy-dependable from the eastern states and how important it is for this to be addressed from the CSDP approach.

How can the Member states securely carry out the “the largest infrastructure transformation ever, with the transformation from fossil fuel driven power plants to renewable energy”?⁶ Are CSDP missions required to ensure the successful implementation of these objectives? These questions are subject to our capability to both studying the influence energy security had on the past operations conducted through CSDP and also anticipating how the dependency factor will change in time.

3. Current state of Research

While maintaining energy security is clearly an objective for the CSDP, it is known that both of them are part of a three-front war with the following: climate change, geopolitical conflicts and ill-intentioned actors using energy for geopolitical coercion⁷. The above listed threats will be extensively analyzed and provided with in-depth statistics in order to fully comprehend how fragile and low-tolerant this “energy security grid” is.

3.1 Energy security: past and present

The winters of 2006 and 2009 represented the alarms that went off all across Europe. “Europe is facing an energy crisis. We now live in an era of energy uncertainty. The days of cheap and abundantly available energy are over.”⁸ Unfortunately, these two sentences accurately described the energy flow that had been streaming through Europe over that period of time. In order to properly characterize what the years above actually meant for the European Union, it is appropriate to provide some key facts. This can often lead to a number of vulnerabilities and the consumer is unable to contain any damage done by such specific vulnerability.⁹

The years 2006 and 2009 were subject to the Russia-Ukraine gas disputes, which found two state-owned, oil and natural gas companies, conflicting mainly over prices, supply quantities and debts owed. The situation escalated on 1 January 2006, when Russia reduced pipeline pressure and cut off supply to Ukraine. As a consequence, other EU countries suffered from the domino effect following the decision: Romania, Hungary and Poland, for example.

5 Cf.:Ibid. Paragraph 3.

6 Edited by Rehl J. Handbook on CSDP. Volume I. P.135

7 Hunziker B. The current state of European energy security and transatlantic cooperation. URL: <https://atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/energysource-explains-european-energy-security-and-transatlantic-cooperation-a-current-assessment/>

8 Cf.: Europe's Energy Crisis. The no fuel solution – EWEA Briefing. February 2006.

9 Cf.: EU imports of energy – recent developments. Eurostat statistics. URL: <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/pdfscache/46126.pdf>




Figure 1: Map of oil and gas pipelines from Russia to Europe.

History repeated itself in 2009 when tension rose so high that Russia completely halted the flow of gas through Ukraine, affecting the above mentioned Member states, adding Turkey, Greece and Bulgaria.

3.2 CSPD missions and operations in energy focal zones

The CSDP's efforts are concentrated in military and civilian missions and operations. As stated before, there are over fifteen such cases all over the world. And since the threats that the energy security is currently facing are the same the CSDP tries to prevent and oppose, there is a clear and indisputable correlation between the two.

Approaching the situation from the geopolitical perspective, what is worth mentioning is that the civilian mission EUAM Ukraine, standing for the European Union Advisory Mission. Its main objective is to encourage and assist authorities in reforming the civilian security sector, but it is also important to acknowledge the energy security aspect. If supplies of energy are to be cut off again, reduplicating the 2006 and 2009 disputes, the civilian population will, once again, find itself in despair. The immediate course of action for the EUAM is to observe, advise and assist the authorities in regaining stability.

3.3 Climate change

Another well-known and highly debated hazard is climate change. The energy security is directly influenced by the consequences of climate change and vice-versa, with poorly designed, polluting energy systems and resources affecting and accelerating the already advanced process of climate change.

The high demand for affordable energy determines high cost and more difficult emissions reductions, thus discouraging an engagement to use “clean energy” and to hold them responsible for their high rate of emissions.¹⁰ This is of tremendous importance because the European Union, being the first economic power in the world, currently setting out to replace 32% of its energy with renewable energy by 2030.

“The developing countries are among the most affected. People living there often depend heavily on their natural environment and they have the least resources to cope with the changing climate.”¹¹ Gradually, the specific zone finds itself in a state of conflict and turmoil. The CSDP is well placed within this sequence, as it is engaged in both maintaining the stability in such regions, with missions like EUBAM Libya, EUTM/EUCAP Mali, but not less than in supervising the very security of the European Union’s borders.

4. Research gap

The latest energy security facts and statistics place the European Union in a “gray” zone. Geopolitical interests, climate change and pressure to maintain the “clean energy” trend will all have important effects on the energy politics and policy in the years to come. For the EU member states Russia is the most convenient partner in terms of energy supply, but the convenience/stability ratio regarding natural gas delivery is pretty low and defined by geopolitical uncertainty. Even if stronger, more reliable efforts are made in the direction of renewable energy, the technicalities can easily interfere with keeping the energy flow constant. This introduces a new aspect of the problem, specifically if the European Union should whether invest or not in renewable energy exported from the developing countries. Also, the CSDP missions and operations are fighting the actual threats that climate change induces, forming a hazardous loop that has not been approached before.

5. Research questions

At the foundation of our research lie a number of important questions to be addressed. For instance, having understood that the European Union is, at the moment, a “victim” of eastern embargo on oil and natural gases, the most reasonable question to ask is whether or not the Member states actually have any other alternatives. To what extent are the middle-eastern states reliable when it comes to assuring a safe and constant gas export to the Union? Another topic of debate is the role of CSDP’s civilian or military missions in assisting the safe flow of energy, taking into consideration the numberless critical situations and problems CSDP representatives are confronted with, like war-torn zones, low region stability and poor infrastructure, and which obviously gain precedence on their already busy agenda. Could the East turn out to be more hostile while progressively giving up Russian energy? If some years ago these questions were subject to the “what if” expression, in the present they require our uninterrupted attention and research competence: “now what?”.

10 Cf.: Boqiang L. Balancing energy security and climate change. URL: <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2012/10/balancing-energy-security-and-climate-change/>

11 Climate change consequences. European Commission. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/clima/change/consequences_en

6. Methodology

Undoubtedly, all of the questions above have a more or less conclusive answer. In order to properly address them, a number of specific steps have been taken. Analytical data has been collected and reviewed from sources directly correlated to the institutions of the European Union, such as the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and The Council on the matter of the European Energy Security Policy. After a solid, statistic-based foundation has been laid down, we advanced in the research process by exploring solutions to the threats and “geopolitical dilemmas”. With documents from the European Council on Foreign Relations, this paper reviews possible alternatives to the EU’s current energy suppliers, discussing the implications these “workarounds” could have on the stability of the Union and its foreign affairs.




Figure 2: Pyramid scheme of the desired approach¹²

7. Research and results of research

7.1 Statistical data on energy security

The European Union imports 53% of the energy it consumes.¹³ The main forms of imported energy are common to those stated in the introduction as it follows: crude oil (90%), natural gas (65%), solid fuel (42%) and nuclear fuel (40%).¹⁴

Russia is the main provider of energy for most of the member states which, in the first semester of 2019 imported 39% of their natural gases and 27% of their petroleum oil from the Russian Federation, followed by Norway which provided 29% of the natural gases and 11% of the petroleum oils the Member states import.¹⁵

¹² Figure created by the author for the purpose of this chapter.

¹³ Cf.: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. European Energy Security Strategy. Paragraph 3. URL:<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52014DC0330&-from=EN>

¹⁴ Cf.:Ibid.

¹⁵ EU imports of energy - recent developments. Eurostat statistics. URL: <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/pdfscache/46126.pdf>




Figure 3: EU imports of energy products, 2015- first semester of 2019¹⁶

With these statistics in mind, it is important that we define the energy security approaching it from the dependency angle. As mentioned in the part dealing with energy imports, the EU depends mainly on Russia for imports of crude oil, natural gas and solid fuels, then on Norway for crude oil and natural gas.¹⁷

With the intention of addressing all this data, the European Commission released in 2014 the European Energy Security Strategy included an extensive approach for reducing dependency, researching all types of exploitable resources, preventing supply halts and supporting the trend of clean energy.

In 2014, all the Member states from the European Union conducted a stress test in order to prepare for the winter of 2014/2015 and try to avoid the energy crises of 2006 and 2009. It consisted of a simulated halt of energy supply with for a duration of six month, disrupting the energy import from the Russian Federation through the Ukraine pipeline system and other routes.¹⁸ The test resulted in a much anticipated conclusion: supply disruption would have a massive impact on the European Union, and only with the cooperation of the Member states, would this impact be overcome¹⁹.

7.2 Alternatives to Eastern energy

The lack of diversity when it comes to the EU's energy imports is one of the biggest threats the Union is currently facing. Over the last decade, Europe has been the victim of a strategy in which the Russian energy is leveraged to obtain economic and political gains²⁰. If this situation continues, the EU will find itself in further danger, as its dependence leaves it beholden to interests of the East.²¹

According to the ECFR, most of the EU's Russian contracts on energy imports are to expire until 2025, opening a window for the Member states to diversify their sources of supply.²²

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Eurostat infographs. URL: <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/infographs/energy/bloc-2c.html>

¹⁸ Energy security strategy. The European Commission. URL: <https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/energy-strategy-and-energy-union/energy-security-strategy> [01.12.2019]

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Cf.: Zeyno, B.(2007). EU Energy Security: Time to End Russian Leverage. The Washington Quarterly. P.132

²¹ Cf.: Ibid.

²² Chyong, C. K. & Slavkova, L. & Tcherneva, V. Europe's alternatives to Russian gas. URL: https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_europes_alternatives_to_russian_gas311666 [02.12.2019]

EUROPE'S ALTERNATIVES TO RUSSIAN GAS

February 2015: the European Commission describes the rationale for a **European Energy Union**
Aim: To diversify the EU's gas supplies away from Russia and to boost EU's energy security



Figure 4: EU's alternatives to Russian gas²³

While multiple gas import alternatives are available in other regions of the world, one must acknowledge the fact that each and every one of them has its own circumstances and geopolitical implications. Figure 4 highlights two of the most viable opportunities for the European Union:

- Imports from the Middle East and North Africa;
- Imports of liquefied natural gas from the United States, Australia and EA.

The first alternative of the two is the most relevant one to our debated topic. Most of the states listed in figure 4 are subject to political unrest and turmoil, with multiple factors interfering in a possible energy export deal, like poor infrastructure, war-torn regions controlled by hostile factions and deficient welfare.

7.3 CSDP missions and operations on energy security

Launching a CSDP mission or operation represents a five-step process, involving a complex, decision-making process driven by multiple entities of the European Union.²⁴

- Monitoring and early warning
- Drawing the Crisis Management Concept

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Cf.: Xavier, A. &Rehrl, J. Handbook on CSDP. Volume I. CSDP missions and operations. Volume I. Edited by Rehrl, J. P.78

- Operation planning
- Deployment and implementation
- Strategic review²⁵

Assuredly, all of the phases presented above are applicable to the subject of energy security. Even though there is a lack of such CSDP operations, this sub-chapter will review whether the EU needs such missions and operations and the possibility of co-existence with the already existing ones in the regions showed in figure 4.

7.3.1 Libya

The EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya, for short EUBAM Libya is a civilian CSDP mission launched on 4 August 2016 and is, according to the EEAS, “part of the EU’s comprehensive approach to support the transition to a democratic, stable and prosperous Libya”.²⁶ Before we illustrate the possible influence that EUBAM Libya could have on an energy deal with the European Union, it is important to outline the geopolitical context and infrastructure technicalities.

Libya currently holds an impressive export potential, especially to the Member states. More than 85% of Libyan oil exports and almost all of the natural gas have Europe as their destination, the majority of the exports flowing through the Greenstream pipeline and under the form of LNG.²⁷ The lack of export infrastructure and the state of political unrest in the region determine that Libya is unlikely to be a reliable partner in energy exports without proper assistance from the European Union,, hence the need for actual CSDP measures in order to prevent these from happening again.

Even though EUBAM Libya is a “border assistance” mission, the co-existence with a mission on energy security would be completely viable and they would definitely reinforce each other. This is achievable with a correct implementation of a Special Envoy on International Energy²⁸ integrated into a CSDP framework, specially designed for the region.

7.3.2 Nigeria, Niger and Algeria

The Trans-Saharan project is an ambitious objective of the energy zone; it comprises a 4400km long gas pipeline stretching from Nigeria to Algeria via Niger, assuring the flow into the European continent through Spain.

Statistically, the three are important and consistent partners to the EU in exporting oil and natural gas, with Algeria entertaining high level meetings with the Union’s energy sector representatives accessing European investments in infrastructure projects, such as LNG and natural gas.²⁹

25 Cf.: Ibid.

26 Homepage of the EEAS. About EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM). URL: https://eeas.europa.eu/csdp-missions-operations/eubam-libya/3859/about-eu-border-assistance-mission-libya-eubam_en [02.12.2019]

27 Homepage of U.S. Energy Information Administration. Libya is a major energy exporter, especially to Europe. URL: <https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=590> [02.12.2019]

28 Chyong, C. K. & Slavkova, L. & Tcherneva, V. Europe’s alternatives to Russian gas. URL: https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_europes_alternatives_to_russian_gas311666 [02.12.2019]

29 The European Commission. The European Union and Algeria strengthen their energy partnership. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/info/news/european-union-and-algeria-strengthen-their-energy-partnership-2018-nov-19_en [03.12.2019]



Figure 5: Gas pipelines in North & Central Africa³⁰

In spite of their rich natural resources, these three states are also known to be the most dangerous conflict zones in the world. EUCAP Sahel Niger is a CSDP’s civilian mission launched to assist the authorities fighting terrorism and organized crime.³¹ The European Union has identified the need of serious assistance in the region, with Sahel being one of the poorest zones in Africa. Enforcing the energy security measures from the CSDP approach, with European investments and representatives in the region, joined by troops in the region, could mean a more accelerated development process of the Trans-Saharan pipeline.

7.4 Climate change and renewable energy

In 2008, Javier Solana, then the High Representative for Foreign Policy, together with the European Commission published a paper called “Climate change and international security” in which climate change was a “threat multiplier”³²In 2010 William Hague suggested that: “Climate change is perhaps the twenty-first century’s biggest foreign policy challenge.” Analysts predict climate-induced threats such as: mass migrations, border insecurities, low resource availability, state fragility and even a closing down to the international trading system.³³

A number of CSDP missions and operations are already deployed in climate-challenged regions: EUTM / EUCAP Mali, EU NAVFOR Atalanta, EUCAP Somalia having as main objectives to fight off some of the threats listed above. However, the climate factors are neither the primary nor even the secondary circumstances or reasons of deployment, although, the aggravating climate change process is directly proportional with the hazards being fought off by the specified missions.

The obvious wanted achievement is, of course, renewable and clean energy. However, this complex process must be carefully analyzed, because the renewable sector has its own market with shares, profits and interests.

30 Greenstream pipeline. URL: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greenstream_pipeline [03.12.2019]

31 The European External Action Service.EUCAP Sahel Niger.Factsheet. URL: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eucap_sahel_niger_general_factsheet_en_2019.pdf [03.12.2019]

32 Cf.: Youngs, R. (2014). Article. Climate change and EU Security Policy: an Unmet Challenge.

33 Cf.: Ibid. P.101.

To respect the objectives in the 2014 strategy, the European Union must be careful when it engages in researching and implementing large-scale, clean energy projects in developing countries, as it will ultimately be used for export.³⁴ While the intentions might be good, attention has to be put into the possible, unwanted, reverse of the medal: quick grab and exporting of renewable might worsen the geopolitical conflicts in the “host countries”³⁵, especially on the region of North Africa in the detriment of genuine, long-lasting energy partnerships. If at the first sight, these factors go far beyond the frameworks of CSDP, the consequences of such actions, counter-intuitive as they are, ultimately have an impact in worsening the threats that the current missions and operations are fighting. This ultimately can lead to a devastating Hydra effect: cut off one head of the climate change giant and two more shall grow back.

8. Discussion of results and personal conclusions

This whole research process has brought us valuable statistics, measures, possibilities and the capability to anticipate future evolutions of the energy security, with each of them to be reviewed in the following sub-chapters.

8.1 Diversifying the energy supply

A major part of the research chapter was focused on the European Union’s alternatives to the Russian exports of energy. We have identified multiple such alternatives, ranging from the LNG of the United States of America to the oil and natural gas of the MENA region. Without any doubt, each and every one of them has its advantages and disadvantages.

The Middle-East and North Africa (MENA) region is known for its political unrest and turmoil in the region. However, this zone represents the most viable partner of the EU in securing its energy supplies. With the already present CSDP missions and operations in the region, negotiations of such a partnership could easily be conducted and viable solutions for both sides would be accomplished, which is a tremendously positive argument. On the other hand, these conflict-torn zones suffer from lack of infrastructure (the case of Libya).

Algeria’s export potential is limited due its difficulties in launching and supporting new projects³⁶, with the clear example of the Trans-Saharan pipeline currently under development. “Europe’s goal of significantly diversifying away from Russian gas is challenging but not impossible in the short to medium term.”³⁷

8.2 Sustainability of CSDP missions on energy security

We have previously highlighted the notion of possible CSDP missions and operations in regions that are already subject to the CSDP and represent a possible valuable partner in terms of energy imports. This could be implemented by either reworking of the current civilian missions, such as EUBAM Libya, EUCAP Sahel Niger and EUTM RCA in Central African Republic, or by deploying new, objective-ori-

34 Cf.: Youngs, R. (2014). Article. Climate change and EU Security Policy: an Unmet Challenge.P.113.

35 Cf.: Ibid.

36 Cf.: Chyong, C. K. &Slavkova, L. &Tcherneva, V. Europe’s alternatives to Russian gas. URL: https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_europes_alternatives_to_russian_gas311666 [02.12.2019]

37 Ibid.

ented CSDP operations. As this is, at the first sight, the easiest method of implementation, the main disadvantage is the possible “shift of interests” and neglect of the actual objectives (border security, civilian security reforms, troop training and so on). The five steps required to launch a CSDP operation are completely applicable to the issue of energy security and could productively co-exist with the already deployed missions. The main actor that should be included in such a procedure is a Special Envoy on International Energy, directly responsible for supervising the research, negotiations and infrastructure reforming in order for oil transportation or natural gas flow through intercontinental pipelines to properly function. This hypothetical, complex process has to be carefully conducted having in mind the fragility of the region. This is why such CSDP missions should take the form of a “partnership”, with a full-on support from the “host government” – to avoid the non-sense, but possible public speculations of land grabbing and energy draining from the territory of a developing country.

8.3 Fighting climate change

It is of utmost importance that after reading this paper, the reader acknowledges that climate change has an impact on the CFSP and that energy security is no longer perceived purely on the ever changing factors of oil and natural gas exports.³⁸

Evidence has highlighted that developing, conflicted and geopolitically challenged countries suffer heavily from the polluting habits of the world powers. It is the European Union’s responsibility, as the leading economy in the world, to respect its commitment for 2030.

The main threats that the CSDP is facing in its operations are induced by climate change, and we have identified interdependence between the two. Migration, border instability and civilian outbreaks are only to amplify if living conditions will be worsened by the effects of a changing climate.

Renewable energy is the most obvious solution for this problem, but it is also known to be a sensitive market. The EU heavily invests in this market, but we have emphasized that the Union should review its actions “with a grain of salt” – the exports of renewable energy from developing countries should not be rushed, as they can represent a destabilizing factor of the already disorganized society, and should rather focus instead on developing clean energy on the territory of the Member states.

8.4 Conclusion and personal opinion

The European society is undoubtedly on the verge of energy revolution. In the following decade, the Union will benefit from a large diversity of energy supplies, transforming the “eastern bonds” into a well-defined partnership, without the fear of possible outages or energy crises as those experienced in the past. After a thorough analysis, my conclusion is that the main factor that will influence this process is the Common Security and Defence Policy with newly designed frameworks applicable for maintaining the security of the EU’s supplies. Together with the already existent missions and operations in the MENA regions, I am convinced that the stabilization process of the zone will be heavily accelerated while also serving the European Union’s import interests.

Inevitably, these possibilities conduct us to the analogy with the third law of motion presented in the preface: every action that the Union is taking into the direction of securing its energy supplies and climate challenges, will have equal reactions ranging from close-ranging, geopolitical ones to natural, devastating consequences.

38 Cf.: Youngs, R. (2014). Article. Climate change and EU Security Policy: an Unmet Challenge.P.102.

9. Annexes

9.1 List of abbreviations

CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSDP.....	Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union
ECFR.....	European Council on Foreign Relations
EEAS.....	European External Affairs Service
EU.....	European Union
EUBAM	European Union Border Assist Mission
LNG	Liquefied Natural Gas
NAVFOR.....	Naval Force
MENA.....	Middle-East & North Africa

9.2 Figures

Figure 1: Map of oil and gas pipelines from Russia to Europe

Figure 2: Pyramid scheme of the desired approach

Figure 3: EU imports of energy products, 2015- first semester of 2019

Figure 4: EU's alternatives to Russian gas

Figure 5: Gas pipelines in North & Central Africa

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Needs for an updated or revised EU Global Strategy

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Abstract

The European Union's Global Strategy was welcomed by the Council in 2016. From that three years have passed and now we live in an even more contested and fragile world than we did. This instability and unpredictability put the Union's own security at stake. In order to provide our interests and the prosperity of our citizens we need to build greater coherence between our Member States. The Global Strategy is perfectly suitable for this role.

The EUGS creates a framework for better cooperation on the field of security and defence. However we need to update and revise it from time to time so that it will be always up-to-date and responsive to the new challenges and threats.

This paper examines if there is a need for an updated or revised Global Strategy now or just a few years later. I am going to review that to what extent the EUGS' objectives were implemented in the past few years and which kind of new goals should we set and which should be the next steps toward them. Nowadays euroscepticism affects the decision making process of the European Union remarkably through those decisions which are related to the common foreign and security policy. This research tries to give answers according to the current political and security environment

Keywords

Europe, Global Strategy, security environment, new objectives, future step

1. Preface

I am studying international security and defence policy as a civilian student of the National University of Public Service in Hungary. I have started to examine the European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy in correlation with my university studies. Personally I am greatly interested in all topics related to the CSDP and I am engaged in the issue of achieving a European strategic autonomy.

I was born in an East-Central-European country where I could see the differences between being a part of the EU or not. In the initial phase of the great European integration the Eastern Bloc was hermet-

ically separated from the rest of the continent. My parents have grown up in a world divided by the Iron Curtain while I have socialised after the political changeover in a united, joined-up Union so I can clearly see the benefits of being part of this integration and also the dark sides of being divided, due to my personal experience (family experience) and historical knowledge. I definitely believe that a strong Union is essential for the prosperity of the European citizens, especially in today's unpredictable world where the European countries cannot deal with the new challenges on their own. We need a common and integrated action plan and a Union which thinks strategically, shares a vision and acts together as Federica Mogherini urged in the foreword of the EU's Global Strategy.

This paper will focus on the European Union's Global Strategy, which was welcomed by the Council in June 2016. I am going to examine if there is a need to update or revise it by studying the EUGS content and the stages of the implementations of its objectives. This is fundamental for advancing and supporting the Union's interests.

I would like to gratefully acknowledge Dr. Anna Molnár's help, valuable suggestions and discussions. Without her expertise this paper would never have fulfilled its objectives. Support was also given by Colonel Zsolt Szilágyi, without whose advices I could not have seen clearly the military aspects of the topic. Moreover, I would like to thank for the support provided by Dr. Éva Jakusné Harnos, who helped me with the proper use of English and ensured that the paper is correct grammatically.

2. Introduction

The strategic thinking within the European Union did not start with the acceptance of the EUGS in 2016. The European Council accepted the EU's first strategic document on the 12th of December in 2003. It was created parallel with the formulation of the European security and defence policy and followed the pattern of the National Security Strategy of the United States from 2002. The process was coordinated by Javier Solana. The document's main ambition was to enable the Union to come up as a global actor in the field of common security and defence policy and it was revised in 2008. After the revision of the document eight years have passed before a new strategic concept started to take shape. However, some Member States, such as Italy, Poland, Finland, Spain and Sweden urged the elaboration of a new strategy since 2009. Finally, in 2016, after the Brexit referendum, Federica Mogherini presented the EU's new strategic document entitled "Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy". The Council welcomed the strategy on 28th of June. It is a significant difference between the strategy from 2003 and from 2016 that in 2003 the Council accepted the document but in 2016 they only welcomed it.¹

This paper examines if there is a need for an updated or revised Global Strategy. My thesis is that three years are not enough to assess a complex document like the EUGS. It has several objectives and priorities the successful implementation of which requires not just institutional reforms but also consensus among Member States on topics which impact on the sphere of national sovereignty. Nowadays euro-scepticism affects the decision making process of the EU remarkably through those decisions which are related to the common foreign and security policy.

In my opinion five years should pass before the EUGS is updated and revised. The trial or first cycle of many projects have just started, so now we cannot assess them comprehensively: we need time to see

1 Molnár, A. (2016). Az EU Global is kül- és biztonságpolitikai stratégiája. Stratégiai Védelmi Kutatóközpont, Elemzések 2016/9. <https://svkk.uni-nke.hu/document/svkk-uni-nke-hu-1506332684763/svkk-elemzesek-2016-9-az-eu-globalis-strategiája-molnar-a.original.pdf>

their flaws and vulnerabilities and correct them before we repeatedly launch new projects. Foremost we should focus on the ongoing projects and for this duty the EUGS is enough.

In order to scrutinize my thesis the essay is divided into four sections and sub-questions are analysed in each of them. The sub-questions will mostly focus on the EUGS' internal agenda, however, there is no hard line between the strategy's internal and external nexus.

The main terms of the essay are strategic autonomy, soft and hard power. In my research the definition of strategic autonomy is the following: *“strategic autonomy as the ability to set one’s own priorities and make one’s own decisions in matters of foreign policy and security, together with the institutional, political and material wherewithal to carry these through – in cooperation with third parties, or if need be alone.”*² Soft power for me means: *“the use of a country’s cultural and economic influence to persuade other countries to do something, rather than the use of military power”*.³ while hard power means the use of military power rather than cultural or economic influence.⁴

3. Current State of Research

Every year the Union publishes a review about the EUGS based on the objectives they have achieved in that year. These reviews also point to the future steps.

Moreover, every organisation of the EU which takes part in the implementation of the Global Strategy provides reviews about their work and annual work schedule. Since I am going to focus on the Common Security and Defence Policy, I would like to examine those parts of the EUGS which are related to that. Namely, the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the Military Planning of Conduct and Command (MPCC), the European Defence Fund (EDF) and the European Peace Facility (EPF). The Union provides information about these projects from time to time.

Previous works have focused on European strategic thinking and the revision of the Global Strategy. From Hungary Dr. Anna Molnár has studied European strategic thinking as well as the circumstances of the EUGS adaptation and its content. In her work from 2016, she examined European strategic thinking and the way a new strategy was created.

A more recent study was published by Sven Biscop in March 2019. The title of his work is “The EU Global Strategy 2020”. The author claims that we should review the Global Strategy when the new Commission is in place following the May 2019 European elections.⁵ In his analysis he calls for a regular and systematic review of the EUGS for which a settled procedure is absent. He draws our attention on three essential features for the establishment of a revision process. These key features are: a small drafting team (including at least one expert from outside the EU institutions); intense consultation with MS; and input from the academic world.

In another work of Biscop, which was published in September 2019, the author argues about the EU's role in the world that it cannot just be the world's professor neither the world's policeman. “We have to make sure that we have the power to make our ideas work in the real world,” claims Biscop.⁶

2 Lippert, B. & von Ondarza, N. & Perthes, V. (eds.). (2019). European Strategic Autonomy. SWP Research Paper 2019/RP 04. <https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2019RP04/#hd-d14204e258>

3 Cambridge Dictionary. <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/soft-power>

4 Cambridge Dictionary. <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/hard-power>

5 Biscop, S. (2019). The Eu Global Strategy 2020. <http://www.egmontinstitute.be/content/uploads/2019/03/SPB108.pdf>

6 Biscop, S. (2019). The Power to Engage: Giving Punch to a new EU Global Strategy 2020. Security Policy Brief. <http://www.egmontinstitute.be/content/uploads/2019/09/SPB114.pdf>

He proposes that the 2020 edition of the EUGS should be ready by the end of next spring. In his view the EU has to engage in world affairs with political, economic and military power. He also announces a bumper sticker for the 2020 Global Strategy, which is “The Power to Engage”.

I can totally agree with Mr Biscop’s suggestions. I see his points, however, in some aspects I share other authors’ different ideas.

Focusing on European strategic culture the European Council on Foreign Relations published an article about Europe’s Pursuit of Strategic Autonomy in July 2019. The paper argues about the Member States’ ambitions related to the European strategic autonomy. It also pays attention to the EU’s capability building measures and the issue of strategic sovereignty which is essential in this more contested world.⁷ It is an interesting comprehensive study which provides a deeper view into the strategic culture of the Union.

We can see that several authors examine the EUGS and one of its main goals, strategic autonomy. In my paper my I used the above mentioned authors’ points of view as a guideline to help to formulate my thesis and the answer to it. Besides, I consulted with a military officer whose suggestions helped me to understand the military aspects of the topic.

The previous studies do not cover the whole issue of my research question. Neither of them compared the current security environment to the state of implementation of the EUGS’ objectives in order to decide what specific means should be revised in the Global Strategy. This is the area where my research can produce new results. It is important to come up with concrete suggestions and ideas and not just speak in broader terms.

4. Research Gap

This paper is divided into four sections based on the research sub-questions. A detailed discussion of the European Union’s partner programs falls outside the scope of this paper due to reasons of space. Furthermore, the essay does not contain mental concepts about the establishment of a European army and its organisational background, however, I will give a personal opinion about this topic since it affects the EU’s strategic autonomy, which is a key objective of the Global Strategy.

In nowadays’ multipolar world structure where the distribution of power is more fragmented, moreover, interdependence and contestation between nations and alliances is increasing significantly, it is essential for the European Union to have a coherent strategic concept. The Global Strategy provides a frame for common strategic thinking within the EU so that the Union is able to champion its interests not only at regional but also at global levels. This strategy has to be updated and revised from time to time in order that it will not become obsolete and so as to enable the Union to give a proper answer to current and future challenges. This is why my topic is important.

5. Research Question

This essay is divided into four sections, in which I am going to examine my sub-questions. The Section One gives a brief overview of the current security environment of the world. What types of new challenges and threats must the EU face? I would like to outline those challenges which are not mentioned in the Global Strategy.

⁷ Franke, U. & Varma, T. (2019). European Council on Foreign Relation. Independence Play: Europe’s Pursuit.https://www.ecfr.eu/specials/scorecard/independence_play_europes_pursuit_of_strategic_autonomy#

Section Two analyses the implementation of the EUGS objectives. Which have been implemented so far and in which phase of implementation are they? Linked to this question I also touch upon what more we could do in the frame of the EUGS to reach its goals. In the third section I examine if there is any action which could or should be taken but the EUGS does not mention?

Finally, after the examination of the questions above, I would like to focus on the new objectives and policies (if there are any) that we should incorporate into the Global Strategy. What type of new objectives should we set in order to provide the Union's security and resilience, ensure its strength, reliability and credibility. My conclusions are drawn by answering these sub-questions.

6. Methodology

To assess the European Union's Global Strategy I mostly used secondary data such as the yearly reports of the EUGS, other authors' research and publications from the EU's websites. I examined all available literature to get acquainted with the selected topic, however, I had some limitations. My main limitation was my knowledge of languages consequently I only analysed English and Hungarian literature. My sources comprised the internet, digital libraries and publications. Besides I also used primary data. I regularly consulted with my supervisor discussing questions related to my topic.

I developed a working hypothesis which is that five years should pass before the Global Strategy is updated. To form the basis of certain assumptions I collected information that enables me to conclude if my hypothesis was right. I followed four logically connected research questions throughout my essay.

I also used graphs and diagrams to illustrate my answers.

7. Results and research results

The EUGS have five priorities which are the security of the Union; state and social resilience to our east and south; an integrated approach to conflicts and crises; cooperative regional orders; and global governance for the 21st century.⁸ In this paper I am going to focus on the security of the Union and examine the current state of security environment, the breakthroughs which we achieved in the past three years and test my research thesis.

7.1. The world we live in 2019

In her foreword to the three years' assessment of the EU's Global Strategy, Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Vice-President of the European Commission, highlights that nowadays the world is in no better shape than it was in 2016.⁹ According to the report's first chapter we live in a more connected, complex and contested world where uncertainty and rivalry are increasing. However, only a few new challenges and threats emerged in the past few years. Below is a list of those challenges which are mentioned in the EUGS and those which are prominent in 2019.

8 A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy. June 2016.

9 The European Union's Global Strategy – Three Years on, Looking Forward. Page 4. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu_global_strategy_2019.pdf

Threats in 2016 (Based in the 2016 EUGS)	Threats in 2019
Terrorism	Terrorism Illegal migration
Hybrid threats	Hybrid threats - cyber threats
Economical instability	Economical instability
Climate change	Climate change
The absence of energy security	The absence of energy security
	Proliferation
	Arms race

Table 1: The threats we are facing with in 2016 and 2019.¹⁰

As we can see, the factors which threaten us are mainly the same and there are no significant changes in the global security environment. The EUGS 2019 review states that non-proliferation and arms control are at a risk.¹¹ The world's strategic stability has altered since the United States of America quit the INF-treaty and likely will not renew the START-III agreement.¹² It is a huge drawback in the field of arms control. Moreover, the new precision weapons and weapon systems, technologies and new ways of warfare might lead to the destabilisation of the current world order. Another problem is the proliferation of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, especially in politically unstable regions where conflicts are undergoing and extremism, terrorism, the extending power of non-state actors are concrete threats. To solve these problems comprehensive treaties should be accepted in the field of non-proliferation and arms control.¹³

Let me also mention the destabilising factor of the new arms race which has begun between great powers and indicated new acquisitions of armament in Europe, too. Especially because of the NATO membership of some European countries since President Donald Trump placed pressure on them.¹⁴

Secondly, I would like to point out the hybrid threats which involve all kinds of "grey zone" tools, for instance disinformation, cyber attacks, psychological operations, indirect influencing of the society.¹⁵ As a result of their disguised nature they are more risky than the conventional means of conflicts. Furthermore, they can be applied within the Union itself, between Member States. The EU suffers from an existential crisis which opens the field of intrigue between Member States.¹⁶

¹⁰ Table created by the author, 2019.

¹¹ *ibid.* page 8.

¹² Johnson, D. (2019). General Gerasimov on the Vectors of the Development of Military Strategy. Russian Studies Series 04/2019

¹³ Author's note: Conclusion based on the author's arguments so far.

¹⁴ Reuters. (2019). NATO Moves Towards Spending Goal Sought by Trump, Spain Lags. <https://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2019/11/29/world/europe/29reuters-nato-summit-stoltenberg.html>

¹⁵ Resperger, I. (2018). A válságkezelés és a hibrid hadviselés. Dialóg Campus Kiadó. Budapest. https://nbi.uni-nke.hu/document/nbi-uni-nke-hu/Resperger%20István_A%20válságkezelés%20és%20a%20hibrid%20hadviselés.pdf

¹⁶ European Council of Foreign Relations. How to Save Europe? URL: https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_how_to_save_europe

7.2. The implementations of the EUGS' objectives

The most important characteristics related to the military capabilities of the armed forces of Member States are coherence, deployability and interoperability. In the past three years in the field of security and defence the EU achieved a historic breakthrough. In line with the 2016 EUGS several projects had been realised. In this section I would like to outline four of them which are important institutionally and which help Member States to enhance the deployability and interoperability of their forces within an EU framework.¹⁷

First of all, let me start with the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), which was established by the Council in 2017. Its objective is to provide a binding framework in order to enhance defence investments, cooperation and operational readiness among the Member States. Today PESCO has 25 participating states and 47 ongoing projects which covering areas like training, land, maritime, air, cyber and joint enablers. The key factor here is to strengthen defence cooperation and interoperability between the forces of Member States by letting them individually engage in commitments to each other.¹⁸

Secondly, I would like to mention the European Defence Fund (EDF), which provides the funds to support the implementation of cooperative defence projects in general, particularly in the area of defence research and development.¹⁹ Related to EDF, the European Peace Facility (EPF) is another fund which is designed as an off-budget fund to finance all Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) external action with military or defence implications. The proposal is going to start its first implication term in 2021.²⁰

I will continue with the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), which provides an overview of where we stand and identifies the future cooperation opportunities. The CARD has finished its trial run and will start its first full cycle in autumn 2019.²¹ It monitors the implementation of EU capability development whose priorities are identified by the Capability Development Plan (CDP).

I finish this review of the established EUGS projects with the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC), which is a permanent command and control structure at military strategic level within the EU Military Staff (EUMS). It helps the EU to react faster and more efficiently to a conflict or crisis. It was established in 2017 and by the end of 2020 it will take responsibility for the operational planning and conduct of the non-executive military CSDP missions.²²

To sum up this section, we could see the newly launched projects have started to work. These are big steps in the implementation of the Global Strategy and now we are on our way to archive strategic autonomy. There is a vision of a well coordinated, coherent institutional system where each of the system's components helps work and they are heading towards a common goal. The Capability Development Plan sets out what things we should focus our common effort on. According to it, in the frame of PESCO, Member States are able to start to collaborate. The EDF and EPF provide the money in order to support the implementation of these defence projects and the CARD monitors and assesses the state of defence cooperation in Europe.

17 The European Union's Global Strategy – Three Years on, Looking Forward. Op. cit. P. 10.

18 About PESCO. <https://pesco.europa.eu>

19 European defence fund. https://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/defence/european-defence-fund_en

20 Questions & Answers: The European Peace Facility. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/46286/european-peace-facility-qa_en

21 European Defence Agency. Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) . (26 November 2018). https://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/eda-factsheets/2018-11-26-factsheet_card.pdf

22 The Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC). (November 2018). https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/mpcc_factsheet_november_2018.pdf

7.3 Actions which we could or should implement but the EUGS does not mention

The EUGS put greater emphasis on the EU's own security, defence capabilities and defence cooperation than the previous strategic documents. Besides, it does not mention the necessity of the establishment of a European army. However, the state of strategic autonomy is a vital goal of the strategy and it cannot be reached without a real operational military capability.²³

As I defined the term of strategic autonomy in my introduction, it is the “ability to set our own priorities and make our own decisions in matters of foreign policy and security, together with the institutional, political and material wherewithal to carry these through – in cooperation with third parties, or if need be alone”. It is clear that we cannot reach this state only with the use of soft power. Today's threats cannot be deterred with the use of traditional foreign policy tools of sticks and carrots. Furthermore, Europe must not take NATO, especially U.S. protection for granted. We should not depend on the Americans. The EU is in the G3, it is a global player and all global players need real military capabilities which can be provided by the establishment of an army. This type of hard power suits the fulfilment of the ambition of strategic autonomy and the enables us to act more sufficiently as a global security provider.²⁴

Of course the establishment of a European army in the frame of the Union has many obstacles. It affects the national sovereignty which is a fragile topic between the Member States. It is something which we could not agree on easily, everyone should make a concession and it is not obvious that all Member States could do it. Especially the ones who are more eurosceptic and are against deeper integration. As this picture below shows, the European strategic autonomy is not an important goal for all the MS. More than the Member States 45% think that it is not important or they are clearly against it. Only 25% of them consider it as a necessary thing.



Figure 1: How important is the goal of European strategic autonomy to your country's foreign and defence policy?²⁵

23 Molnár, A. (2016). Op. cit. P. 7.

24 Based on an interview with Colonel Zsolt Szilágyi, chief of the Hungarian EOD and Warship Regiment.

25 Source of picture: https://www.ecfr.eu/specials/scorecard/independence_play_europes_pursuit_of_strategic_autonomy#

7.4. New objectives

According to the results above there are two new objectives that we should incorporate in the Global Strategy.

First of all we should act as a stakeholder and initiate a new agreement about non-proliferation and arms control. The most suitable forum for this is the United Nation since it contains all countries of the Globe.

A comprehensive international agreement about non-proliferation and arms control is not just the interest of the EU but of other nations, too. The Union has the necessary political and economic weight and influence to initiate something like that. It would enhance the global security and predictability which directly influences the Union's security.²⁶

The second initiative which should be incorporated in the EUGS is the enhancement of hard power tools and building a deterrent capability. We need military power if we want to provide global security. Without real and common operational capabilities we are not able to promote our interests because our ambitions lead further into the reinforcement of our role on a global stage. PESCO is a perfect start and first step on this way but we should not stop here and be satisfied.²⁷

To conclude, I would like to underline that these two initiated objectives are extremely ambitious and affect the national sovereignty of Member States but also essential for a greater integration. A new Commission have just formed so we do not know their intentions yet according to this topic.

I would also like to point out that in my opinion focusing on the present projects would be an appropriate solution to my research question. We cannot concentrate on everything all the time. Firstly, we have to fully implement our ongoing projects and when they are working we can start to deal with new challenges. There is a proverb in Hungary: a person who starts to deal with too many things, will fall under the bench between two chairs (*Ki sok felé kap, két szék között a pad alá esik.*)²⁸ The Union should not make this mistake. We have to make a list of our objectives and start to implement them in order.

8. Discussion of Results

As predicted, my results show that there are no such significant changes which require a revised Global Strategy now. We are faced with the same threats as in 2016, they are just intensified as the world has become more interdependent. Three years on the EUGS have just started to implement its objectives and have not achieved all the goals.

After I have examined my research questions I made the conclusion that now we do not need to update the Global Strategy. We should let it work for five years and update it in 2021. But the conclusion of the essay should be interpreted with caution. I have only studied the state of the security of our Union and I left out the transatlantic relationships, the questions about the cooperation with NATO. It leaves the discussion open to several arguments against my thesis. Now I would like to highlight some cons.

Contrary to the conclusions above, some scholars might say that we should not just concentrate on the current projects but look into the future and start to take actions in order to be prepared for the

26 Author's note: Conclusion based on the author's arguments so far.

27 Author's note: Conclusion based on the author's arguments so far after an interview with a military officer, mentioned above.

28 Arcanum. <https://www.arcanum.hu/hu/online-kiadvanyok/Szolasok-regi-magyar-szolasok-es-kozmondasok-1/erdelyi-janos-magyar-kozmondasok-konyve-2E62/p-4668/6130-ki-sok-fele-kap-ket-szek-kozott-a-pad-ala-esik-466C/>

forthcoming events. If we only focus on the present then we can find ourselves behind. So now let us support the ongoing projects but also name the new needs and incorporate them into the Strategy. Thus, when in 2021 we have the smoothly working projects, we do not have to think about what to do next: we will have our answers. This spares time for the Union.

However, our EUGS related projects have been only working for a few years or have just been in a trial cycle. First of all, we should concentrate on these elements and test them to see their limitations and flaws which we can correct later. In my opinion we should not rush into new challenges and start new projects until the old ones are all working reliably and smoothly. Our task should be to monitor their work in the next two years. After that we can start to launch new projects.

I can argue this point of view in another way too. Due to the fact that now there are no concrete concepts about completely new steps it would take time to come up with new ideas. It also takes time to agree with the Member States about new concepts. So it would take at least for a year to update the EUGS. But then we are nearly in 2021, so, as far as I can judge, it is enough to revise the document in 2021.

Another remarkable point is that if we update the Strategy too often we could miss the big picture and make a mistake that we only focus on the smaller steps. But that is called a tactical and not a strategic thinking. A strategy sees the world affairs and the Union's place in the world order in a longer term.

Moreover, it is hard to reach agreements between Member States about CSDP related questions. We cannot predict if they would be interested in a revised strategy or not. The Union is more divided than ever, which creates obstacles in the way of a deeper integration on common security projects. The revision of the EUGS does not depend on the High Representative or experts, it depends on the political leaders of Member States. Their motivations influence the future of the Global Strategy. We could witness that thirteen years had to pass before the Union came up with an up-to-date strategic document and it was only welcomed by the Council and not accepted. In case this tendency continues we cannot be sure that the update of the EUGS will be feasible. Also a new Commission have just started their work. There is a chance that the new President of the Commission wants to update the strategy. We will see.

To sum up my work, I think that we need a substantial strategic culture and strategic autonomy in order to build a strong and resilient Union. To achieve this we need an up-to-date Global Strategy which enables us to respond to the threats correctly and in a joined-up way so that we can promote our interests sufficiently in this fragile world. As Mr. Sven Biscop said, we need a systematic and regular review of the Global Strategy. In my opinion this should happen in every five years because this amount of time is enough to see and predict new trends and set new goals in line with them.

9. Annexes

9.1 List of Abbreviations

CARD	Coordinated Annual Review on Defence
CDP	Capability Development Plan
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
EDF	European Defence Fund
EPF	European Peace Facility
EU	European Union
EUGS	European Union's Global Strategy
EUMS	European Union Military Staff
G3	Group of 3
INF-treaty	Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
MPCC	Military Planning and Conduct Capability
MS	Member States
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
PESCO	Permanent Structured Cooperation
START-III	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
UN	United Nations
U.S.	United States

9.2 List of Figures

Figure 1: How important is the goal of European strategic autonomy to your country's foreign and defence policy?

9.3 List of Tables

Table 1: The threats we are facing with in 2016 and 2019

9.4 List of Literature

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Needs for an updated or revised EU global strategy (EUGS)

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Abstract

EU global strategy (EUGS) is one of the most crucial documents regarding European Union’s Foreign and security policy. Its importance is in determining common guidelines for joint activities on the field of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Signing of this strategy is a big step towards integration of all the member states regarding CFSP. It is precisely because of the great importance of this strategy that we need to reassess and critically analyse it. Upon studying currently available sources it becomes clear that there is not a single study which does exactly that. That is why this paper will analyse the strategy in detail. It will break down the strategy into components and will explain its logical structure, after which a research of logical consistency will be conducted. At the very end of the paper the results of the overall analysis are presented, and the author discusses the conclusions reached.

Keywords

EUGS, security, strategy, CFSP, revision

1. Preface

As a third year cadet on Croatian Defence Academy „Dr. Franjo Tuđman“ the author has attended a fair number of courses in field of political , geopolitical, security and management studies and as such understands the importance of strategic management today. So far, the author has studied the National Security Strategy of Republic of Croatia, written in 2017, as well as the process of its making. Aware of the potential weaknesses of security policy created by Republic of Croatia without the help and cooperation from its allied states, and the possibilities which the integration of the CFSP policies offers, the author took interest in EUGS. The need for a proper EU strategy is of utmost importance to the Union itself. It is thus necessary that such documents are constantly revised and updated. The ever-shifting world around us necessitates that we actively partake in upgrading our strategic management. Critical thinking and studies of existing strategy is our duty as European citizens if we are to secure a peaceful and prosperous lives for our children.

2. Introduction

Three years have passed since making EUGS. This document has made a great leap from the idealism of ESS, the strategic document which preceded EUGS. The new strategy is rooted in realpolitik, but „Realpolitik in the original sense of the term. As John Bew usefully reminds us, Realpolitik as coined by the German liberal Ludwig von Rochau in 1853 meant a rejection of liberal utopianism, but not of liberal ideals themselves.“¹ Such a strategy is necessary for European CFSP if desired results of those policies are to be seen. Regardless, despite the many advantages over the older versions such as ESS, it is worth looking into just how well EUGS is written and recognising certain aspects of it that can be improved. This intention is what this entire paper is based on. In order to effectively examine this idea, previous studies on this subject must be analysed. After this, certain topics that were not addressed in previous studies will be researched. In this paper, all the research shall be conducted exclusively on EUGS. It will be broken down into elements, which will then be systemised into a logical structure and presented. All of this will be done in order to define a clear purpose of each priority given in EUGS so that the inconsistencies in the strategy itself can be recognised.

Through this paper the concept of security will be used. Since this concept can be defined in many ways it is imperative that it is clarified. When security is mentioned here, it is referred to the book *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*.² In this book security is defined through five dimensions i.e. military, political, economic, social and environmental security. Population, state and international community are referent objects when talking about security. The Strategy itself states that it is oriented towards the security of the citizens and territory of the European union, while the international community is observed due to its role in providing said security because „The external cannot be separated from the internal.“³

3. Current State of Research

In this chapter previously conducted researches about EUGS will be discussed. The primary objective is to find research gaps which will allow the author to make his own contributions to the subject. Upon analysis of these studies, it becomes clear that they can be roughly categorised into three distinct categories. This rough estimate will allow easier understanding of the topic.

The first category is consisted of studies that aim to describe the process of how EUGS came to as well as its differences from ESS from 2003. Some of these studies are as follows:

In the book *Towards an EU global strategy – Consulting the experts*⁴ the early ideas of what EUGS should be like are given, however, since it came out before the release of EUGS it lacks a critical analysis of currently existing Strategy

Antonio Missiroli (2015.)⁵ describes the stages in the making of EUGS in his book.

In a study by Žutić and Čehulić Vukadinović (2017.)⁶ a comparison between EUGS and ESS is made, from which a conclusion that EUGS is a strategy that established the EU as an effective strategic actor arises. However, they too did not conduct research regarding needs for revisions.

1 Biscop, S. (2016). *The EU Global Strategy: Realpolitik with European Characteristics*. Security Policy Brief No. 75. June 2016. P. 1.

2 Cf.: Buzan, B. & Wæve, O. & de Wilde, J. (1998). *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*.

3 European Union Global Strategy (2016). P. 17.

4 Cf.: Missiroli, A. et al. (2016). *EU-ISS: Towards an EU global strategy – Consulting the experts*.

5 Cf.: Missiroli, A. (2015). *Towards an EU global strategy – Background, process, references*.

6 Cf.: Žutić, I. & Čehulić Vukadinović, L. (2017). *EU GLOBAL STRATEGY – AN UPGRADE OR NEW OS?. Europske studije*. 3 (5-6). 0-0.

In an article by Tocci (2016.)⁷ the genesis of EUGS is described in detail, but once again without a critical analysis.

The second category consists of studies made on a single aspect of the strategy, while omitting other parts of it. Some of these are as follows: Sven Biscop's article (2016.)⁸ talks about the most realistic strategy yet. His research is not aimed at finding shortcomings of EUGS, but rather at explaining the core principles on which it was made.

Wolfgang Wosolobe in his article⁹ talks about the Strategy by summarizing guidelines given for military engagement

In article Juncos, A. E. (2017)¹⁰ discusses a new all-around access of strengthening countries' resilience introduced by EUGS, but without critically analysing the entire Strategy.

The third group consists of researches that haven't significantly touched on the content of the Strategy, rather discussing its effects on other political domains. Some of the examples are:

Article made by Margriet Drent & Dick Zandee (2016.)¹¹ problematizes the process of carrying out policies of the EUGS.

In article Howorth, J. (2016.)¹² effectiveness of the EUGS is questioned on a political level without critically thinking about its content.

4. Research gap

As shown in the previous chapter, author didn't find a single relevant paper that would critically discuss EUGS in its entirety. It also appears as no one has even thought of questioning the logical structure of the Strategy. No researches were conducted about necessity of adding amendments or altering parts of the Strategy.

5. Research question

The main question of this essay is: does EUGS need to be updated or revised? To answer this question, we must first answer two sub-questions: What is the Strategy's logical structure, and are there any shortcomings in it?

6. Methodology

Our research question is the following: does EUGS require any changes or amendments? The answer to question can be researched in two ways. One is through analysis of the Strategy's content and condition of EU's strategic environment, thus finding defects in the Strategy. Second way to answer this question is to disassemble the Strategy into its logical components and analyse the logical structure.

7 Cf.: Tocci, N. (2016). The making of the EU Global Strategy. *Contemporary Security Policy*, 37(3), P. 461-472.

8 Cf.: Biscop, S. (2016). *Op. cit.*

9 Cf.: Wosolobe, W. (2016). *After the EUGS: specifying the military tasks*, Alert – No. 35.

10 Cf.: Juncos, A. E. (2017). Resilience as the new EU foreign policy paradigm: a pragmatist turn?. *European security*, 26(1), P. 1-18.

11 Cf.: Margriet Drent & Dick Zandee (2016). *After the EUGS: mainstreaming a new CSDP*, Alert – No. 34.

12 Howorth, J. (2016). EU Global Strategy in a Changing World: Brussels' approach to the emerging powers. *Contemporary Security Policy*. 37(3). P. 389-401.

Author decides for the second approach and asks two sub-questions:

- What is the Strategy's logical structure?
- Are there any shortcomings in the Strategy's logical structure?

To answer these questions, we will explain Strategy's logical structure in the first part of our research. In the second part, we will analyse in detail each priority, as well as their relationship with strategic interests and values. Doing this will expose certain logical errors and point out any needs for amending the Strategy.

Thus, type of research requires only the Strategy itself and researcher's analysis. Our methodical approach to this research will be scientific hermeneutics, i.e. author's interpretation of the Strategy.

7. Research and Results of Research

In this chapter, we will conduct the research to answer the research question. We will first explain the relation of values, strategic interests, principles and priorities given in the Strategy. In second part of our research, each priority will be individually critically processed, and then connected to the strategic interest it directly affects. That part has the goal of exploring the existence of logical connection between priorities and strategic interests, as well as logical connection of guidelines given in the priority itself, all to finally provide the answer to our research question.

7.1 Values, interests, principles and priorities

EUGS is a strategic level document whose aim is to provide general guidelines for strategic actions of the European Union. The Strategy has an extreme importance, for it provides a vision of a strong, united European Union, ready to bear its role in global politics. To make that vision come true, the Strategy codifies commonly shared values, principles and interests among all members of the European Union. These interests and principles then beget priorities and principles for Europe's actions and attitude in its CFSP. EUGS attempts to instil a unity among all members of the European Union in their response on important strategic questions concerning safety of all European Union's citizens and European Union's territory.

The Strategy presents the main values of European Union to be peace and security, prosperity, democracy, and a rules-based world. Strategic interests stem from aforementioned values. Promoting peace and guaranteeing European citizens' and territory safety are quoted as primary interest of European Union. Improving prosperity for EU's citizens is quoted as a second interest. With prosperity meaning: „*promoting growth, jobs, equality, and a safe and healthy environment*”¹³. Furthermore, as third interest, strengthening democracies' resilience is stated, resilience in this case being defined in this manner: „*States are resilient when societies feel they are becoming better off and have hope in the future*”¹⁴. The fourth interest in the strategy is promoting world order based on multilateralism and a rules-based world.

Before setting priorities of EU's course of action, it is necessary to set principles which will guide EU in creating and conducting its policies. One of the main principles, is the unity of EU and its interests with national interests of individual member states. Inclusion in relevant events around the world and being committed to solving problems at their core is another crucial principle because „*internal policies often*

13 European Union Global Strategy (2016). Op. cit. P. 14.

14 Ibid. P. 26.

*deal only with the consequences of external dynamics*¹⁵. Listed as another principle is existence of feeling responsibility for the consequences of its actions. The last, but not least, is the principle of cooperation with countries, as well as regional and international organizations while enforcing policies. At the very end of the Strategy, it is said that its enforcement requires EU to be credible, responsive and joined-up. Priorities on acting were set to make sure their enforcement would be guided by predefined principles and result in realization of EU's strategic interests. They are the best-defined guidelines for enforcing the Strategy, and therefore take up the largest part of EUGS. To find shortcomings in the Strategy, we will break down one priority at a time and connect them with the interest they directly influence. It's important to emphasize that each priority indirectly influences all the interests, but we'll stay oriented on a direct correlation between a priority and an interest to look for possible lacks in Strategy's orienteers on each individual interest. Special attention must be paid to the first priority, because that's where the author found the Strategy to be inconsistent

7.2 Priority analysis

The first priority is security of the EU. The Strategy here lists threats to its citizens and territory to define sub-priorities required to fulfil the first major priority. These threats are „*terrorism, hybrid threats, climate change, economic volatility and energy insecurity*”¹⁶. Defining the threats gives us a better outlook of EU's security, however, things begin to change when the Strategy lists five sub-priorities, which are: security and defence, counterterrorism, cyber security, energy security and strategic communications. The sub-priorities clearly show a more narrow understanding of the term „security“, i.e. without considering economy and ecology, as the Strategy completely lacks guidelines on how to respond to climate changes or economic volatility. All of the sub-priorities are directed at strategic resources required to defend against an outside hybrid threat. Although the first sub-priority mentions the word safety, it is understood in a narrower context, without considering economic and ecological dimensions of safety. Although visible from the whole chapter, it is best shown in the following excerpt: “*addressing challenges with both an internal and external dimension, such as terrorism, hybrid threats, cyber and energy security, organised crime and external border management.*”¹⁷ Furthermore, sub-priority „energy security“ does not provide an answer to the threat of climate changes, because is focused solely on energy management aimed at strategic energy supply autonomy, without even addressing the issue of climate changes. Therefore, the Strategy talks about safety of its citizens and territory, yet completely ignores economic and ecological dimension of security. How illogical and inconsistent the Strategy is, is best recognised in the fact that its first priority recognises the problem of economic volatility and climate changes, yet still forgets to provide guidelines on how to address these threats. All in all, we can say that the first enforcement priority has a direct influence on realization of the first interest – promoting peace and guaranteeing security of EU's citizens and territory – should we consider security as a term that doesn't include ecological and economic dimension.

Second priority is investing in resilience of countries to the east of Europe all the way to central Asia, and to middle Africa to the south. The Strategy divides that priority into activities towards countries with ambitions to join EU, activities towards those that wish to reinforce their cooperation with the EU, and activities towards unstable countries in these regions. As another important part of this priority, the Strategy lists the need for a better migrations policy towards countries in transition. This shows that all determinants important for realization of this priority have been considered, which directly affects the realization of the third interest – strengthening democracies' resilience.

15 Ibid. P. 17.

16 Ibid. P. 18-19.

17 Ibid. P. 20.

The third priority is an integrated approach to conflicts and crises. Integrated approach means „use of all available policies and instruments aimed at conflict prevention, management and resolution”¹⁸. This priority is in fact an amendment of the previous one. When enforcing the second priority fails, and a crisis arises in a specific country, different sort of activities are required. Activities in third priority consist of pre-emptive activities, activities responding to crisis and activities towards rebuilding state and society after the crisis is over. Strategy puts special emphasis on importance of establishing a legitimate economy in crisis-struck countries. We can say that the third priority has considered all the most important items for its realization, hence directly enabling the third interest – strengthening democracies’ resilience.

Fourth priority are cooperative regional orders. It has been stated that „Voluntary forms of regional governance offer states and peoples the opportunity to better manage security concerns, reap the economic gains of globalisation, express more fully cultures and identities, and project influence in world affairs.”¹⁹ This is one of many reasons why this strategy decides to settle on a multilateral approach to world order. This priority consists of activities towards building European security, emphasizing the threat coming from Russia, activities towards Mediterranean, Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa, activities towards countries across the Atlantic, activities towards dominant countries in Asian regions and activities towards Arctic. It’s easily noticeable that this priority has given attention to all the important regional systems, which directly enables the realization of fourth strategic interest – strengthening multilateral world order.

Fifth priority is global leadership for the 21st century. The Strategy envisions UN as „bedrock of the multilateral rules-based order, and develop globally coordinated responses with international and regional organisations, states and non-state actors.”²⁰ Put simply, the priority is creating a powerful UN, which would be accomplished by reforming it, investing in it, and especially its missions, enforcing its decisions regarding sustainable growth, climate change, encouraging free trade, enforcing disarmament treaty, and defining rules in all areas of activity shared with other international actors. From this stem a conclusion that the fifth priority provides all the guideline necessary for its execution. Fifth priority has a direct influence on realization of the fourth interest – creating a rules-based global order based on multilateralism.

7.3 Research results

7.3.1 What is the Strategy's logical structure?

The Strategy is assembled by defining EU’s core values, from which strategic interests are derived. Certain priorities are defined to assure interests’ realization. From these priorities, sub-priorities have been derived, whose enforcement is directly correlated to the realization of priorities. To assure policies directed via priorities and sub-priorities positively affect the realization of strategic interests, adherence to certain principles is required. Simultaneously, successfully implementing the strategy requires EU to be credible, responsive and joined-up.

18 Ibid. P. 28.

19 Ibid. P. 32.

20 Ibid. P. 39.

7.3.2 Are there any shortcomings in the Strategy's logical structure?

Research results have shown that the Strategy's logical structure itself is flawed, making two major logic flaws, as the strategy lists four major interests, along with five priorities which are supposed to assure interests' realization. This would not be as odd, had the second interest not been directly unsupported through any of the priorities. Not a single priority addresses the interest of „growth, jobs, equality, and a safe and healthy environment”²¹. Second major logic flaw is the fact that while the Strategy acknowledges the threat of economic volatility and climate change, it doesn't provide even a single guideline in dealing with these threats to provide EU's citizens with economic and ecological security.

7.3.3 Does EUGS need to be updated or revised?

A rather obvious conclusion is that a consistent strategy would require addressing economic volatility and climate change through either an additional priority, or through a first priority's sub-priorities, providing clear guidelines for tackling these issues. The nature of these guidelines is a topic for another research, but these measures should be aiming for prevention, response to, and recovery from eventual financial and ecological crises. To answer our research question, revision of the Strategy is most certainly necessary due to its logical fallacies.

8. Discussion of Results and personal Conclusions

One of the most important prerequisites for making a good strategy is its logical structure. It is essential to clearly define values, interests, priorities and sub-priorities and put in a clear hierarchy. Each sub-priority must directly influence the execution of priorities, which in turn must be determined in a way that allows for a direct influence on completion of interests. Those interest must originate from established, written values. When making a strategy, we must first observe the core values, then interests, which finally lead to priorities and sub-priorities. Before determining the priorities and sub-priorities, a strategic analysis must be conducted. This can be achieved through SWOT analysis or any other technique which will help us to determine best priorities for achieving our interests. After this whole process is done, it is necessary to regulate principles which will guide the policies' application based on that strategy. In order for strategy to keep its logical consistency it's important that for each interest there exist at least one subordinated priority with its sub-priorities. In addition, each written value must be articulated as interest.

In the EUGS it really is the case that for each value there is an assigned interest, however it becomes clear that there is a big flaw in connectivity between interests and priorities. The strategy did not determine a priority which would directly influence on achieving the second interest so a mistake in a logical structure of strategy itself has been made. It has also been noted that during the strategic analysis for determining first priority's sub-priorities the danger of economic volatility and climate changes has been observed. Despite this, these threats have not been addressed at all when determining sub-priorities. In this way the Strategy has shown its inconsistency once more. A question arises; how can such obvious mistakes be made in such an important document? Possible answers to this question shall be presented in the next paragraph of this chapter, however it will not offer a definitive or conclusive solution to this problem which will leave room for further research into this topic.

²¹ Ibid. P. 14.

At first glance there appear to be two possible explanations. First is that these errors are accidental, with second being that they were made on purpose. With the assumption that these mistakes were accidents, the solution is pretty simple. The authors of EUGS didn't think the logical structure through, and simply forgot to give guidelines for dealing with defined threats after finishing the strategic analysis. Given that the great number of experts on the subject have contributed to EUGS, as seen in an article by Tocci N. (2016.)²², this idea must simply be rejected. Thus, it can be concluded that this error was purposeful. Such an interpretation presents many new questions, of which two stick out the most. These are as follows: why such mistakes have been made, and in whose interest? This paper will not even attempt to offer any answers to these questions since it would derail the paper from its main topic.

Regardless, one might be tempted to argue that ecological changes have been addressed. Indeed, in the fifth priority there is a sub-priority that defines EU's willingness to abide by UN's decisions on sustainable development and climate change. Therefore, it can be argued that this sub-priority is connected to enhancement of the prosperity of EU citizens. This argument loses its validity when one takes into account the following context: *"It will increase climate financing, drive climate mainstreaming in multilateral fora, raise the ambition for review foreseen in the Paris agreement, and work for clean energy cost reductions."*²³ Just before this sentence it's written: *"The EU will lead by example by implementing its commitments on sustainable development and climate change"*²⁴ Taking into consideration that this is a sub-priority of the fifth priority it becomes clear that the main purpose of this policy is to strengthen the UN's position as a global leader. That is why the author believes that the security threat which the European citizens face has been ignored. This necessitates broader and clearer guidelines which will directly impact the second interest. It is important to note here that a well written strategy defines priorities in a way that they not only directly influences one interest, but indirectly affects others as well. Author is therefore inclined to believe that the Strategy is well written in these aspects.

This research has shown some glaring inconsistencies in EUGS. With all the due respect to the threat climate change poses, the author thinks that a far more pressing concern is the economic dimension of security. The logic behind this reasoning is that the lack of proper strategy on the matters of economics will affect the citizens sooner than ecological threats, which leaves more time for dealing with ecological challenges. It is author's firm belief that clear strategic guidelines for prevention of economic crisis, dealing with such crisis and for economic revitalization must be defined. If we truly want economic stability and security for our citizens it is important to implement these guidelines which will directly influence second interest, while at the same time indirectly affecting other interests and principles. The author encourages experts to conduct further studies which will show which guidelines, priorities and sub-priorities must be implemented into the Strategy to truly offer economic stability and prosperity for European citizens.

22 Cf.: Tocci, N. (2016). Op. cit. P. 461-472.

23 European Union Global Strategy (2016). Op. cit. P. 40.

24 Ibid. P. 40.

9. Annexes

9.1 List of abbreviations

EUGS	European Global Strategy
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU.....	European Union
UN.....	United Nations

9.2 List of literature

9.2.1 Books

01. Buzan, B. & Wæve, O. & de Wilde, J. (1998). Security: A New Framework for Analysis
02. Missiroli, A. (2015). Towards an EU global strategy – Background, process, references.
03. Missiroli, A. et al. (2016). EU-ISS: Towards an EU global strategy – Consulting the experts

9.2.2 Articles

01. Biscop, S. (2016). The EU Global Strategy: Realpolitik with European Characteristics. Security Policy Brief No. 75. June 2016.
02. European Union Global Strategy (2016.)
03. Howorth, J. (2016). EU Global Strategy in a Changing World: Brussels' approach to the emerging powers. Contemporary Security Policy. 37(3). P. 389-401
04. Juncos, A. E. (2017). Resilience as the new EU foreign policy paradigm: a pragmatist turn? European security. 26(1), P. 1-18
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The Best Strategic Use of CSDP in EU-Africa Relations

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Abstract

This paper aims to answer to the following research question: 'What is the strategic use of the Common Security and Defense Policy for EU-African relations?'

To do so, the work first focussed on the current relations between the European Union and Africa. The most important elements in this relations are twofold. Firstly, there are two important cooperation frameworks between the two actors, namely the Joint Africa-Eu Strategy and the Cotonou agreement that was signed in 2000. Secondly, there are areas of cooperation such as trade, development, migration, counter-terrorism and security. These two sides of the partnership form the basis upon which the Common Security and Defence Policy can be based.

Afterwards, the CSDP was analysed in the African continent, first in the extent and then in the exact strategic use of this policy on EU-African relations. As for the extent, research learned that the majority of CSDP missions actually take place in African countries, showing that it is the main theatre. It is a continent that is permanently plagued with instability and insecurity but has limited resources, meaning it is highly dependent on external aid such as in the CSDP context.

Moreover, the paper concluded the best strategic use of CSDP for EU-African relations is in improving stability in Africa and strengthening its relations with the continent. This is all in order to diminish the current security risks for Europe that might stem for the African continent, such as migration and terrorism.

Keywords:

CSDP, Africa, EU, security, strategic

1. Preface

The first mission in the context of the Common Security and Defence Policy was introduced in 2003, merely four years after the creation of what then was called the ESDP.

In those times, the main field of interests was in Central and Eastern Europe, with the situation having escalated in the Balkans in the nineties. The main reasoning was that the primary field of interest for CSDP missions would be either in the scope of Europe itself or in its neighbourhood. Yet already in the early 21st Century, the first mission to the African continent was created. It concerned the Operation Artemis that took place in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Over the past two decades, the world has seen a serious amount of conflicts and humanitarian crisis in the African continent. It is therefore not entirely surprising that the main theatre of CSDP missions lies exactly in this region, instead of in Europe's close neighbourhood.

2. Introduction

The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union is an important pillar in its security strategy. With this policy, the EU wants to create a comprehensive approach in order to be able to respond to crisis throughout the world that might affect the security situation in our countries. It therefore puts both military and civilian assets to use by creating peace keeping operations. These missions however are not only limited to the traditional sense of peace keeping, but also entail operations that must prevent conflicts, strengthen the international security or end human rights violations and human suffering.

The European Union emphasizes that what happens outside of its borders can have a strong impact on the security within the Union. The Common Security and Defence Policy was therefore established in order to be able to face the increasingly complex and multidimensional challenges as a unified front, instead of all of the small of a bit less small countries on their own. The interests of all members are linked, thus a strong collaboration between states in the EU based on the Global Strategy is a priority for all.

Africa is certainly one of the most turbulent regions in the world at this moment. It is a brewing continent with a complicated dynamic and history. While the continent is full of potential, it is on the other hand facing a number of difficulties. The European Union highly values its relationship with Africa, certainly the continent's importance in the security environment. Hence, missions to Africa are high on the priority list of the EU's external action and thus for CSDP as well. Consequently, the region is the main theatre of operation of Common Security and Defence Policy missions.

Therefore, it is certainly interesting to research the influence of CSDP on relations between the European Union and Africa. As there has been no comprehensive research done on this subject up until now, this paper aims to answer the question 'What is the best strategic use of CSDP for EU-Africa relations?'.

3. Current State of research

The subject of the strategic use of the Common Security and Defense Policy of the European Union is one that has seen limited research. Moreover, CSDP's strategic use for relations between the EU and the African continent has been researched even less. Yet there have been a few studies that did cover some elements that could be placed under the subject in part. The first element of the current research that must be stated is the research on the use of CSDP itself.

Since the establishment of the Common Security and Defense Policy, the European Union has struggled to live up to the initial goals of the policy. The foreseen theory behind the document has not been put into practice. There are two elements mentioned in the European Security Strategy published in 2003, namely the component of operations and the component of capability development.

The operational component demanded fast and robust interventions from the European states, but the last two decades have barely seen any realization of that goal.¹ That does not entail that the Eu has not been an active agent around globe, since it has organized more than twenty operations in several theatres, with both civilian and military assets.

However, the effectiveness has been dismal. In nearly all cases, the EU has taken reactive actions that had not been well conceived before, consisting of inadequate strategic thought. One of the main issues is that there is an intention to take action, but the means remain rather limited.² This combination results in many operations of poor quality that are not able to attain the necessary goals.

In order to resolve this continuing issue, a clarification of the priorities must be finalized and recognized by all involved parties. We must therefore conclude that the strategic use of the Common Security and Defense policy is lacking.

4. Research gap

There is certainly a lack of research on the strategic use of the Common Security and Defense Policy for the relations between the European Union and the African continent. While there has been some research done concerning the effectiveness and the implication of the CSDP, which could be combined and put together so that the strategic use of the Policy becomes a bit more defined, there is no comprehensive work. An overview of all the necessary elements to analyse the strategic use has not been written yet. On EU-Africa relations in particular, there has been barely any attention to the implication of the Common Security and Defense Policy in this relationship. This paper will therefore aim to fill in the wide gap currently existing in the literature and research the strategic use of CSDP regarding all the African states in general.

5. Research questions

This paper aims to answer to the following research question: ‘What is the strategic use of the Common Security and Defense Policy for EU-African relations?’. To do so, different subordinate questions need to be posed beforehand. Firstly, the question on what are the current relations between the European Union and Africa will be regarded. Secondly, attention will turn on the extent of the CSDP on the African continent at this moment. Thirdly, the paper will work towards the main question on what the best strategic use of the CSDP is for Eu-Africa relations.

1 Witney, “Where Does Csdp Fit in EU Foreign Policy.”

2 Biscop and Coelmont, “Europe Deploys Towards a Civil-Military Strategy for CSDP.”

6. Methodology

As a methodology, a comprehensive literature study is used. The first step is the reading and analysis of the basic documents on the Common Security and Defense Policy and the European Union's approach to cooperation on the security domain. This entails in the EU's Shared Vision from 2016, written out in the report named *Shared Vision, Common action: A stronger Europe*. Of course the handbook on Common Security and Defense Policy from 2017 is essential here. The second step contains the search for secondary works that comment on the utility of CSDP and detail the different practical uses of the policy. As there is not yet any comprehensive work on the topic, variant sources on the EU's relations with Africa will be placed besides each other in order to reach a general picture of the current situation and the future possibilities.

7. Research and result of research

7.1 Common Security and Defence Policy

The European Union is an intergovernmental organization that strives for peace, prosperity and democracy. In order for that to even be on the table, both internal and external security has to be guaranteed. The Common Security and Defence policy (CSDP) was established to pursue security, focussing on crisis management and defence. It involves both military and civilian missions to maintain peace and forms a politico-military arm to the already existing Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).³

7.2 Eu-African relations

7.2.1 Outside of EU context

Africa's relations with the European Union goes far beyond merely the CSDP operations in the region. European countries, NGO's and other organization also have their own missions and interests in particular African countries or regions. The security policy of the EU and their CSDP is relatively new, and therefore has limited experience with peacekeeping or crisis response operations. However, many countries in Europe do have long historic ties with African countries and have developed an approach based on diplomatic ties, trade, development and humanitarian aid, energy security and antiterrorism. The CSDP cannot dismiss this strategic tradition in the African continent of its members. As they have their own security policy individually or in the context of bilateral or multilateral cooperation between European countries, the European Union must find a way to use this experience to be able to act as the intergovernmental actor that it is in the field of global security and defence.⁴

7.2.2 Within EU

Africa is a brewing continent with a complicated dynamic and history. It is a region full of potential but is also facing a number of difficulties. The European Union highly values its relationship with Africa, the continent's importance in assuring security environment is not to be neglected. Therefore, Africa

³ Union, Handbook on CSDP.

⁴ Rummel, "In Search of a Trademark: EU Civilian Operations in Africa."

holds an importance place in the EU Global Strategy and is mentioned in the priorities of its external action. The Global strategy for the EU in Africa entails the following.

Generally, the European Union wants to invest in peace and development in the African continents as a way of investing in its own security. To do so, cooperation with several organisations in the region should be strengthened. These organisations include first of all the African Union, but also more regional organisations such as the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development in eastern Africa, the East African Community and the Economic Community of West African States.

More specifically, stimulating economic growth and creating more jobs must be high on the priority list. With the Economic Partnership Agreements already in place, Africa's participation in the world trade ought to be extended, resulting in more African integration and mobility. Here the funding of sustainable development and combining his with other efforts such as on migration, education, medicine and climate is crucial.

Security is another element needing attention, which consist of assisting local organisations with conflict prevention, fighting organised crime and terrorism and helping with controlling migration and border administration.

For these purposes, the EU will use diplomacy, NGO's and trust funds, and the Common Security and Defence Policy.⁵

7.2.3 Cooperation frameworks

To formalise relations, two cooperation frameworks have been agreed upon concerning Africa. The Joint Africa-Eu strategy is the over-all basis for EU partnership with African countries. Placing the cooperation on a more official footing, mutual interests and goals were defined. It was written in 2007 and is implemented by the means of periodical action plans. These detail the course of events for a few years at a time and list the priorities for joint action.⁶

The second important commitment is the Cotonou agreement of 2000. It entails a partnership agreement between the European Union and developing countries from the Caribbean, the Pacific and Africa, counting 48 Sub-Saharan countries. Aiming for the integration of these countries in global trade and improving prosperity, it focusses on development cooperation, on economic and trade cooperation and on the political dimension⁷. However, this agreements expires in May 2020 and negotiators are working hard at the moment to create an agreement to pose as a successor to Cotonou⁸.

7.2.4 Areas of cooperation

There are several areas of cooperation. The first is trade, for which the Cotonou Agreement was established. It consists of a series of Economic Partnership Agreements with 48 countries from Sub-Saharan Africa. The second area is development, funded by the European development fund that supports programmes and initiatives in the region. The third is migration, now based mainly on the Malta declaration and focussed on Lybia. The fourth is counter-terrorism and the fifth is security. It is for these last elements that the Common Security and Defence Policy is the most important.⁹

5 European Union, "Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe."

6 Consilium Europa, "EU-Africa Relations."

7 Consilium Europa.

8 Benjamin Fox, "Cotonou Successor: EU-Africa Relations at the Crossroads - EURACTIV.Com." se

9 Consilium Europa, "EU-Africa Relations."

7.3 CSDP in Africa

7.3.1 Extent

Currently, the majority of the Common Security and Defence Policy operations are deployed in the continent of Africa. It is consequently the main theatre in which the CSDP is active and has most of its interests.¹⁰ The European Union performs operations in the context of peacekeeping and peacebuilding, falling under the scope of peace support operations. Both civilian and military personnel have been deployed in a broad variety of tasks, which range from police training, to force protection, surveillance of borders between countries and piracy-detering activities. There are currently nine CSDP missions being performed on the African continent, as it is a region that has continuously been plagued with conflicts, tensions and failed states in the past decades. The threats include border disputes, racial violence and terrorist actions, which all demand swift responses. In order to effectively resolve similar issues, there is a need for deployment of civilian support and military personnel that has the capabilities and permission to act in combat missions when needed. As funds and resources of the countries involved are rather limited, the African security highly depends on the intervention and support of international beneficiaries.¹¹

7.3.2 Strategic use of CSDP

The EU has undertaken and is currently still undertaking operations in the African continent with the application of both civilian and military instruments in the CSDP context. These missions aim for an comprehensive approach and coordination with EU officials in the region. Some of the most known missions are currently EUTM Mali and EUTM Somalia.¹²

For the EU, it would be extremely valuable to have a stable African continent to its south. The entire collection of actions of the European Union should be placed in that context. In order to be able to resolve issues that plague Europe, such as migration and the terrorism threat, the African continent needs to be in better condition. Therefore the European Union deploys CSDP missions in the region.

For that, the root causes of the poor security environment need to be resolved, including poverty, state failure and the lack of sufficient governance and attention to development. Moreover, the more immediate security crisis that pop up over the continent need quick and comprehensive solutions.¹³ To solve these issues, the European Union is well equipped as it has a continuum of tools and policies at its disposal. Instruments such as diplomacy, economic policies, development and humanitarian aid are certainly at the EU's disposal. In order to establish more meaningful and profitable relations with Africa, CSDP missions should be chosen and executed in light of the needs of the continent. The best strategic use of CSDP must thus be focussed on improving the EU-African relations by addressing the most problematic regions that can also effect the security environment in Europe.

The best strategic use of the Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union lies therefore in the crisis response operations and humanitarian aid that they provide for African countries. This aid is supposed to guarantee long-lasting solutions for peace and development in the African countries, meaning that it must help Africa move forward. By carrying out CSDP missions in Africa, the EU therefore deepens its interests and involvement, resulting in stronger EU-Africa relations. The final aim for Europe when creating stronger EU-African relations is a stable Africa, so that the southern neighbour of our continent can no longer be the region of origin of security issues such as migration and terrorism.

10 Tardy, "The EU and Africa: A Changing Security Partnership."

11 Tor, "Peacekeeping in Africa: The EU at a Crossroads."

12 EU Website, "Military and Civilian Missions and Operations - European External Action Service."

13 Akokpari, "The EU and Africa: The Political Economy of an Asymmetrical Partnership."

8. Discussion and Conclusions

Through this research, it has become clear that there certainly is a strong advantageous result of the strategic use of Common Policy and Defence missions concerning the relationship between the European Union and the African continent.

First, the current relationship between the European Union and Africa has been brought in the picture. Here we found that there are several cooperation framework in existence. The main framework that plays a major role in these relations is the Joint Africa-Eu Strategy, as it forms the basis for all partnership aspects between both actors. The second important cooperation framework is the Cotonou agreement that was signed in 2000, which entails the trading partnerships the EU has with developing countries, of which many are on the African continent.

Secondly, there are several areas of cooperation between the EU and Africa. The entail trade, development, migration, counter-terrorism and security.

We conclude for this that there are a number of setting and contexts established by which the European Union is connected to the African continent. These connections for the basis upon which the Common Security and Defence Policy can be based.

After the detailing of the relations between the European Union and Africa, this paper analysed the Common Security and Defence Policy in the African continent. To do so, the paper first regarded the extent of Common Security and Defence Policy missions and engagement in Africa. The majority of CSDP missions actually take place in African countries, showing that it is the main theatre in which the European security strategists are interested in.

The research has shown that the African security is highly dependent of external interventions. Countries have been continuously plagued by border disputes, racial violence and the rise of terrorism and piracy. Several are now seen internationally as failed states and cannot re-establish the needed societal infrastructure without a helping hand. Hence the European Union invests most of its CSDP missions and capabilities in the African continent.

Subsequently to detailing the extent of CSDP missions in the region, the last part of the research goes into detail on the strategic use of the Common Security and Defence Policy regarding EU-African relations.

Here, it is imperative that the importance of stability in Africa for the European Union's security is underlined. Many of the current security risks and threats that Europe has to deal with have their connection to what is happening in a number of African countries. Problematics such as migration and territory cannot be handled on European soil, but must be addressed in the region of their origin. It is in this context that the strategic use of Europe's CSDP must be placed, connecting to the improvement of relations to Africa that come with effort in the region.

The paper therefore concludes that the strategic use of the Common Security and Defence Policy for EU-African relations is in improving stability in Africa and strengthening its relations with the continent. This is all in order to diminish the current security risks for Europe that might stem for the African continent, such as migration and terrorism.

9. Annexes

9.1 List of Literature

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The Capability Priorities of the EU in light of the establishment of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund

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Abstract

Ever since Europe, not just as a continent, The Old Continent, but as a group of allied states, together in the name of political, economic and cultural harmony, overcame the atrocities of the wars that still haunt its past, through the creation of multiple treaties and the arranging of numerous organizations between states, it has been a primary objective of the European Union (EU) to emphasize and develop the most efficient ways to keep, not only the member states' inhabitants, but also those of allied countries, safe and secure.

Taking this into account, and with the EU's influence and responsibility, within itself, as well as with neighbouring states, there has been a continuing need to develop programs and courses of action such as the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), and to establish sections of the EU's foreign policies and external relations such as the more encompassing Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), regarding the EU's defence and security, a subject of the utmost importance for the highest ranks of the political leadership.

These policies and programmed courses of action have taken to action in order to project the EU's intentions on to the world, originating the space of opportunity for the creation of deeper frameworks that develop a more involved collaboration between member states in the defence and security subjects, as we will see the prime examples of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund (EDF).

Keywords:

Cooperation; Defence; Framework; Security; Union.

1. Preface

Defence and security are subjects which are seeing an increase in the frequency at which they are debated, along with new programs and projects being created every year, it was only fitting for this topic to be studied and investigated upon by the author, a fourth-year Cadet at the Portuguese Military Academy, enrolled in the course to become an Officer of the Guarda Nacional Republicana (GNR).

There has been a continuing effort by the higher ranks of the EU to establish greater spanning partnerships and agreements in the fields of defence and security, due to the ever-growing dangers of diffuse threats, with the departure from the classic “state vs. state” approach to warfare, and the unpredictability of world leaders, that will be studied throughout this essay, particularly the establishment of the PESCO, and the EDF and how the EU’s capabilities and foreign relations will be affected by these.

2. Introduction

Cooperation between member states was always one of the most valued assets and goals for the EU. Ever since 1951, after the signing of the Treaty of Paris, consequently forming the European Coal and Steel Community, by the nations of Belgium, The Netherlands, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Italy,¹ and, following that, in 1957, with the coming into force of the Treaty of Rome, thus creating the Economic European Community (EEC) or “Common Market”,² that the states that were committed to this long-term project laid down the foundations for what would later be a prosperous and developed, albeit challenged organization, as is the present day EU.

In order to seek a stable peace, to build upon a strong and reliable relationship between the countries of the Old Continent, these neighbours came together with the notion, as written in the Treaty of Paris, “*that world peace may be safeguarded only by creative efforts equal to the dangers which menace it*”.³ This idea of a collective effort directed towards a continental peace was one of the utmost importance and was to be carried on to every future treaties and agreements that should, from amidst these organizations, arise.

The PESCO, being one of these organizations, has garnered more attention coming into light as an ambitious step towards increasing the defence capabilities of the EU, combining both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and non-NATO in itself, and focusing, primarily, on the military aspect of countries working together in the pursue for a common goal, the better defence and security of the EU.

The EDF presents itself as the proposed solution, to the problem of the increasing spending by the member states in defence and security areas, often exceeding their own budgets. The EDF is also valuable in a strategic sense, by directing the states involved in better applying resources when it comes to defence and security development.

1 Gabel, M. (2019) European Union. Encyclopaedia Britannica. Online article. URL: <https://www.britannica.com/topic/European-Union> [15-11-19]

2 Homepage of the Official website of the European Union. Page of the History of the EU. URL: https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history_en. [15-11-19]

3 Homepage of the Digital Research of European Studies. Page of the Treaty of Paris. URL: https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1997/10/13/11a21305-941e-49d7-a171-ed5be548cd58/publishable_en.pdf. [15-11-19]

3. Current State of Research

With this chapter the author aims at presenting the reader with the state of the art regarding the subject at hand, it being the capability priorities of the EU in light of the establishment of the PESCO and the EDF. Another goal is also to properly show the foundation and the defining features of the programs and frameworks on which the EU embarked, in the fields of defence and security, the treaties and documents that legally support these very programs.

3.1 The European Union's Role in the World

Seeing the collective group of member states as one, the EU is the largest economy of the world⁴ and, as so, being the role model when it comes to international cooperation, technological, scientific, cultural, economic and civilizational advancements, human development conditions, and keeping the vanguard when it comes to building and setting laws that respect and uphold Human Rights, as well as enforcing them, within its external borders and beyond them is a responsibility that, consequently, falls on the EU's shoulders. However, this is no easy task as according to Jean-Philippe Scherer, "*poverty, criminality, corruption, famine and violence, amongst many other factors, are often interlaced in modern crises*".⁵

3.2 Military and Civilian Missions Conducted by the EU

With this added responsibility, as it is not only our duty, as Europeans, to protect our continent and Union, but also, to protect those oppressed and to aid those in need. The EU seeks to fulfil these goals by carrying out many diversified missions around the world, such as peacekeeping, humanitarian aid or border control and vigilance, as we have seen in recent years, in missions developed alongside NATO, which is still the largest and lead transcontinental defence structure in which most of the member states of the EU are inserted, as well as missions in Somalia, Mali or FRONTEX missions around the Mediterranean sea.




Figure 1: Active CSDP missions as of 2019⁶

4 Scherer, J. (2015) Handbook on CSDP Missions and Operations. The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union. Vienna. Armed Forces Printing Centre. P.43
 5 Cf.:Ibid.
 6 Homepage of the EEAS. Page of the Military and Civilian Missions. URL: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/430/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations_en. [15-11-19]

3.3 CSDP and the CFSP

In 1993, with the coming into force of the Maastricht Treaty, being the founding treaty of the European Union, later reformed by the Treaty of Lisbon, coming into effect in 2009, the EU was built on three pillars that supported its structure, in a political, thus functional way and also in a segmented way, as a sort of division of powers, within this organization.

These were the European Community, primarily focused on economic trade, the CFSP, which is the one most relevant for this essay, for it is the one that holds and orients the foreign policy and external action of the EU when it comes to both military and civilian missions, and, lastly, the Cooperation in the Fields of Justice and Home Affairs, which dealt with the more security focused objectives of the EU, particularly, the creation of the Europol and the keeping of our external borders.⁷

The CFSP is of course the pillar to which the author will be most referring to, throughout this essay, given the fact that it is the EU's main policy, an organised one and also agreed between its members, that focuses on defence, security and diplomacy actions. As its main and more active body it has the CSDP, which, as described in the official European External Action Service (EEAS) website, "*aims to strengthen the EU's external ability to act through the development of civilian and military capabilities in Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management.*"⁸

The CFSP makes its decisions based unanimity of all the members of the Council of The European Union and is headed by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP), who is, since December 1, 2019, Josep Borrell.

4. Research Gap

Plenty of information surrounding the current and past state of international missions and security and defence priorities of the EU is provided from official documents and framework factsheets.

In 2016, the EU's Global Strategy (GS) was published, and in it were present the EU's priorities towards the safekeeping of the citizens of Europe as well as the guidelines regarding the EU's external action and foreign affairs. This publication is of value to the activity of all the bodies that comprise the departments of the EU that deal with the military capabilities of the member states and how their means are applied in crises management operations abroad, such as the previous mentioned CSDP, that will, in the future, deal with the changes of the implementation of policies such as the PESCO and EDF, as we will see ahead.

In short, a lack of study in the field of these future alterations, particularly, in the way in which they will affect the course of the missions being carried out constitutes the research gap for this essay.

5. Research Questions

Given the subject of this essay, the author proposed to answer the main research question, which presents itself as the focus and final goal of all the steps of investigation that are taken, functioning as a beacon that guides all of the author's efforts.

7 Homepage of the European Parliament. Page of the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties. URL: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/3/the-maastricht-and-amsterdam-treaties>. [15-11-19]

8 Homepage of the EEAS. Page of the CFSP. URL: https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-foreign-security-policy-cfsp/420/common-foreign-and-security-policy-cfsp_en. [15-11-19]

That question is “What are the Capability Priorities of the EU with the Establishment of PESCO and the EDF?”

In order to be able to conduct a properly framed thought process, the author first needs to answer 3 other sub-questions, which are:

- Sub-question 1: What is the current scenario of EU defence and security policies?
- Sub-question 2: What is PESCO?
- Sub-question 3: What is the EDF?

6. Methodology

Keeping in mind the goal of maintaining the most rigorous investigation method, information was gathered almost exclusively from official sources, such as official EU websites, the Treaties that give the legal basis for the governing bodies and established programs, official EU documents, such as the GS or the official notification regarding the creation of the PESCO. This information was then shifted through and analysed through a lens that obeyed to the subject that this essay is subordinated to, in order to avoid any deviations from the matter at hand. This collected data set the foundation to provide answers to the sub-questions, which, later themselves offered, together, the answer for the Research Question.




Figure 2: Methodology for collecting information⁹

⁹ Figure created by the author on 16 November 2019

7. Research and Results of Research

Subjects such as EU policies and agreements were brought to light due to the research necessary for answering the research question. However, before one can answer the main research question, the sub-questions that compose the train of thought behind it must, themselves, be answered. Given this fact, the present chapter details the results of the research in providing a general description on the overall state of the art in matter of EU external action, as well as the description and objectives of the PESCO and the EDF.

7.1 Capabilities

The first major step into setting a number of concrete objectives that dealt with military capabilities was taken in 1999, at the European Council of Helsinki, when one of the goals was that to create a European Rapid Reaction Force, or EUROFOR. The Helsinki Headline Goal was defined, and, as of January 1, 2007, fulfilled, with 60,000 troops ready to deploy at 60 days' notice, to embark on whatever mission they were needed, ranging from humanitarian aid, evacuation of EU nationals, and conflict response.

In the wake of this goal, the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) was published, and with it came more general guidelines related to the EU capacity to respond to conflict situations that needed its participation. The ESS aimed at increasing activity, capabilities and coherence, and maintained that *“systematic use of pooled and shared assets would reduce duplications, overheads and, in the medium term, increase capabilities.”*¹⁰

This notion of shared responsibility of the defence and security matters stayed and remained one the main focuses on future meeting and agreements. Given this, in 2016 the GS was published, and, under the direction of the HR/VP, presented itself as more multifaceted and, as its name suggests, global in nature, setting five priorities regarding the EU's foreign action:

- The Security of our Union
- State and Societal Resilience to Our East and South
- Integrated Approach to Conflicts
- Cooperative Regional Orders
- Global Governance for the XXI Century

The main priority being the Security of our Union, which, in itself, contains a number of sub-principles.

The first being security and defence, in which this document sets the standard of translating this will to evolve in field of security, to better maintain and keep our countries safe. It speaks of the unprecedented period of peace and prosperity in which we currently live, and how these very feelings of safety and security will serve as the foundation for a better, safer Europe.

We will have to face many diverse threats to our security, and we will have to do it with the notion that, as it is expressed in the GS, *“we must be ready and able to deter, respond to, and protect ourselves against external threats”*,¹¹ as these ambitions, together with the changing nature of the threats dictate the evolution of our defence and security capabilities. From what it is possible to understand from the 2016 GS, when it comes to the fields of capabilities in security of the EU, three basic principles are to be kept, that of autonomy, credibility and competence. The EU has to have its militaries better equipped,

10 Homepage of the Digital Research of European Studies. Page of the European Security Strategy. URL: https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2004/10/11/1df262f2-260c-486f-b414-dbf8dc112b6b/publishable_en.pdf. [16-11-19]

11 Homepage of the EEAS. Page of the European Global Strategy. URL: http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf. [16-11-19]

better trained and organised, in order to maintain and improve upon the competence to defend itself from any foreign threats, and to stimulate autonomy, to enhance the notion that the main responsibility to defend the EU belongs to none other than ourselves, as Europeans. We also need to keep improving our credibility, to build and develop work structures as well as the means to keep the EU as a bastion of military and civilian cooperation, particularly, regarding NATO and the EU's most powerful ally, the United States. The principles of mutual assistance, consecrated in the Solidarity Clause, article 222 of the Treaty of Lisbon, are to be upheld, along with the development of industrial and technological capabilities, to strive forward in these fields and keep the EU as a valuable asset within frameworks such as NATO.

One of the other major threats to our safety, as Europeans, is the spread of terrorism. The use of violence to achieve political or religious goals is becoming the weapon of choice of extremists to push their ideologies and it is becoming more of a societal phenomenon, with an increase in social media related radicalization. The EU must face this problem and deepen its bonds with private organizations, with societal agencies and has to improve its positive influence in the fields of education, culture, religion and youth.¹² Another present day problem that sees itself on the rise is cybersecurity. The investment in cyber technologies is paramount and plays a key role in the readiness and modernization of the EU's defence industry, due to the increasingly cyber-dependent communications, as well as the way of operating defence and security measures, and as a general way of governing nations through the cyber world, which gives a cyberattack consequences on an unprecedented scale, capable even of bringing entire nations to a halt. Given this, the GS asserts that *"the EU will support political, operational and technical cyber cooperation between Member States, notably on analysis and consequence management, and foster shared assessments between EU structures and the relevant institutions in Member States"*.¹³

7.2 What is PESCO?

On December 11, 2017, the Council of the European Union decided, with the keeping of the idea of deepened cooperation, to establish the PESCO, which, comprised of 25 member states, only 3 short of the entirety of the EU's member states, those not participating being Malta, Denmark and, due to Brexit, The United Kingdom, presents itself as a framework meant to deepen military cooperation, unity and defence capabilities of the EU, by binding those who integrate it to share and work together towards a more capable and credible European defence.¹⁴ It was created based on articles 42.6, article 46 and the Protocol created by these, Protocol 10, of the Treaty of Lisbon. What differentiates this structure from other forms of defence agreements, or any other field, for that matter, is its legally binding nature,¹⁵ granting that all member states voluntarily signed themselves into it and it is expected that control over decisions influencing the future of this framework continue within the grasp of its members, in the Council. On March 1, 2018, there was another Council decision, this time regarding the first list of actual projects to be conducted under the structure's oversight and control. This list was comprised of 17 projects, among those there were projects such as a European Medical Command, an Upgrade to Maritime Surveillance, and a Cyber Threats and Incident Response Information Sharing Platform, among others. On November 19, 2018, a second set of projects, again 17 of them, was approved and started to develop.

12 Cf.:Ibid.

13 Cf.:Ibid.

14 Homepage of the official PESCO website. URL: <https://pesco.europa.eu/>. [16-11-19]

15 Homepage of the official PESCO website. Page about the member states. URL: <https://pesco.europa.eu/about/>. [27-11-19]

This list, was again oriented to cover, as presented in the official European Defence Agency, “*areas such as training, capability development and operational readiness in the field of defence.*”¹⁶ This second batch of projects included endeavours such as a Joint EU Intelligence School, the European Military Space Surveillance Awareness Network and the European Attack Helicopters TIGER Mark III, among 14 other projects. Most recently, on May 8, 2019, a third list of PESCO projects was submitted, and with it, the total number of projects under this frameworks guidance came to 47, these last 13 also being in the fields of training, collaborative actions and capability building, mainly, on sea, air and space.¹⁷

7.3 What is the EDF?

Although going through the longest period of peace in its recorded history, the European continent, has, as well, been faced with its greatest challenges in the fields of security and defence, in the more recent periods of its life. And, as such, in September 2016, the then President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker announced the creation of an EDF. This Fund would serve to, greatly, enhance the member states’ opportunity of investment in the fields of defence and security, as it would decrease the need for these same states to rely on foreign aid, mostly financial aid, as it aimed as better channelling taxpayers money towards the defence industry, in a coordinated effort, thus increasing the EU’s autonomy. The EDF will work in a two faceted way, with a research component, fully financed by the EU, and a development and acquisitions area, which would find its funds, mostly, originating from pooled contributions of the member states, although also having a part of EU funding in the mix, up to 20%,¹⁸ to incentive progress and to better leverage the development process.¹⁹ It is expected to gather around 2.590.000.000€ in total up until 2020, and, after that, 5.500.000.000€ every year.²⁰ In order to motivate its members to combine their projects in PESCO and the EDF, projects developed in the scope of the PESCO will garner an extra 10% EU funding.²¹

8. Discussion of Results and Personal Conclusions

Firstly, the study of the history behind the EU, as well as its governing bodies and capability building frameworks, adding to the guidelines written in the founding treaties, leads us to a point where we can see that defence and security always had its place, and a privileged one at that, on the agenda of the EU. Several programs were created, conventions held, and strategies implemented in order to develop both military and civilian missions, particularly, under the control and direction of the CSDP and the HR/VP. These missions contribute for the image the EU projects into the world, as a bastion of security, a thoroughly competent defence and a hub of civilizational progress. Along with this progress come many challenges, presenting themselves in several official documents, such as the 2003 ESS or the 2016 GS, that range from power imbalances in the world, energy crises, demographic changes, the increasingly diffuse nature of threats to the member states’ sovereignty, or cyber-attacks.

16 Homepage of the European Defence Agency. Page of the PESCO projects. URL: [https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/our-current-priorities/permanent-structured-cooperation-\(PESCO\)/current-list-of-pesco-projects](https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/our-current-priorities/permanent-structured-cooperation-(PESCO)/current-list-of-pesco-projects). [27-11-19]

17 Homepage of the European Council. Page of the new PESCO projects. URL: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/11/12/defence-cooperation-council-launches-13-new-pesco-projects/>. [27-11-19]

18 Homepage of the official website of the European Commission. Page of the EDF factsheet. URL: <https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/34509>. [28-11-19]

19 Homepage of the official European Commission website. Page of questions and answers about the EDF. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/memo_17_1476. [28-11-19]

20 Cf.: Ibid.

21 Cf.: Ibid.

Understanding these issues, the EU has dedicated itself to the cause of deeper and more closely knitted cooperation between states, creating frameworks as the PESCO and ways to better maintain them, as the EDF is the point in case.

This will all culminate in the answering of the research question posed in the beginning of the essay, “What are the Capability Priorities of the EU with the Establishment of PESCO and the EDF?”

The author concludes that this question hides a nuanced answer, for, depending on the context, the issue at hand and the field of investment, the priorities sway. The first easily identifiable priority, as it has been one the keywords of this essay and several official EU documents, is cooperation. Every one of the measures taken into effect by the many bodies of the EU now define themselves has having always an underlying notion and purpose of cooperation between actors. This notion of cooperation will encompass all other priorities, an example being the training. The nature of many of the PESCO programs are in the preparation of the military personnel, by means of joint exercises, purchasing of equipment or even the creation of international military organisations, all for the better defence of Europe’s interests. Another priority considering the PESCO and EDF is technological development. The EDF finds its purpose, particularly in the field of research, in developing and evolving Europe’s military capacity by keeping up with the technological advancements that mark our time. These advancements will serve as the object of many PESCO projects as the members states’ military forces will be able to assert themselves as more modern, better trained and equipped forces. Finally, the last priority is the entering and setting new ground in cyber-defence. As the threats to the security of the EU keep evolving, the cyber world is one that keeps mutating faster than whatever effective counter measures can be implemented. However, this is to be changed, as several programs within the PESCO list of projects deals, in some manner, with cyber threats.

8.1 Differing points of view

One can take the setting of these frameworks in one of two ways. While it is undeniable that cooperation is the main key concept in all of these efforts, one could argue this collective approach to defence and security issues, something that has always been so individual of each nation, contributes to the mainly referred issue when discussions over EU measures arise, and that is that of a lack of individual thought and self-determination by each member to deal, develop and maintain defence and security capabilities as it would please. PESCO and the EDF could be seen in a less than positive light, due to the legally binding nature of the first, and the continued need to commit to the joint defence projects, in order to be able to participate in the funding of the EDF. This could be even seen as a limitation on the sovereignty of a nation. However, this argument falls short when it comes to a closely analysed discussion, as the participation in these programs and projects has been, entirely, voluntary, by the nations that chose to enter in them, as well as any contribution when it comes to monetary terms.

This brings us to the other side of the discussion, the praise and incentive for the continuation of programs such as the previously discussed. They can be viewed as a positive endeavour for the EU, in the sense that collaboration is almost always a good thing, and that the more we work together, the stronger, more cohesive, and more unified we will be as a union of states, thus making the EU the example setter it is. The organization of projects the likes of those created in the PESCO and the pool funding in the manner of the EDF helps smaller states, with less potential for financial expansion and engaging in large-scale military development programs to reach a level of technological sophistication once impossible, or, in the very least, very difficult to achieve, on their own.

8.2 Final remarks

Due to these reasons, the author's opinion on the matter is that these programs, frameworks, funds and agreements are to be looked at in a positive light. While cooperation should not always be seen as an inherently good thing at face value, in this aspect, the upsides greatly upstage the downsides, and cooperation between countries that strive towards a more capable, stronger, more secure EU should always be appreciated and pushed for. The creation of the PESCO originated the implementation of new defence and security programs, ranging from cyber defence to space, air or land capabilities, that would otherwise take years to develop, and would be exclusive to the most powerful nations within the EU. Not only that, but the creation of the EDF also brought a system of collective effort, where every state participating in the program plays a part in the advancement of the technological capabilities and better military capacity of the EU that take it one step closer to becoming a group of states brought together by a past filled with war and desolation and now striving for a future of peace, security and prosperity.

9. Annexes

9.1 List of Abbreviations

CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
EDF	European Defence Fund
EEAS	European External Action Service
EEC	Economic European Community
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EUROFOR	European Rapid Operational Force
GNR	Guarda Nacional Republicana
GS	Global Strategy
HR/VP	High Representative of The Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization

9.2 List of Figures

Figure 1: The missions currently active in the scope of the CSDP all around the world

Figure 2: The authors representation of the methodology used in gathering information for this essay

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The best strategic Use of the Common Security and Defence Policy for EU-Africa Relations

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Abstract

The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union should increase the security of Member States. There are specific strategies not only for Europe but for our neighbouring countries as well. This implements a cooperation with the African Union and suggests that our security is depending on the security beyond our borders.

Such an important topic requires many columns. A various number of fact sheets, documents, and essays were developed, signed, and executed by both parties. These papers state that a mixture of military operations, civilian missions, and establishing functional governmental institutions is needed to ensure better conditions for the development of African countries. The current research lacks concrete plans for the future of such a relationship. This essay focuses on how the strategies of the Common Security and Defence Policy can be used at their best to improve the present relationship between the African and the European Union.

Comparing several official papers published by the African and the European Union and their institutions it might be vital to look at the cooperation's structure from a wider perspective. This can help illuminate dark spots and problems still consisting within the relationship.

The essay aims at creating a mind set on how countries have to be stabilised in order to enhance security in their own population which effects the security in Europe.

Keywords:

African Union, CSDP, European Union, Missions and Operations, Strategic use.

1. Preface

During the author's studies at the Austrian Military Academy, he gets confronted with the political and military framework of the EU (European Union). Especially for Austria this cooperation is very important, as it offers a small country the possibility to gain information from other security and defence ministries.

At present days, Austria does not have the capability to launch an operation and to keep it online on its own. However, the network of the Union allows this Central-European country to take part in such operations and to perform on the global stage.

In times where political systems are doing 180 degree turns and the support of the population for the military is decreasing, members of the armed forces should receive the opportunity to explain the reasons why it is so important to participate in international military operations. Climate change, terrorism, and political disturbances put Africa in the focus of the EU's CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy).

At this point, the author would like to take the opportunity to thank Col Assoc. Prof. Gell Harald, PhD, MSc, MSD, MBA and Ass.-Prof. Dr. Ratheiser Ulla.

2. Introduction

Having a plan is the starting point of any strategy and aims at accomplishing a defined mission or operation. The CSDP is the strategy of the EU, used to create a safer environment in and around Europe. This essay deals with the problems both Unions are likely to face in the future. It focuses on the basic ideas of the CSDP and its fields which might hold a possibility for improvement. At the end of the essay it should be clear to the reader which threats have to be managed by the ambitions. In order to be able to find an answer to such a difficult question, a lot of information is required. Many different documents, of which most are from the EU and the African-European partnership, should help the author to handle such a wide-ranging topic.

The EU is one of the driving forces in the world when it comes to supporting nations during a state of emergency. It not only has the financial resources to intervene in unstable regions, but it also has the manpower – even though not united as preferred by many members of the military – to put boots on the ground. One of the most important aspects of the EU's role as driving force is the political power which the partners of the EU can count on. This suggests that a plan has to focus on the most valuable resource – the people. To establish a stable zone around Europe, the cooperation with the local governmental systems is the key to success. Any dictating ideas, laws, or structures coming from a government or organisation thousands of kilometres away, would make the current situation in an unstable region much worse than it would help. A clear sight is given by looking at the current state of research.

3. Current State of Research

*“The European Union's commitment to peace and security in Africa is growing, and the deterioration of the security environment in parts of that continent [...] creates challenges and threats that need to be adequately and effectively addressed.”*¹ The third Edition of the CSDP Handbook which was published in 2017, underlines the importance of the cooperation between the European States and the African Governments.

1 Rehr, J. (2017). Handbook on CSDP. The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union. Vienna. Austrian Armed Forces Printing Centre. ISBN 978-92-95201-04-0. Third Edition. Page 86.

This chapter gives the reader an overview of the current state of research, especially in the fields of the strategic use of the CSDP for the EU-African relations. During the research process, the author gathered a lot of information on the relation between the AU (African Union) and the EU, as well as its missions, operations, and cooperation. These documents were provided by the EU or the AU and made available on the World Wide Web.

This paper tries to create a liaison between all this information. The following chapters deal with the main sources – Handbook on Common Security and Defence Policy 2017, the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership, EUGS (European Global Strategy) and PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation) – which were found by the author and are relevant in the process of finding an answer to the research question.

3.1 The Handbook on Common Security and Defence Policy 2017

In 2007, the Joint Africa-EU Strategy was signed by the African and the European Union. Due to this contract, the African-EU operation elevated to a strategic level.² The difference between the levels will be explained in the following chapters.

3.2 The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership

One of the four main objectives of the long-term partnership and probably the most important one is the aim to restore peace and security. It is the foundation for a working political and economic system as well as for the social development.³

3.3 The European Union Global Strategy

*“It is in the interests of our citizens to invest in the resilience of states and societies [...] and south down to Central Africa. [...] to reform, thus withstanding and recovering from internal and external crises [...]”*⁴ These actions stated in the EU Global Strategy can be seen as an investment in the security of Europe.⁵

3.4 Permanent Structured Cooperation

PESCO is one of the most relevant instruments to secure Europe and its citizens. It allows the EU to strengthen the operational cooperation between the Member States which supports the strategic autonomy. This possibility allows the EU to act alone or with partners, like the AU, whenever requested.⁶

Despite their relevance for the creating process, the documents introduced here are insufficient in providing an answer to the research question.

2 Ibid. Page 175.

3 Cf.: African Union & European Union. (2007). The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership. A Joint Africa-EU Strategy. Lisbon. Page 4.

4 Mogherini, F. (2016). Shared Visions, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the Europeans Union’s Foreign and Security Policy. Brussels. Page 23.

5 Cf.: Ibid. Page 36.

6 Cf.: EU. (2018). Permanent Structured Cooperation – PESCO. Deepening Defence Cooperation among EU Member States. Brussels. Page 3-4.

4. Research Gap

“Due to their history and experience, Africa and Europe understand the importance of peace and security as preconditions for political, economic and social development. On this basis, the two continents have laid the foundation for successful cooperation based on the need to promote holistic approaches to security, encompassing, conflict prevention and long-term peace-building, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction, linked to governance and sustainable development, with a view to addressing the root causes of conflicts.”⁷

Similar to this declaration by the AU and EU, the EU-Africa Strategic Partnership defines in a very specific way that the key for success is the cooperation with the host nation. The need for cooperation is also stressed by the EUGS, according to which the goal to make Europe safer can only be achieved by a detailed strategy which is signed, accepted, and supported by the Signature States.

What the detailed goals and plans of these declarations have in common is that they address the topic of this paper one way or another. However, as most of the official papers will reach the end of their life span in the near future, new opportunities will open up to drive the research of this essay forward.

5. Research Questions

The question that arises from the current state of research is:

What is the best strategic use of the Common Security and Defence Policy for EU-Africa Relations?

For a better understanding of the issue and to explore the question appropriately, the following angles of investigation have been chosen.

- Sub-question 1: Which are the key points of the current Common Security and Defence Policy between these two Unions?
- Sub-question 2: Which are the strategic ideas of the CSDP?
- Sub-question 3: Which challenges does the AU have to face in the near future in relation to the CSDP?
- Sub-question 4: Are there fields for improving the current strategy?

6. Methodology

The question *“what the best strategic Use of the Common Security and Defence Policy for EU-Africa Relations is”*, will be explored by looking at a wide range of sources, in order to achieve the best possible result. These sources range from official EU and AU documents and articles to officially published internet-based information from the official websites.

As outlined in the previous chapter, the topic will be approached from four angles which will also inform about the structure of this paper. The methodology of this essay will rely on a hermeneutical approach which is an author-based interpretation.

⁷ African Union & European Union. (2007). Op. cit. Page 4-5.




Figure 1: Flowchart of the hermeneutical approach to answer the main question.⁸

The previous figure shows the path of the research process as well as the way how the author answered the sub- and main question.

7. Research and Results of Research

7.1 The current Common Security and Defence Policy between the African and the European Union

Every plan, no matter if it is a military plan or the plan to create a stronger relationship, consists of principles and objectives. Also, the partnership between the AU and the EU is built on principles and objectives which are the key to a successful cooperation. It is necessary to define those main objectives in very specific terms in order to be able to reach them.

The African continent is known for its beautiful nature, its diversity of wild animals, deposits of mineral resources, colonial past, military and civilian conflicts, terrorism, smuggling, slavery, poverty and much more. It is obvious that the main objectives are to focus on those threats and problems.

⁸ Figure created by the author.

The representatives of the two political organisations involved have declared four main objectives for their cooperation:

- To strengthen institutional relationships, especially concerning peace and security, development and migration, to protect nature and to reinforce and elevate the partnership.⁹
- To reach the Millennium Development Goals by 2015. To help stabilise the continent, establish and strength democracy and human rights; to push industrialisation forward relying on sustainable economic development.¹⁰
- To create strong governmental institutions which are able to fight pandemics, terrorism, and migration in cooperation with an updated United Nations system. Those institutions also have to be able to provide energy security, reduce the trading of small arms and light weapons, and decrease Weapons of Mass Destruction.¹¹
- To build a people centred partnership with powerful non-state actors that are able to support the plans of these partners. The strategy ought to function as a permanent platform for information exchange and an ongoing dialogue.¹²

Obviously, this partnership does not only try to solve current problems, but also aims at creating a base for the next generation to build their future on.

Both organisations have declared a catalogue, in which they list the actions and challenges that the strategy will face.

Austria is currently taking part in four EU missions, two of which deal with problems in Africa. The first one takes place in the Mediterranean Sea with the objective to reduce the frequency of people who are smuggled over the sea.¹³ The second mission that Austria takes part in, is the EUTM (European Union Training Mission Mali). Austria supports this mission with 46 soldiers and equipment. The EU trains Mali soldiers to improve their capability to: *“Contribute to improving the capacity of MAF under the full control of political authorities in view to: 1. Consolidate the operational and strategic improvements of the MAF obtained with the support of EUTM Mali; 2. Contribute to the political and security stabilization of Mali, through the technical support to the implementation of the Agreement; 3. Support the “restoration” of state control, Rule of Law and Order over the whole territory of Mali.”*¹⁴ Clearly, the key objectives of the EU and AU are used as specific objectives for that mission such as contributions to stabilising the country or to build up a MAF (Mali Armed Forces) which is able to act on a strategic level. These goals lead us to the next chapter.

7.2 The strategic Ideas of the Common Security and Defence Policy

In 1969 many historical events happened. Apollo 11 did the first moon landing and Richard Nixon became the 37th President of the United States of America. Also, in Europe things moved forward when the political systems changed.¹⁵ In December of the same year the foreign ministers received the order from their chancellors to develop new ways for closer cooperation in a political way.¹⁶ In 1998, under

9 Cf.: African Union & European Union. (2007). Op. cit. Page 2.

10 Cf.: Ibid. Page 2.

11 Cf.: Ibid. Page 2-3.

12 Cf.: Ibid. Page 3.

13 Cf.: Homepage of Austrian Armed Forces. Page Mission of the Austrian Armed Forces. Dates and Facts. URL: <http://www.bundesheer.at/ausle/zahlen.shtml>. [22-10-19].

14 European Union External Action Service. (2019). Common Security and Defence Policy European Training Mission Mali (EUTM Mali). Brussel. European Union External Action Service. Page 1.

15 Cf.: Homepage Wikipedia. Page 1969. URL: <https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/1969>. [05-11-2019].

16 Cf.: Rehr, J. (2017). Op. cit. Page 16.

the Austrian EU Presidency, two informal meetings were held. The output of those meetings was the demand for a more active Europe. Furthermore, those councils were the initiators for the Saint-Malo meetings which kicked off the ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy). After several meetings, the European Council decided that the civilian and military organisations should be able to fulfil the *“Petersberg tasks, consisting of humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.”*¹⁷ Those tasks maybe also contribute to the actions against terrorism, as it is also mentioned in the EAS (European Agency Service) *“This cooperation, which will include matters relating to counter-terrorism, will take place through the exchange of information, law enforcement and institutional capacity building and judicial cooperation.”*¹⁸ To be able to ensure that, the EAS has to be based on legal framework such as the EUGS. The security and defence sector was put under the top ten priority areas of the EU Global strategy. That also includes the strengthening of the cooperation between external partners such as the AU.¹⁹

In 2003, the first ESDP missions and operations went online. Since that day more than 30 missions and operations were launched.

The question is: What is the strategic idea of the Common Security and Defence Policy? There are several bullet points which are part of the strategic idea. For example, the reduction of the dependency on other security and defence systems, and the rising of the budget to make the European defence industry valuable and interesting to the EU Member States. Last but not least a concrete action plan was set up with fields of cooperation for existing partnerships.²⁰ On the 14th November 2016 the ministers released a paper on which they agreed on new ambitions in the CSDP sector. The three main points are: *“Enabling the European Union to respond more comprehensively, rapidly and effectively to crises, in particular in our neighbourhood; helping to make our partners stronger when it comes to their security and defence; and strengthening the European Union’s capacity to protect European citizens, by working more closely together on security.”*²¹

The priorities of the CSDP are clear. Economic welfare is one of the major columns for a stable state. To achieve economic welfare in a state certain key points have to exist. Before the EU can offer support, it is advised to guarantee a safe environment at home.²² Distance is all that matters, at the end it all comes together to simple maths. The key regions for the EU are those between Central Asia and Central Africa. A stable state reduces the possibility of a mass emigration. During the time of economic disturbances, the criminal activities rise. In such cases the EU takes action. To survive on the global market, under global pressures and local pushback, it is very important to reap the economic gains and to deal with security affairs.²³ To summarise the major idea of the EU Global Strategy, a state needs a well working economic system, which is only achievable under certain circumstances. A state of economic welfare has to be based on security, peace, and health. Therefor the AU-EU relationship should prioritise the mentioned key points. This is the only way to fight terrorism, pandemics, criminal activities, and other threats. The EU tries to achieve this economic welfare in cooperation with the AU.

17 Rehl, J. (2017). Op. cit. Page 17.

18 The African and European Union.(2007). Op. cit. Page5-6.

19 Cf.: Rehl, J. (2017). Op. cit. Page 18.

20 Cf.: Ibid. Page 24.

21 Ibid. Page 26.

22 Cf.: Rehl, J. (2017). Op. cit. Third edition. Page 21.

23 Cf.: Ibid. Page 22.

7.3 Challenges for the African Union

Similar to the European Union, the African Union was founded on a historically version of the AU. Other than the EU, which is made up of merely 28 of the 47 Member States, the African Union consists of all 55 African states. Nowadays, more than 1.3 Billion people live in Africa on more than 29 million square kilometres. The GDP (gross domestic product) of 2016 was 2.325 trillion US Dollars. Countries worldwide provide 40 Billion US Dollars for development aid in African countries 50.1% are donated by the EU.^{24 25}

According to the African-EU partnership, four working fields were declared:

- Investing in people – education, science, technology, and skills development.
- Strengthen resilience, peace, security, and governance.
- Mobilising investments for African structural sustainable transformation.
- Migration and mobility.

In comparison to the African-EU partnership and the CSDP, the author decided to focus on the most important aspects between those two documents.

7.4 Fields for improving the current strategy

The previous chapters dealt with the current stage of the CSDP; the following chapter should point out fields for improvement. It is based on the challenges for the AU and the EU. The CSDP should not be the main tool to tackle these complex issues; it should be an additional tool.²⁶

7.4.1 Prevention of new Conflicts

After decades of war, crises, and terrorism, Africa needs to establish stable governments over the continent in cooperation with the EU. The EU is willing to allocate support funds for this security. The budget for CPPB (conflict prevention and peacebuilding) was raised in the previous decade to 854 million Euros per year. More than a tenth of the EU-development budget for the period of 2014-2020 is reserved for conflict prevention, resolution, peace building, and security-related activities.²⁷ Peacebuilding shall face the roots of the problem rather than the symptoms, therefore, the EU is advised to use all the available tools.²⁸ In order to be more effective, the EU has to ensure a smooth transformation from peacemaking/peacebuilding to long-term peace and stability.²⁹

The following figure shows the transformation process from a hot conflict to long-term peace and stability.

24 Homepage African Union. URL: <https://au.int/>. [18-11-2019]. Passim.

25 Cf.: Homepage European Union. URL: https://europa.eu/european-union/index_de. [18-11-2019].

26 Cf.: Rehl, J. (2017). Op. cit. Page 106.

27 Cf.: Ibid. Page 187.

28 Cf.: Ibid. Page 188.

29 Cf.: Ibid. Page 189.




Figure 2: Process from peacemaking to long-term peace and stability.³⁰

7.4.2 Counter-Terrorism

The AU declares that it will intensify and promote the fight against terrorism with all necessary means. To enable this action, the cooperation has to intensify its efforts, for example by exchanging information, training in counter terrorism actions, and supporting the ongoing efforts in all sectors.³¹ Weak states, torn by wars and conflicts, are the perfect soil for terrorism.³² Such regions have to be prioritised by the CSDP. It is very important to add counter terrorism aspects in order to deal more effectively with these threats. As already mentioned, this approach points out that it is crucial to intensify the exchange of related information, counterterrorism enforcement, and the judiciary. These actions aim at removing the roots of terrorism, which are similar to the roots of migration, both of which require similar treatments.³³

8. Discussion of Results and personal Conclusions

In this chapter the author discusses pros and cons, presents his personal opinion, and concludes the essay. For this purpose and for a better understanding of the context, the research question is referred to.

8.1 Questions and Answers

Sub-question 1: Which are the key points of the current Common Security and Defence Policy between those two Unions?

As listed in chapter 8.1, the key points of this cooperation are

- To reach the announced goals.
- To strengthen the governments.
- To focus on the most important resource, human beings.

³⁰ Cf.: Ibid. Page 191.

³¹ Cf.: African Union & European Union. (2017). Final Declaration AU EU Summit. Investing in Youth for Accelerated Inclusive Growth and Sustainable Development. Côte d'Ivoire. Page 8.

³² Cf.: Rehr, J. (2017). Op. Cit. Page 116.

³³ Cf.: Ibid. Page 118.

These key points do not deal with the current problems; they rather enable Africa to create a better future for the next generations.

Sub-question 2: Which are the strategic ideas of the CSDP?

In combination with other tools of the EU, the CSDP ought to provide a safer world in a specific radius around Europe. Therefore, the Union is responsible for establishing stable governments in this specific area. Stable states go hand in hand with economic welfare. This welfare enables the governments to fight crises in their country and to establish a safe environment which the economic can grow in.

Sub-question 3: Which challenges does the AU have to face in the near future?

Africa has to deal with a major education problem; many of the well educated people leave Africa because there are fewer opportunities than elsewhere abroad. Everyone has his or her own specific expectations. If a person is well educated and an opportunity to enhance one's career pops up, he or she is likely to take it. In order to provide an atmosphere, where a thriving economic system can be established in, a strong and stable government is essential.

Sub-questions 4: Are there fields for improving the current strategy?

The moment one stops improving a strategy, a plan or even one's personality, he or she also stops moving forward. Improving or adopting does not mean to change a working system, it means to optimise it. Although failing seems to have a negative image, it does not mean one has failed to reach their aim. Having tried, often is more worth than not trying at all. There are many fields to work on, but in the author's opinion, both Unions must focus on the following two fields:

- Prevention of new conflicts to reduce emigration.
- Counter terrorism.

These goals are only achievable with strong and stable governments. Therefore, you need a strong partner, in this case the EU, which offers not only financial support but also manpower and information.

What is the best strategic Use of the Common Security and Defence Policy for EU-Africa Relations?

Throughout the previous chapters while answering the sub-questions, some key points appeared. Neither using force to fight terrorists, nor just donating money to the AU is enough. There is much more to do. Every paper or document that was published in the last decades has to be adopted and improved. The current paths are pointing towards productive approaches, but still there is room for improvement and fields, where the EU can optimise and upgrade their efforts. To launch missions and operations is the most necessary tool, because it enables the EU to create a stable government, fight terrorism, and establish a working economic system. In order to achieve this aim, the EU is well-advised to use the existing systems, try to establish a cooperation with the AU, find African solutions for African problems, and always have the people in the centre of their ambitions.

8.2 Personal Conclusion

To make our continent safer, the EU has to focus on stabilising the surrounding countries. This approach can be compared to security operations, where a Commanding Officer is responsible for creating a safe zone around his objective. The CSDP is an incredible wide-ranging tool. In the author's opinion it is one of the best tools to manage the problems of the present time. The responsible persons continue focussing their ambitions on supporting African efforts to create a better Africa. The CSDP does

not have to be replaced, it rather has to be improved, adapted, and continuously cleared from invalid components.

The Austrian government has to evaluate the consequences of the reduction of the defence budget carefully, as it will not only lose military skills, it will lose its international reputation as well. If the Austrian Military is no longer able to participate in EU operations, it will lose its position as one of the world's driving forces in the struggle against humanitarian, political, and governmental emergency situation, as well as its reputation that many brave men and women helped to build over the past decades.

9. Annexes

9.1 List of Abbreviations

AU.....	African Union
CSDP.....	Common Security and Defence Policy
CPPB.....	conflict prevention and peacebuilding
EAS.....	European Agency Service
ESDP.....	European Security and Defence Policy
EU.....	European Union
EUGS.....	European Union Global Strategy
EUTM.....	European Union Training Mission Mali
GPD.....	gross domestic product
MAF.....	Mali Armed Forces
PESCO.....	Permanent Structured Cooperation

9.2 List of Figures

Figure 1: Flowchart of the hermeneutical approach to answer the main question

Figure 2: Process from peacemaking to long-term peace and stability

9.3 List of Literature

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The effect of energy security on future Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations.

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Abstract

Due to the fact that The European Union relies mainly on energy import, the article addresses an important topic related to the energy security of the European Union by ensuring energy security for the countries that transit it. The Author outlines two significant states intermediating in the energy supply – Belarus and Ukraine. Furthermore, factors affecting energy security are presented, with details of phenomena such as political crises, civil, armed and economic conflicts. The author writes about the subjective, objective and spatial aspect of energy security. He also presents a document which orders the EU to act to ensure mentioned energy security. In the following part, planes are to be noted when organizing Common Security and Defence Policy missions and operations. The way in which the energy security of transit countries should be supported is also described, especially concerns political stability, diversity of supply, intensifying integration with Western Europe and making common effort in the technological issues. Factors listed above are to be considered in order to create future CSDP course of action.

Keywords:

energy import, energy security, transit countries, Belarus and Ukraine, future CSDP course of action

1. Preface

Nowadays everybody needs facilities like electricity, the Internet and transport based on fuel-powered vehicles, thus cutting off energy supplies would have a devastating effect on every human being's life from the individual to the large organizations. The future shape of the European Union depends, among others, on energy security, which has always had vital effect on many aspects of functioning of every country since energy security is becoming a key element of foreign policy. With the increase in demand and prices of energy, consumers are trying to conduct an effective and long-term strategy for the energy procurement. European countries suffer

from a lack of energy resources on their territory, that is the reason why both EU and the Member States are coming up with some activities focused on fulfilling own economies' power shortages mainly by import. Matching needs of the industry are converted into creating financial emancipation as well as conducive to the development surrounding for each citizen. Achieving energetic safety leads through Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations. These are centred on the idea of a comprehensive approach – taking into consideration a range of surfaces - political, economic and social factors to take care of security in various areas in the world. Accomplishing targets of the CSDP strategy should guarantee energy security for the EU and its Member States.

2. Introduction

European energy security is a complex definition and includes political, economic and ecological conditions, especially when the EU multidimensional character is investigated. It is often analysed as a component of economic security - can be understood as a situation in which the economy of a country is provided with the necessary supply of production factors for their functioning and development, including energy sufficiency¹. Thus, the energy sector directly affects the efficiency and competitiveness of Member States' economy². The economic dimension of energy security relates mainly to the costs of obtaining energy and continuity of supply³ since energy is a specific product because it must be available continuously, also in several political or economic situations and crises⁴ countries associated in the EU are facing. Lack of permanence in energy delivery is associated with high costs on the grounds of this the energy sector plays a fundamental role in shaping the efficiency and competitiveness of the economy, directly and indirectly affects the citizens' quality of life⁵. Thus, energy resources are treated as a strategic product. Intensified competition on the international market, the importance of the price of energy, which determines the level of customer's life, industrial competitiveness and economic growth, are continuously increasing⁶. Accordingly, the EU adopted conclusions on the priorities and principles for shaping policies that would lead to an energy transformation resulting in the creation of an affordable, secure, competitive, reliable and sustainable energy system⁷. It is widely agreed that the Union must operate also through CSDP to streamline the entire process of ensuring energy security for Member States.

There are numerous challenges which the EU and its CSDP are facing in terms of energy security, some of them are:

- Energy security of Ukraine and Belarus as transit countries⁸
- Preventing Russia from monopolizing the market of energy⁹
- Stabilization on the Middle East¹⁰

1 E. Haliżak, *Ekonomiczny wymiar bezpieczeństwa narodowego i międzynarodowego, bezpieczeństwo narodowe i międzynarodowe u schyłku XX wieku*, Warszawa 1997, p. 78 - 82

2 *Energy Security and CSDP: Energy Factor in the EU Military Missions and Operations*

3 A. Gradziuk, W. Lach, E. Posel-Cześćik, K. Sochacka, *Co to jest bezpieczeństwo energetyczne państwa? Kryteria bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego państwa*, Warszawa 2003, p. 76.

4 Ibidem p. 71.

5 Ibidem p. 71.

6 Ibidem p. 76.

7 <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/pl/policies/energy-union>

8 Z. Ślusarczyk, *The Energy Security of Countries, Siedlce 2012*, p. 117-119.

9 Ibidem p. 114.

10 Ionuț Alin CÎRDEI, *East Land Forces Academy Review Vol. XXII, No 2(86), Aspects regarding the energy security in the Middle East, Sibiu, Romania 2017*

- Normalization of relations with Iran¹¹
- Boosting African's states ideas of producing renewable energy¹²
- DSQ - Chinese transformation of Africa's energy(impact on CSDP)
- NordStream I and Nordstream II as cutting off possibilities for Easter EU states

This paper will not cover all of mentioned above difficulties in energy security matter, however it is advised to focus and provide proper solution to at least one.

3. The current state of research

3.1 Lisbon Treaty

Legal acts of the EU are determining the importance of energy security in the CSDP. Crucial meaning of ensuring energy efficiency and distribution, developing renewable sources of energy as well as promoting new energy networks favours CSDP initiative among other ways of conducting foreign politics¹³. According to the Lisbon Treaty main responsibility and control of national energy policy is being transferred from the national government to the EU. The other initiative is to include energy as one of the "shared competences" – Member States can operate only on policy areas that the Union has determined not to.¹⁴



Picture 1: Photo of heads of state, heads of government and ministers extensive proceedings after the signing ceremony (Lisbon, Portugal, December 13, 2007)¹⁵

11 <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-europe-usa/iran-urges-europe-to-normalize-economic-ties-with-it-or-face-consequences>[01.12.2019]

12 <https://www.irena.org/africa>[01.12.2019]

13 *Lisbon Treaty* (articles 42.2, 42.3, 194)

14 http://www.inforse.org/europe/eu_table_lisbon.htm [01.12.2019]

15 Archives of the Chancellery of the President of the Republic of Poland - www.prezydent.pl [01.12.2019]

3.2 CSDP current missions and operations¹⁶

- ALTHEA/BiH – European Union Force in BiH
- EU NAVFOR Somalia – Countering Piracy off the coast of Somalia
- EUAM Iraq – support of security sector reform in Iraq
- EUAM Ukraine – support of security sector reform in Ukraine
- EUBAM Libya – European Union Border Assistance Mission in Libya
- EUBAM Rafah – European Union Border Assistance Mission in Rafah
- *EUCAP Somalia* – European Union Capacity Building Mission in Somalia
- EUCAP Sahel Mali – European Union Capacity Building Mission in Mali
- EUCAP Sahel Niger – European Union Capacity Building Mission in Niger
- EULEX Kosovo – European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
- EUMM Georgia – European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia
- EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia – disrupting the activities of immigrant smugglers and human traffickers
- EUPOL COPPS/Palestinian Territories – the EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support
- EUTM RCA – Military training mission in Republic of Central Africa
- EUTM Somalia – Military training mission in Somalia
- EUTM Mali – Military training mission in Mali

3.3 Impact of instability on energy production

It is a commonly known fact that stabilization always has a positive impact on the economy, transit of resources and energy production. What is more, safe neighbourhood helps to conduct long-term strategies if the energy is examined too. Although none of Common Security and Defence Policy operations and missions is targeted mainly at solving energy supply issues – many of them contribute a lot to global and regional security¹⁷. Another advantageous effect flowing from CSDP activities is preventing armed conflicts or limiting range and repercussions already existing. Military conflicts have always been believed as destructive to one economy and demography, limiting the country's development¹⁸. Figures posted below show what conflict, unrest and lack of stability administers to energy production and GDP.

¹⁶ <https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations/430/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations> [01.12.2019]

¹⁷ R. H. Ginsberg et al., *The European Union in Global Security* © Roy H. Ginsberg and Susan E. Penksa 2012

¹⁸ <https://www.rp.pl/Gospodarka/306019988-Ile-na-wojnie-traci-gospodarka-Ukrainy.html> [01.12.2019]




Figure 1: Graph of GDP growth dynamics in Ukraine¹⁹




Figure 2: Iraq's total petroleum and other liquids production²⁰

19 <https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/UKR>

20 <https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.php?iso=IRQ>




Figure 3: Libya's total petroleum and other liquids production²¹




Figure 4: Syria's total petroleum and other liquids production²²

4. Research gap

Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) main principle is a comprehensive approach, thus a complex energy strategy is required to provide proper work of the EU's industry. The strategy's executive body could cooperate and rely on CSDP missions and operations to ensure the energy security of the Union. There are some missions and operations focused indirectly on energy supply matters, therefore it is highly recommended to consider what steps should be taken to maximize the positive influence on EU energy security by its CSDP.

21 <https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.php?iso=LBY>

22 <https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.php?iso=SYR>

5. Research questions

This article tries to – based on the current impact CSDP missions – predict the most efficient and necessary directions where in the course of ensuring the EU’s energy security. Moreover, it is targeted to predict which directions CSDP should turn to achieve the greatest benefits in the field of ensuring energy security for the Member States of the EU. Since there are plenty of solutions in this dimension – this paper will be focused on a few of them. This document has to provide answers to the following questions:

- How to provide energy security for Ukraine and Belarus?²³
- What is the condition and main treats for the energy security of transit countries?
- How to prevent interruptions of energy import?²⁴

The proper respond to problems mentioned above will reassure enough data to forecast how future CSDP missions and operations should look like in order to boost energy security throughout the European Union.

6. Methodology

In order to provide answers to questions mentioned in the 6-th part of this paper, the author uses data from various sources like the CSDP analyses, documents published by the European Commission, CSDP and Eurostat. To ensure the greatest possible data diversity and avoid subjectivity this essay also contains a variety of information published on the Internet as well as publications gathered in the Military University of Technology’s library.

7. Research and results of research

7.1 European dependence on energy import


Member States rely in most cases on the import of the energy, thus ensuring safe supply is a matter of the highest concern. Likewise, the process of losing energy self-reliance is proceeding, therefore the EU course of action should include securing its import routes to prevent situations of being cut off energy. Such situations would have a destructive effect on the economy.²⁵

23 Łukasz Wojcieszak *Polska, Ukraina i Białoruś wobec problemu dostaw i tranzytu rosyjskiego gazu* Bielsko-Biała 2013

24 <https://science.sciencemag.org/content/211/4489/1379>

25 http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=183:energy-security-as-national-security-defining-problems-ahead-of-solutions1&catid=92:issuecontent&Itemid=341


Energy dependency rate (%)



Source: Eurostat

Figure 5: EU states energy dependency rate(%)²⁶

One of the most important indicators to be assessed the country's energy security is an indicator of energy self-sufficiency, and therefore the largest are the possibilities to cover the country's energy needs through own extraction, the greater energy security. The opposite is true when using the import dependency indicator, the higher the indicator, the huger dependence on external energy supplies, As a result less energy security of the state. As Europe relies on Russian Gas CSDP course of action should include securing allocations routes.



Picture 2: Western Europe countries dependency on Russian gas.²⁷


²⁶ <http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submitViewTableAction.do>

²⁷ <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/07/why-ukraine-is-central-to-europe-s-energy-security/>

7.2 Ukraine and Belarus role as transit countries.

Yamal, Soyuz, Northern Lights and Brotherhood currently are the most significant pipelines as the energy security of Europe is considered. Listed connections are crossing Ukraine and Belarus both countries are believed to have a major impact to ensure safe import of primary energy from Russia to Europe. As a consequence the EU relies mostly on gas and oil, it is advised to monitor the policy and stability of transit countries.²⁸

EU cannot negate the key role of Belarus and Ukraine in the process of supplying the European energy market.



Picture 3: A gas pipeline network of the European continent.²⁹

7.2.1 Ukraine's role in energy transit should be decreased.

Ukraine is one of the most important countries transiting gas to Europe because of owning several pipelines. The *Northern Lights* and *Yamal-Europe* are two main elements of providing energy from Russia to Europe. The summed capacity of these connections is estimated at 84 billion cubic meters per year. Facilities contributing much to European energy security due to being main energy import routes to Western Europe are also pipelines *Soyuz* and *Brotherhood* as their total capacity is believed to reach 150 billion cubic meters per year.³⁰ It is widely agreed that alternative pipelines are not sufficient to manage the transport of enough amount of fuel powering Member States economies. That makes Ukraine a key player in the energy market. Being an unstable state in the same time creates risk in the energy security.

28 <https://biznesalert.pl/pgnig-opal-tsue-gaz/>

29 <https://Southfront.org>

30 <https://thesaker.is/a-network-of-power-gas-pipelines-of-the-european-continent-infographics/>

Table 1: Russian gas exported to Europe - transit dependence on Ukraine(billion of barrels per year)³¹**Russian gas exports to Europe: transit dependence on Ukraine by country (2013-14)**

Countries	Exports, 2013 (Total)	Exports, 2014 (Total)	Exports, 2014 (LTSCs)
<i>Countries receiving <u>all</u> their Russian gas imports via Ukraine</i>			
Italy	25.3	21.7	21.7
Austria	5.2	4.2	3.9
Greece	2.6	1.7	1.7
Bulgaria	2.9	2.8	2.8
Hungary	6.0	5.4	5.4
Romania	1.4	0.5	0.3
Slovakia	5.5	4.4	4.4
Czech Republic*	7.9	4.76	4.76
Slovenia	0.5	0.4	0.4
Croatia**	0.2	0.2	0.2
Serbia	2.0	1.5	1.4
FYROM	0.1	0.1	0.1
Bosnia & Herzegovina	0.2	0.2	0.2
Sub-total	59.8	47.86	47.26
<i>Countries receiving <u>some</u> of their Russian gas imports via Ukraine</i>			
France***	8.6	7.6	7.1
Poland	12.9	9.1	9.1
Turkey	26.7	27.3	27.3
Sub-total	48.2	44	43.5

7.2.2 Belarus' role in energy transit should be increased.

Rights to control the energy transmitting infrastructure were sold to Gazprom in 2011³² thus it is difficult to anticipate the real value of Belarusian role in energy supply. Russia by its companies uses pipeline *Yamal-Europe*, which capacity allows transport about 20 percent of Russia's gas to the EU. Gazprom was willing to sell gas to Belarus for just \$0,165 per cubic meter starting in 2012, while EU and Ukraine's customers were charged twice more. The same volume average sale price was then \$0,4 in Western Europe. Although all these difficulties mentioned above Belarus still can cut the flow of fuels off, since the pipeline is located on its territory.³³ A role of CSDP is to deepen integration with Belarus – mainly by selling technology, sending experts and relieving energy security risk.

31 Simon Pirani and Katja Yafimava, *Russian Gas Transit Across Ukraine Post-2019: pipeline scenarios, gas flow consequences, and regulatory constraints*, The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2016

32 <https://www.france24.com/en/20111125-russias-gas-deal-power-putin-belarus-pipeline-ukraine-lukashenko-moscow>

33 <https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/26/world/europe/in-deal-with-belarus-russia-gets-control-of-yamal-europe-pipeline.html>



Picture 4: Oil refineries, oil and gas pipelines in Belarus³⁴

7.3 Deepening EU's relations with Belarus and Ukraine.

Both the Union and Member States relations with two countries presented above are areas of the largest impact while energy supply is considered. Maintaining proper diplomacy with transit countries could be an influent factor of energy security.³⁵

Future CSDP missions and operations are to be focused on the matter of building trust among EU and transit countries.

³⁴ Wikipedia.pl - Homoatrox own work

³⁵ http://yadda.icm.edu.pl/yadda/element/bwmeta1.element.desklight-d4140d71-7a04-462c-b15e-bf76222e91ad/c/02_31.pdf



Picture 5: Major pipelines leading to EU with its flow³⁶

The map posted above shows the importance of transit countries and possible loss of energy supply for the EU in case of cutting off the flow by Belarus or Ukraine.

7.3.1 European Union's current relations with Ukraine are constantly improving.³⁷

Bilateral relations of EU and Ukraine are centred around the idea of the association agreement, which came into force on 1st September 2017, means tightening both political and economic bonds but also respecting each other values, history and culture. The deep and comprehensive free trade area (DCFTA) offers an option for Ukraine's economy and trade. EU-Ukraine Summit as a tool to advance in mutual commitment includes planning the future and evaluating past activities on the various areas. There are several ways to assist Ukraine, some of them are already active:

- Financial support
- Introduction autonomous trade rights
- CSDP mission to help Ukraine reform civilian security system
- The imposition of sanctions on Russia due to annexation of Crimea

36 https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Oil-and-Gas-Pipelines-from-Russia-note-approximately-half-go-through_fig5_326426407

37 <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eastern-partnership/ukraine/>

7.3.2 Are European Union's relations with Belarus neglected?³⁸

The Republic of Belarus is a part of the Union State of Russia and Belarus.³⁹ EU is making an effort to foster its relations with Belarus by a variety of assets, but there is yet a long road ahead. Main principles are focused on deepening democratic standards as well as taking restrictive measures targeted to limit suspicious activities like unresolved disappearances, interrupting free elections or abusing human rights.⁴⁰ Methods taken into consideration to improve relations with Belarus include:

- Multilateral technical cooperation
- Supporting democratic reforms
- Dialogue including technical issues
- Launching negotiations on visa and a mobility partnership
- CSDP missions including sending experts to develop technology

7.4 Energy sector in Belarus and Ukraine and its threats.

It is advised to present both Belarusian and Ukrainian energy sector data as it could help to anticipate if a CSDP mission is needed. If so – what should be the main aim of such a mission and what would be the prospect effect of deploying a mission.

7.4.1 Energy sector in Ukraine and its threats.

The energy sector is an important industry of Ukraine, a set of subsystems used to convert, distribute and use all types of energy resources. Its purpose aims to ensure the production of energy by converting primary, natural energy into secondary, for example, into electric or thermal energy. It is based on the use of traditional types of thermal and hydroelectric power plants, with a deviation from global statistics towards greater use of nuclear power plants. Most of the existing energy facilities were created by the efforts of energy specialists of the Ukrainian SSR and currently requires modernization. The development of the electric power industry stimulates the creation of new industrial units. Some industries are geographically close to sources of cheap electricity, for instance, non-ferrous metallurgy. Electricity in Ukraine is generated mainly at thermal power plants, hydroelectric power stations, PSPs and nuclear power plants.⁴¹

Areas of the largest risk considering Ukrainian energy security are mentioned below:

- Matters related to the Ukrainian Crisis in 2014⁴²
- Corruption among national companies⁴³
- The physical condition of the pipelines⁴⁴
- Unstable government⁴⁵
- Phenomenon of “reversed flow”⁴⁶

38 <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eastern-partnership/belarus/>

39 <http://mfa.gov.by/en/courtiers/russia/>

40 <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/02/25/belarus-sanctions/>

41 <https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.php?iso=UKR>

42 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukrainian_crisis

43 <http://www.antykorupcja.gov.pl/ak/analizy-i-raporty/rankingi-korupcji/13083,Indeks-Percepcji-Korupcji-2018.html>


44 <https://www.oxfordenergy.org/publications/russian-gas-transit-across-ukraine-post-2019-pipeline-scenarios-gas-flow-consequences-and-regulatory-constraints/?v=9b7d173b068d>

45 <https://www.obserwatorfinansowy.pl/forma/rotator/ukraina-na-progu-totalnej-prywatyzacji/>

46 <https://www.dw.com/en/slovakia-opens-reverse-flow-pipeline-to-carry-gas-to-ukraine/a-17895333>

larus in cases such as:⁵⁰

- Low geopolitical diversification of energy import
- Possible restrictions of energy import from Russia due to political factors
- The emergence of alternative energy supply routes
- Relying mainly on natural gas
- Poor per capita specific electricity production
- Increased imbalance due to launching a nuclear power plant consumption



Picture 7: Structure of primary energy production by-product in 2017.⁵¹

7.4.3 Dealing with treats for transit countries energy security.

A crucial threat to the energy security of the EU is the fact that the main, and often the only supplier of energy from the eastern direction is Russia through pipelines through Ukraine and Belarus. Coping with the problem of providing energy security of both transit countries should assume, above all, increased integration with Western Europe, help in reforming civil security services, dealing with the problem of corruption and undemocratic governance. As for Belarus, the issue of neutralizing political tools for Russia's influence on it is another important platform for strengthening the security of supply. An essential element of the comprehensive effort for energy security in the European Union should also include the solution to the problem of low diversification of supply - for example, by developing renewable energy sources in Belarus or nuclear energy. Considering Ukraine - this state requires stabilization,

50 A. Mikhalevich, I. Filiutsch, *Monitoring of energy security of the Republic of Belarus* Institute of Power Engineering, Laboratory of Energy Security, Minsk, Belarus

51 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/European_Neighbourhood_Policy_-_East_-_energy_statistics

calming the unrest and stopping the armed conflict in the eastern part of the country. Due to situation with the Russian Federation EU should make some effort to work out new longterm contract offered to Ukraine.⁵² The assistance should also include offering technology to Ukraine to use its gas deposits.⁵³

8. Discussion of results and personal conclusions

8.1 EU Challenges

The EU has been energy dependent for many years, as a significant part of its energy comes from imports - mainly via pipelines through Ukraine and Belarus. This fact carries a lot of threats, as no European institution has direct control over what happens with energy in the countries that transit it. The European Union and CSDP face a serious challenge of ensuring energy security for the Member States through the energy security of the countries that transit this energy - Ukraine and Belarus. Moreover, these countries are far from being reliable partners in democratic dimension, not to mention relying on them in the energy security of Western Europe - and thus also the lives of every EU's citizen.

8.2 EU Answers

The idea of the Eastern Partnership, under which the EU conducts its policy towards its eastern neighbors, leads to closer relationships, building trust and economic ties, also helps to deal with threats to the stability of transit countries. Energy security as a pillar of European Security and Defence Policy is supported by missions and operations that will have a positive, long-term effect on ensuring the continuity of energy distribution to Europe. Along with the diversification of energy sources, ensuring security for suppliers will contribute to the balanced development of every branch of the economy in the member states of the European Union.

8.3 Road toward security

The key importance of energy security is a well-known and well-developed topic both globally and locally. Constant access to energy allows almost every industry to operate. The European Union and its organs work to ensure energy security for the organization and individual Member States. CSDP missions and operations take into account the increased stability of transit countries, the diversification of energy supplies, counteracting restrictions on energy imports, as well as the threats arising from the possible termination of energy supplies due to random factors.

52 <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-gas-russia/ukraine-wants-long-term-gas-transit-deal-with-russia-idUSKBN1WO1KQ>

53 <https://energypost.eu/increasing-production-of-gas-in-ukraine/>

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Table 1: Russian gas exported to Europe - transit dependence on Ukraine(billion of barrels per year)

9.4 List of literature

9.4.1 EU Documents

01. Energy Security and CSDP: Energy Factor in the EU Military Missions and Operations
02. *Lisbon Treaty (articles 42.2, 42.3, 194)*

9.4.2 Papers

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02. Gradziuk, W. Lach, E. Posel-Cześcik, K. Sochacka, *Co to jest bezpieczeństwo energetyczne państwa? Kryteria bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego państwa*, Warszawa 2003, p. 76.
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THE USE OF THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY (CSDP) MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS TO ATTRACT POTENTIAL PARTNERS IN ASIA

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Abstract

The EU and Asia are now established partners. The time in which they were defined as two distant, totally opposite worlds is far away. Many things have changed in a century of history, and they will still change; the link between these large areas will not cease to exist because there are many points in common and objectives to be pursued together. Asia is a territory of massive investments by the EU and its member countries, the Asian market has a very large economic area and Europe in some areas imposes itself as the first investing force. However, this presence on the territory is not one-sided but in the same way the Asian powers also invest in European territories. Integration between these two countries works already not only in the social and technological fields but also, and above all, in the political / military one. Everything shows how this issue is very dear to both forces, from the EU-Asian alliance to involvement in operations on Asian territories to ensure security and support for defence, as happened in Indonesia; and today, like never before, the cooperation is essential and necessary to achieve international goals and ensure peace. EU and Asia are two apparently opposite worlds, but closer and closer. “The time when Europeans and Asians could consider themselves distant friends is over. To preserve and strengthen our economic exchanges we must also work together on global security”¹

1. Preface

The Common Security and Defense Policy has been committed for years to ensuring a foreign defense policy, thanks to bilateral and multilateral partnerships with large global organizations and associations. The birth of the CSDP is the result of years of development, from the Maastricht treaty where the then CFDP had a similar role to what it now competes for. The main objective of European policy is not only to launch partnerships at military level, but the concept is extended to the most disparate areas to respond promptly to the challenges and needs that the globalized world leads to sustain. There are many

1 Speech of EU High Representative Federica Mogherini, “Europe and Asia – together for a more secure world”. Bruxelles, 28-05-2018

different operations initiated by the CSDP, including training missions in Africa, offshore operations with “oceanic partners” and the increasingly necessary collaboration with the ASEAN, Association of South-East Asian Nations. This type of research, which analyses the stages of development and the skills of the CSDP at international level, is useful for understanding the complexity of international relations, the complexity of managing situations affecting Europe and its partners. This study made me understand the efficiency of a globalized world, of a world without barriers and collaborative. Asia and Europe are different worlds both for politics, for culture, and for history. Not many years ago Asia, as it happened for Africa, was subjugated to the European expansion, not long ago Europe controlled the markets and the politics of great Asian states, but, despite this, today the World allows these two realities, not only to be independent in their own territories, but also to coexist and share objectives and goals for the well-being of their territory and of the whole world. This is the magnitude of the common policy.

2. Introduction

A common defense and security policy of Europe was designed for the first time in 1993 with the Treaty of Maastricht. It was part of the three pillars, the base of European Community. Following the Treaty of Amsterdam, in 1999, the CSDP was modified with the establishment of the High Representative for the CSDP and, in 2001 it was decided to strengthen the decision-making mechanisms for the successive enlargements to new states. The Lisbon Treaty in 2007 defined the CSDP as we know it today; in particular, the number of missions in which the Union can resort to military and civilian means has been extended, and it is envisaged that the Council, unanimously, can entrust their implementation to a group of Member States (Article 44 TEU). The prohibition on creating enhanced cooperation is eliminated and it is envisaged the possibility that Member States wishing to make more binding commitments in this area will achieve a “permanent structured cooperation” (PESCO), subject to a decision adopted by qualified majority by the Council. The participating Member States agreed on a list of 17 projects, covering areas such as training, development of operational terrestrial, maritime and air capabilities, as well as cyber defense. 11 November 2019 The Council announced another 13 projects to be launched within the framework of PESCO. Overall, 47 projects currently exist. Almost totally focused on strengthening EU collaborative actions and developing maritime, air and space capabilities.

Unlike the general provisions for enhanced cooperation, “the Lisbon Treaty does not provide for a minimum number of countries participating in permanent structured cooperation”. The need for Europe to adopt an international policy is given by the new international challenges on the political, social and military scene which, with other problems such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of destruction mass, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime, have pushed the EU security policy strategy towards the need to establish three strategic objectives, achievable with collaboration and integration of member countries’ security policies, as well as with some international civil and military partners.

The three objectives are:

- to face the threats: militarily less visible than in the Cold War (in some cases there are organizations that are not purely military and that therefore require a more massive effort and collaboration), but even different ones such as cyber-attacks, energy security, changes climate;
- to guarantee security outside Europe, the Caucasus, the Middle East, the Mediterranean, the Balkans;
- to create an international order based on effective multilateralism.

The main partner of the EU in terms of security is undoubtedly NATO, this is also shown by the joint declaration of 18 July 2018 in Brussels which reads: “We welcome EU efforts to bolster European security and defence to better protect the Union and its citizens and to contribute to peace and stability in the neighbourhood and beyond..”², and still, the following day of the NATO summit, European Council President Donald Tusk said: “President Trump, America has not and will not have a better ally than Europe. Today, Europeans spend far more for defense than Russia and China. I think, Mr President, that you cannot doubt that this is an investment in the common American and European defense”³.

At the international level, the CSDP is open to collaborations with regional and international organizations because of it recognizes the importance of a comprehensive approach and seeks collaboration and sharing of knowledge and skills useful for achieving the objectives. Not only NATO, therefore, but also UN, OSCE, the African Union and ASEAN, Association of South-East Asian Nations, that is a regional organization of Southeast Asia.

3. Current state of research

From 2007 to 2013, the geographic distribution of funds allocated under the IfS Crisis Response envelope (Art. 3) was 34 % to Africa, 34 % to Middle East and North Africa, 17 % to Asia and Pacific, 9 % to Latin America and the Caribbean, 5 % to Central Asia and South Caucasus, and 1 % to Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans.⁴

The csdp shows a real interest in starting an external policy on its borders, as shown by the percentages of the allocated funds. A given percentage, however, should not be misleading because 5% of the funds allocated to central Asia doesn't mean a lack of collaboration with that continent.

The following is a factsheet of European External Action Service: “With European prosperity and Asian peace and security closely connected, the European Union has decided to strengthen its security cooperation in and with Asia. This is also in line with the steps taken by the EU in the past years to strengthen its role as a global security provider: Europe and Asia share a fundamental interest in upholding the rules-based international system, as well as the view that the challenges the world faces today go beyond national borders and cannot be tackled alone. The EU-Asia security partnership is therefore both desirable and necessary”⁵. The following report expresses even more the strategic proximity of the EU with Asia and the sharing of international objectives and strategies that bring the two continents to a partnership that will last over time. Meanwhile, every year, to strengthen and improve the points of discussion and closeness between the two continents, a meeting is held, named EU-central Asia ministerial meeting, which on 7 July 2019 has reached its 15th edition in Bishkek (Kyrgyz Republic). There were The Foreign Ministers of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan, as well as the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission, and they didn't hesitate to express special gratitude to the High Representative Federica Mogherini for her significant contribution to the development of the cooperation between the European Union and Central Asia during her period in office.⁶

2 Joint declaration on EU-NATO cooperation, 10 July 2018

3 NATO summit, Brussels, 11-12 July 2018

4 Handbook on csdp missions and operations.

5 Brussels 17/10/2019 - 10:07 Factsheets EU Asia Security.

6 https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/65107/15th-eu-central-asia-foreign-ministers-meeting-bishkek-7-july-2019-joint-communiqué-eu-and_en

Here it was reaffirmed their commitment to work together for common goals such as peace, security, human rights, democracy and sustainable development. Currently there are no CSDP missions in the Asian territories. The image shown below defines the missions still open in international territories.




Figure 1: Missioni CSDP in atto.

1st of Jan 2015 was archived on the Aceh Monitoring Mission – AMM in Indonesia. This mission was designed to monitor the implementation of various aspects of the peace agreement set out in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by the Government of Indonesia Free Aceh Movement (GAM) on 15 August 2005. “The mission comprised personnel with expertise in the whole range of competencies needed to fulfil the tasks of the mission. AMM was a civilian and not a military mission. Its members did not carry weapons. Some monitors had a military background as this was necessary to perform certain technical tasks required by the mission. All monitors wore recognisable white shirts with AMM logo. Monitors conducted their monitoring tasks by patrolling and communicating with both parties, and by carrying out inspections and investigations as required.

The costs of the mission were financed from the EU budget (EUR 9.3 million) and by contributions of EU Member States and participating countries (EUR 6 million).⁷

4. Research gap

It is not easy to outline the international political situation and the alliances that are formed. World stability has always been created with agreements and wars between great powers that, based on their own needs, have influenced the decisions of other countries. Today the international situation is weaker than a few years ago. Although Europe is going through decades of relative peace, this does not mean that we should not engage internationally. Not by chance, in fact, the creation of a common security and defense policy clearly defines the European will and the complexity of the global challenges that it is facing. In a world like the contemporary one, full of differences and conflicts, a single state or group of states cannot work alone and claim to solve the problems that arise, but a common front is needed to analyse the common challenges and objectives and fight together to reach them. EU and Asia were totally discordant and separate worlds that, today, have made an important and functional partnership,

⁷ EU council secretariat ~background~ “EU monitoring mission in Aceh (Indonesia)”

through the sharing of skills and characteristics of both sides, from cybersecurity to military. This is a partnership that demonstrates the absence of territorial boundaries in terms of world security and defense. Although the international action of Europe is always closer to the Asian one, reinforced by pacts and organizations, it cannot be defined with certainty what the future objectives will be, neither if this approach will be more intense or will be dispelled due to the global needs of a near future.

The international balance is changeable, as are partnerships and alliances.

5. Research questions

- How many missions does the CSDP currently have?
- In which of these missions an Asian country is?
- In which areas EU and Asia can collaborate?
- Why is international collaboration necessary to ensure common security and defense?

6. Methodology

All the information reported in the essay are the result of the study of articles and texts concerning the topic of common security and defense policy. The essay is reworked based on my skills and my critical vision of the subject. I analysed the structure of the CSDP, how it was born and how it developed over the years. Later I described what are the missions launched by the CSDP at the international level and I focused on all those operations and activities carried out to approach the Asian world. I described the points in common and the projects launched over the years by the EU to operate in Asia and with Asian partners in order to face all the challenges and objectives in common on the world scene to guarantee security and defense.

7. Research and results of research

7.1 CSDP missions

The EU currently has 17 civilian and military missions around the world, one of which, Moldova and Ukraine, is not managed by CSDP structures: missions range from military ones, in which the armed forces are formed and trained, such as in Mali; to those civilians where for example the Ukrainian and Iraqi authorities are joined to reform their civil security sectors; until the fight on the seas to defeat piracy in the Indian Ocean and guarantee freedom of navigation. In 2018 a Permanent Structured Cooperation was launched, an EU initiative in the field of the common security and defense policy aimed at the structural integration of the armed forces of 25 of the 28 member states; it is based on Article 42.6 ("Member States that meet higher criteria in terms of military capabilities and have signed more binding commitments on the subject for more demanding missions establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union"⁸) and on Protocol 10 of the Treaty on European Union.

⁸ Treaty on EU, article 42.6

PESCO is like enhanced cooperation, because of it does not require the adherence of all member states to be started. Therefore, it is working hard to become an even more credible and reliable security provider. The challenges that the world proposes are always new and difficult to foresee, the international situation is changeable and also the CSDP must adapt to this through investments and practical projects, from the rapid response to cyber-attacks to innovative systems for maritime security, to an European training center for troops intervening in the event of natural disasters. The High Representative also proposed to establish a new fund, outside the EU budget, to help strengthen the security capabilities of our partners. The EU is now a powerful actor on the world stage, just think that the EU and its Member States have the second largest defense budget in the world, and this shows how immense the potential for development and collaboration in the field of defense and security policy.

7.2 European CSDP and Asian partner

2007 was characterized by substantial progress in relations between the EU and Central Asia, with the adoption, at the European Council in June, of an EU strategy for Central Asia. The strategy aims to focus EU priorities on seven main issues:

- human rights and the rule of law
- good governance and democratization
- education and youth
- economic progress
- energy and transport connections
- security and stability
- environment

The strategy provides the tools and funding for projects in these areas, as well as the visibility and effectiveness of EU activities in the area. From that year, and from the first commitment in the Asian territory of the EU to support and guarantee the peace process of Aceh in Indonesia in 2005, cooperation on security matters in Asia and with Asia has expanded to include other different areas:

- computer security
- anti terrorism
- non-proliferation

as well as massive support for peace processes throughout the region, from Afghanistan to Mindanao to Myanmar. The partnership with Asia also means collaboration and support in those missions that the EU with the CSDP implements in different international areas. For example, there have been concrete contributions from several Asian partners to combat piracy off the coast of Somalia. In the context of the ASEAN Regional Forum, EU is working together with Vietnam and Australia on maritime security. Furthermore, contacts with Asian countries are increasing, such as the discussions between the head of the EU military committee and its counterparts in Beijing, Islamabad and Seoul. But the most urgent issue for EU-Asia security cooperation at this historical moment remains de-nuclearization.

In a speech by the high representative of the European Union, Federica Mogherini, the EU's interest in supporting the actions and projects in this area and to save the Iranian nuclear agreement and the de-nuclearization of the Korean peninsula was reiterated.

This was reiterated despite the use of a submarine ballistic missile by North Korea in October 2019. This pushes even more towards collaboration with Asian partners who initiate projects and policies that share these ideals. China is a signatory to the joint global action plan, which is fundamental for global efforts to achieve the complete, verifiable and irreversible de-nuclear power of the Korean peninsula.

Similarly, Japan and the Republic of Korea have an important role in ensuring that the nuclear deal with Iran is preserved and that the Korean peninsula is dis-nucleated. Global peace requires a global effort. It is precisely the global effort that must push us to move to new actions.

The EU will expand its cooperation with Asian partners in additional areas such as:

- capacity building
- training programmes – including on UN peacekeeping –
- joint exercises

Cooperation is essential for peace and peace brings prosperity. We must fight the unitarisms and the political ones that too often seek the good of their own state in the immediate, not analysing the benefits that instead a multidimensional and multilateral policy would bring in the long term. Those who believe in this must unite and fight together to respond to the crises that the modern world proposes, and “the EU and Asia, together, can be the engine of a more cooperative approach to world politics.”⁹

7.3 The Korean provocation

On October 3, 2019, North Korea tested a submarine ballistic missile, a Pukguksong-3, launched in portrait mode. These types of launches are more dangerous because they are difficult to detect and therefore require longer times to react. All this has annoyed the United States and the European allies who, frightened by a possible undetectable nuclear threat, have asked for explanations from Korea on the principle of dis-nuclearization of the peninsula that has been in negotiation for some time.

The EU, through a Statement by the spokesperson Maja KOČIJCANČIĆ, Spokesperson for the Foreign Air and Security Policy, the day after the launch, reiterated the difficulty in achieving that program of complete decommissioning of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs on the Korean peninsula in order to guarantee a prolonged peace process and has made itself available to support international efforts to find a diplomatic solution.

7.4 High Representative met with the Minister of National Defence of Viet Nam.

The diplomatic relations between the European Union and Vietnam were started for the first time in 1990. The following years the partnership and global cooperation agreement took place in 2016, the signing of the European Union-Vietnam free trade agreement (EVFTA) and the investment protection agreement (IPA) in 2019, for greater multilateral collaboration on security and defense. As regards cooperation on crisis management, both sides accept an agreement establishing a framework for Vietnam’s participation in EU crisis management operations. Cooperation between the two countries also extends to distant areas up to a few years ago, such as safety and freedom of navigation, and the necessary cybersecurity, through collaborations in the field of information security. These agreements will lead to periodic meetings to show the effective implementation of the agreed rules and points. The meeting, which took place in August 2019, and the EU’s proximity to Vietnam is part of the project of collaboration with the East to face global challenges, but it is also a far-sighted political action aimed at ensuring a collaborative continuity between the EU and ASEAN, of which Vietnam will win the presidency in 2020.

⁹ Speech of Federica Mogherini. Bruxelles, 28-05-2018

8. Discussion of results and personal conclusions

Throughout history, armed conflicts and wars almost entirely concerned the states and their governments which, due to political ideologies or economic interests, challenged the rival to beat in the field. In the contemporary age, the one following the end of the cold war, this type of war is no longer present. According to a report by Uppsala University, world conflicts since 1989 are mainly intra-states, between governments and secessionist groups that claim to assert their ideologies. The war is no longer fought in a battlefield with stable and precise boundaries, but, as the two Chinese colonels Liang and Xiangsui say in their book “War without limits. The art of asymmetric warfare between terrorism and globalization”, the war has turned into a war without limits. If wars or conflicts are undefined and increasingly present in society, the defense and security action must be more widespread. The battlefield today is everywhere. Everyone can, by picking up a rifle or driving a van, be an actor in a war that is unlikely to end in a short time. If the real boundaries of the battlefield have expanded throughout society, this is also true for virtual boundaries. In a world like ours, always connected and interconnected, a cybernetic attack could bring to its knees a State that bases its organization on technological capabilities and comfort. Faced with the uncertainties of the contemporary world, the themes of security and defense are beginning to be at the top of international agendas. For these reasons no state can claim to start a defense policy autonomously, but it is necessary to share the capacities, knowledge and personnel between the different states to face the difficulties of new conflicts and new global challenges. The Islamic state, the nuclear threat, piracy, the cyberattack, these are just some of the international problems I mentioned in my essay and that international organizations must defeat, together, for a better world. As I wrote in the introduction, Europe has launched 47 international projects for security and defense, and represents not only an example to follow for the global partners, but also a point of reference for all those who really want to uproot the rot in the world and bring more security. With these premises, the Asian countries are proving to be solid allies and the joint activities, together with the common projects, are proving it.

9. Annexes

9.1 List of Abbreviations

CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
EU.....	European Union
CFDP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
TEU	Treaty on European Union
PESCO	Permanent Structured Cooperation
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
UNØ	United Nations
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
ASEAN	Association of South-East Asian Nations
IFS	Instrument for Stability
AMM	Aceh Monitoring Mission

MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
GAM	Government of Indonesia Free Aceh Movement
EVFTA	European Union Vietnam Free Trade Agreement
IPA	Investment protection agreement

9.2 List of Figures

Figure 1: On-going CSDP missions and operations.

9.3 List of Literature

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